

COMMENTARY

DE GAULLE IN POWER

The Fifth Republic in the Mirror of History

H. STUART HUGHES

AMONG the various anecdotes, authentic or *bien trouvées*, that circulated in Paris this summer, the one that best expressed the country's perplexities ran as follows: an old friend of de Gaulle's, not currently associated with the government, came to call on the new Prime Minister; on taking his leave he was amazed to find André Malraux, reputed to be de Gaulle's closest collaborator, literally throwing himself upon him with the anxious query, "You who know the General so well, tell me, what does he really think?"

During the weeks between the installation of de Gaulle's government in late May and the announcement of the new constitution in early August, the whole of France was

GENERAL DE GAULLE's coming to power has revived the discussion around the French political tradition. Here, H. STUART HUGHES sketches the background of authoritarian rule in France, and appraises de Gaulle's political conception of France and of his own role in the light of history, as well as the attitudes of various leaders and groups in France and Algeria to de Gaulle and the solution of the present crisis. Professor Hughes, who teaches history at Harvard, is the author of *Consciousness and Society*, a study in European political thought since 1890 which Knopf will issue this month. He is a frequent contributor to COMMENTARY, whose August number carried an exchange by him on Catholicism and democracy with Professor Michael Fogarty.

asking itself the same question. The revolutionary change had been accomplished—what the political experts had dismissed as impossible had in fact occurred—but the outlines of the new regime were far from clear. The country was living suspended between two eras, with the Fourth Republic obviously dead, but the Fifth still to be defined. In Paris the commissions elaborating the new institutions and the new policy worked long and earnestly—no holidays for them. The rest of the French elite simply went off on vacation.

It was a strange and most unrevolutionary atmosphere. There was as little apparent enthusiasm as there was militant or organized protest. The dominant mood seemed to be one of acceptance tinged with anxiety. In the dead weeks that extended from the Fourteenth of July—a holiday celebrated this year with unprecedented official orchestration and expense—to the beginning of the autumn electoral season, the French held their breath and hoped for the best. Their fate, they knew, had largely been taken out of their hands. With all other possibilities foreclosed, they had played their last card. And the most disquieting thing was that nobody knew exactly what this card was worth.

Hence all the obvious parallels and precedents were as likely as not inapplicable. The American journalists who found reassur-

ance in de Gaulle, and pictured him as the restorer of orderly administration, might be as far or farther astray than the Italians who quite understandably, in terms of their own experience, compared him to Mussolini. Both tended to simplify an enormously complex situation. All that was clear to everybody was that the French had entrusted themselves to a *man*—rather than to an idea, an institution, or a party. In this situation, a “cult of personality” was unavoidable, however distasteful it might be to the majority of Frenchmen. Or—to quote Malraux’s Fourteenth of July declaration—“Some want the Republic without General de Gaulle, as others want . . . de Gaulle without the Republic. But France . . . wants the Republic *with* . . . de Gaulle.” As an ideological definition for the vacation season, that had to suffice.

Thus any effort to place the new dispensation, to situate the France of de Gaulle in political and historical perspective, must start with an assessment of the General himself. Even this narrower task has its inextricable complexities. For de Gaulle as a historical figure has appeared in two quite different capacities: his original bright image is blurred with a second image of more doubtful character. From 1940 to 1945 he was the lone fighter for freedom, the man who gradually succeeded in rallying to his cause the vast majority of the public-spirited and the politically articulate—and thereby restored to the French people their national self-esteem. Two years later, however, he reappeared as the leader of a faction, a political partisan who, under the guise of reuniting the French, in fact divided them still further. This second effort, of course, ended in failure. But its highly chequered existence altered beyond recognition the original meaning of the terms “Gaullism” and “Gaullist.” In the war and Resistance years these had come to suggest a militant republicanism—a spirit and a constituency that were quasi-socialist in character. After 1947, Gaullism was distinctly a movement of the right, with a large proportion of its adherents drawn from the former following of

Pétain. By 1953, when the General gave his followers their “freedom of action” and withdrew from the leadership of his Rally of the French People, little seemed left of his original reputation and prestige. In this perspective, his triumphant return five years later appears all the more surprising.

FORTUNATELY for his historical repute (and for the peace of mind of those who are currently seeking to understand him) de Gaulle occupied the half decade of his retirement with the composition of two stout volumes of memoirs. From these there emerges once again a figure of large dimensions—of a stubborn consistency through all his changes of following and fortune. A few very simple ideas, we see, have been the mainsprings of his conduct. And these are notably archaic: a notion of France as a nation of special excellence and with a special “mission,” of the French as a people who can be led by “dreams,” above all a notion of “grandeur”—the word is the *leit-motif* of his whole book. When “grandeur” fails, we gather, then life is scarcely worth living.

But this is not all. There is also de Gaulle the expert in tank warfare, the young officer driving hard for the technical improvement of his army. There is the de Gaulle who can share with his Socialist counsellors the vision of a new France of social justice. In short, there is de Gaulle the modern man. In his memoirs he appears as a Churchillian figure, temperamentally a survival of the old regime, but sufficiently intelligent to be aware of the technical needs of an industrial world. As in Churchill’s case, however, this awareness takes second rank: de Gaulle is not really interested in economic problems. For him, the modernization of France is a subsidiary concern: social reform, technical improvement—these are simply means to a greater goal. Again it is the “grandeur” of his country that is primary.

Yet surely one can doubt whether the grandeur of France is compatible with its industrial modernization. It is far from clear

that one can reconcile a nostalgia for past glories with an adjustment to the contemporary world. This is the central problem confronting the Gaullist experiment.

It was as a lone individual without an organized movement or party that de Gaulle came to power last spring. His wartime followers had scattered in a hundred directions; only fragments remained of his Rally of the French People. At the start of the May crisis no more than a handful of deputies saw him as a possible solution. By the end of the month he received a massive vote of confidence. This sequence of events already presents an enormous riddle. Since we lack other guideposts, the manner of de Gaulle's coming to power may suggest an initial characterization of his regime.

In a technical sense, the advent of de Gaulle was legal and constitutional. In real terms it was not. (We may recall that Mussolini and Hitler similarly came to power under technically constitutional auspices.) In the absence of organized support in France itself, de Gaulle was enabled to come to power *solely* through the threat of force from Algiers. The North African coup d'état of May 13 created a situation which he alone was in a position to resolve. Hence the Deputies had no true freedom of choice: they were *forced* to vote for de Gaulle—or to face the consequences. These consequences, however, were not precisely what the press took them to be. It was not the threat of civil war or a Popular Front that drove the Deputies to vote the investiture: there was scarcely anyone prepared to take up arms for the Fourth Republic, and the Popular Front was never a real possibility. It was simply and brutally the fear of a parachute attack from Algiers.

All this may be obvious—but in the euphoria of June and July it was something that tended to be forgotten. De Gaulle came in not on a wave of enthusiasm, but in the cold chill of fear. As one wag summarized the situation: "Caught between red terror and white terror, France was scared blue." There was nothing glorious about it—no trace of grandeur here. In their minds, the

Deputies could already see the "*paras*" slogging down the Champs Elysées—as they did in fact on the Fourteenth of July, to the applause of a delighted throng. And even the courageous band among the non-Communist left who voted against de Gaulle's investiture did so with an eye more to their historical reputations than to any practical result. Everyone wanted to be among the immortal "eighty"—a reference to those who in 1940 had voted against Pétain. But they did not want the eighty to swell to too large a number: even *they* knew in their hearts that there was no alternative to de Gaulle.

YET this was a solution which very few preferred in the abstract. Such was the paradox of the Gaullist "revolution." It was a revolution almost without partisans—except for the elegant young men who honked their horns in cadence as they drove their expensive cars around the Etoile. Sometime back about 1950 there had been talk of a "Gaullism without de Gaulle." Now quite unexpectedly, in May of 1958, France had de Gaulle without Gaullism. For even the junta in Algiers had put forward his candidacy as a kind of second best. The *colons*, at least, would have preferred someone more uncompromisingly authoritarian and conservative. Thus from the very moment of his investiture de Gaulle was able to present himself in the role he preferred, as an arbiter above party. In this sense he succeeded in returning to his wartime image—in transcending the partisan memory that his Rally of the French People had left behind it.

At the same time there was more than accident—and another wartime memory—in the fact that the original impulse behind the new regime had come from Algiers. For the first time in history the French Empire had imposed its will on the home country, and the fact that this was possible was itself a legacy of the war period and of the personal initiative of de Gaulle. From 1940 to 1944 Free France had been largely an imperial, an African affair. It had established its first solid territorial base at Brazzaville; it was from the Chad that Leclerc began the spec-

tacular advance north across the Sahara that brought the Free French forces into the main theater of combat; and Algiers provided the temporary capital for the provisional government that was eventually to assume power at home. De Gaulle's wartime thinking was consciously and proudly imperial (again a Churchillian parallel). Among the charges he makes in his memoirs against "defeatists" like Weygand and Pétain, one of the most important is their failure to think in imperial terms, to see the possibilities of further resistance beyond the limits of continental France. And when at last de Gaulle was proved right, when he entered Paris in triumph in August of 1944, he brought the French Empire with him. This, as Herbert Lüthy has pointed out, was a dubious gift at best. For it meant that postwar France, unlike Germany or Italy, would be unable to devote all its energies to reconstruction at home. There would always be the obsession of the Empire, the agonizing drain of colonial warfare.

The Fourth Republic did not collapse because of anything it did or failed to do at home—although its record there was mediocre enough. Had there been no Empire left, had France been in the situation of Germany or Italy, it could doubtless have muddled along with its existing institutions. Its failure came on the question of the colonies, and more particularly on the question of Algeria. For those who love paradox there may be a bitter satisfaction in recognizing that de Gaulle came to power precisely because the burden with which he himself had saddled his country—the burden of imperial grandeur—had finally become too heavy to bear.

Once installed in power, the new regime obviously had to supply itself with some sort of ideological equipment. The product of this necessity has been much fumbling and a minimum of clear definition. But by the end of the summer the rough lines of an ideological pedigree were beginning to emerge. The French, after all, are a history-minded people, and every French regime since 1814 has tried to anchor itself in some earlier historical experience. By 1958, how-

ever, most of these precedents from the past had worn themselves out. For the new rulers of the French nation the range of ideological choice was narrow in the extreme.

JUST as the successive collapses of 1940 and 1958 had discredited the formula of parliamentary democracy, so the Vichy experience had made impossible any direct evocation of authoritarian conservatism. Indeed, that had been the trouble with the earlier Rally of the French People. Although this was far from de Gaulle's intent, the Rally smacked too much of Vichy. Or—on the other horn of the dilemma—its elected representatives tended to become ordinary parliamentarians in the conservative republican tradition. It was in this fashion that the Rally had finally fallen apart. Its failure offered a warning to all good Gaullists.

This time the very lack of an organized movement offered distinct advantages. It served as a persuasive answer to the charge that the new Gaullism was in any conscious sense fascist in inspiration. And it made possible the most extraordinary improvisations and adaptations. In his government as originally constituted, de Gaulle seemed to have picked his Ministers almost at random. Along with a large number of civil servants and "technicians," one found the two most influential parliamentarians of the Assembly that had just been sent home in disgrace—Pinay for the right, Mollet for the left. It was as though in his disdainful *grand seigneur* manner, de Gaulle had decided that the whole issue was not particularly important, that he could pick his colleagues from where he wished, including the debris of the old political parties. Moreover these were not really to be his colleagues: they were to be clerks or servants. The Ministry did not function as a true Cabinet with joint responsibility. Indeed, one indiscreet participant—Mallarmé again—went so far as to describe an early session as "similar to those in Napoleon's time."

In the first weeks of the new regime the dispatch of official business proceeded at a

Napoleonic rhythm. In his highly personal style that combined majesty with elusiveness, de Gaulle gave orders and his harassed Ministers did their best to carry them out. Or rather they were harassed in a different and perhaps less taxing manner than had been the case in the past. The telephones in their offices had stopped ringing; a great calm settled over the Ministries, as the Deputies and Senators ceased their customary importunities. For the first time in living memory, the higher civil servants observed, it was possible to put in a full day's work almost without interruption.

THE historical image is of France in 1800 —Bonaparte is First Consul, and, after the shabbiness and corruption of half a decade of rule by committee, the country has at last found a master capable of putting the administrative machine in order. But this master is still only Citizen Bonaparte: he is not yet Emperor. Republican forms have been preserved, the effete heirs of the great Revolution have been absorbed into the new administration, and a margin of liberty remains. The memory of the heroic, embattled Republic of 1793 is still fresh—but it is a memory that the First Consul is seeking to discipline and to steer into constructive channels. Substitute the wartime Resistance for 1793, and the Fourth Republic for the Directory, and you have a suggestion of the present ideological atmosphere. It evokes Bonapartism in its "pure" and truly popular form, before it was overlaid with the flummeries of the Napoleonic Empire. This is a Bonapartism with which most Americans are unfamiliar, and which even for the French has become dimmed by successive deformations. When we think today of the heirs of Napoleon, our minds turn toward more sinister things—the association of the military with royalism and reaction, the persecution of Captain Dreyfus, and the fascist agitation of the 1930's. Since the turn of the century, at least, nationalism in the Napoleonic tradition has appeared most often as the sworn enemy of republican and democratic institutions.

Yet this was not always or necessarily so. Throughout the past century and a half of French history, there has never ceased to exist an alternative possibility, the thin thread of a contrary tradition, often scarcely perceptible but never completely submerged. Within this alternative tradition, democracy and the Republic have figured as perfectly compatible with militarism and strong government. Such were the perspectives which Napoleon himself sought to provide in the proclamations of his Hundred Days in 1815, and in thus returning to his own ideological origins, he set the stage for the development of a personal legend that was at variance with the imperial phase of his career, and for the association of Bonapartism with Jacobinism in the 1820's and 1830's. In this lay the basis of Napoleon III's popular appeal: when in his imprecise and rambling style he wrote of the "Napoleonic ideas" that he proposed to incarnate, democracy and equality naturally took a prominent place among them.

The facts of Louis Napoleon's rule, as of that of his uncle, belied most of these promises. After the defeat of 1870, the democratic possibility within the nationalist or authoritarian tradition seldom appeared in a consciously Bonapartist form. Indeed, its 20th-century manifestations have been so varied that the historians in general have not seen fit to juxtapose them. Yet surely one can find a common denominator in such tendencies as the following: the mentality on the eve of the First World War of so many of the youth of France, who followed Charles Péguy in a common cult of the people, the Republic, the army, and the grandeur of tradition; the rule of the "Jacobin" Clemenceau in the final year of the conflict and his abortive postwar project of a strong presidency; finally, the military aspects of the Resistance itself, with its combination of republican loyalty and devotion to the person of an unquestioned chief.

All this is simply to say that de Gaulle and his immediate advisers are not necessarily insincere when they maintain that the sort of personal rule under which France

now lives can be reconciled with democracy and the Republic. In making such a claim, they have a long, if rather spotty, tradition behind them. Indeed, as we have seen, it is the only ideological tradition that has emerged reasonably intact from the calamities of the past twenty years. But this is simply the surface of the game. The real struggle lies deeper—between the organized forces that are trying to mold the still inchoate Gaullist regime in the image of their own desires. Ultimately, it will be on the General's ability to master or to neutralize these forces—and thereby to remain true to his own ideological inspiration—that the historians of the future will judge him.

IN FRANCE in the summer of 1958, there was one overriding question: Who was ruling? Paris or Algiers? The civilians or the army? And along with this there went the further doubt as to the solution intended for the Algerian war itself. Finally there was the question of the new constitution. Would it be the sort of "presidential" regime that de Gaulle and his followers were presumed to favor? Or would it rather be a hybrid, with both presidential and parliamentary features? And within the framework of the new institutions, what would be the role of political parties and of a constitutional opposition in the traditional sense? Until it had provided an answer to these questions, de Gaulle's government could not be considered to have advanced beyond the stage of experiment and improvisation.

With the French forces established in Algeria, both civilian and military, we encounter for the first time an ideology that can properly be called fascist. And—in contrast to most past experience—it is the military who are more politically sophisticated than the civilians. The *colon* mentality seems to be pretty crude—a combination of old-fashioned colonialism, *Pétainiste* memories, and a few strong-arm tricks of totalitarian inspiration; aside from the utterances of Jacques Soustelle, who is bright enough to give their ideas a minimum of intellectual consistency, the civilians almost totally lack

the rationale of a true political movement. With the army it is quite different. Perhaps the biggest surprise of last spring's crisis was the revelation that the young colonels had quietly been working out a political line of their own.

This is something new in modern French history. Traditionally the military have been content to borrow their ideas from the civilians, or to remain neutral in the political battle. To find a historical parallel one would have to go as far afield as the German Free Corps of the 1920's, and more particularly the veterans of the struggle against the Bolsheviks along the Baltic. The latter were genuinely convinced of their moral superiority to the civilians: their whole youth had been passed in battle and they were emotionally unable to adjust to a world at peace. At the same time, and rather more significantly, they had learned to measure their foe at his full worth: their deadly hatred of Communism did not exclude respect and even imitation. Similarly the French military, absorbed for more than a decade in colonial warfare of the most discouraging kind—warfare without apparent end and with only lukewarm support at home—have come to scorn the civilian ethic of sterile politicking and material self-indulgence. From the struggle in Indo-China they acquired a belated political education: observation of Viet Minh practice and a study of the precepts of Mao Tse-tung taught them why Asian Communism had won so often. In this hard school they learned the virtues of personal asceticism and of seizing the psychological initiative at the grass-roots level; a policy of active social endeavor in the Algerian villages has been the first fruit of this painful effort at self-education.

The military are convinced that given a free hand and full support from Paris they can pacify and reconcile the Algerian Moslems. They are now committed to a policy of total integration. What to the French civilians of Algeria is frequently no more than a clever political maneuver, to the military is a matter of deadly earnest. De Gaulle's

own views on this crucial topic are far from clear. His war record suggests both generosity to native aspirations and an insistence on maintaining the French "presence." He has consistently refused to pronounce the word "integration," and he apparently prefers some sort of federal solution. But such a solution, which might have been practicable a decade ago, has subsequently been overtaken by events. It is difficult to see how under present conditions it would be possible to establish a federation of the three North African territories—and to link these in turn with France—without the grant of at least technical independence to Algeria that would put it on a par with Tunisia and Morocco.

For the summer months, the tactic in Paris was to play for time; this was the most charitable explanation of Soustelle's appointment to the Ministry under pressure from Algiers. Only the balloting in the autumn could give de Gaulle what he most urgently needed—more suitable institutions, a solid parliamentary majority, and some guide to the evolution of Moslem sentiment. Meantime his policy seemed to be to offend as few people as possible by restricting his public pronouncements to exalted generalities. Here again, however, one problem fitted into another to suggest once more the tight entanglement of de Gaulle's dilemmas. The future constitution itself could not be thought of independently of the Algerian settlement. For "integration" in practice would mean that roughly one-sixth of the deputies in Paris would be Moslems—and these would hold the balance of power. Such a situation would be tolerable only if the parliamentary assemblies themselves were kept strictly in check. In short, integration presupposed an authoritarian constitution.

AS THE summer wore on, however, and the outlines of the new constitutional document were gradually revealed to the public, it became apparent that this was not what de Gaulle was aiming at. The permanent institutions of the future, like the provisional regime of the summer months, would be a

hybrid of two different republican traditions, combining both "presidential" and parliamentary features. A reinforced presidency would be tailored to de Gaulle's own concept of the office. But it would be a presidency more of the Eisenhower than of the Roosevelt type. (Again the Gaullist notion of an arbiter above parties is evident.) The day-to-day conduct of government would devolve on a prime minister, and he in turn, although the president's personal appointee, would be responsible to the parliament.

How this will work out in practice is the problem now agitating French political scientists. For here precedents are entirely lacking. The present-day examples are all definitely of one type or the other: the executive in the United States and in Switzerland is without responsibility to the legislative; nearly everywhere else in Europe and in the Commonwealth parliamentary government is the rule. And the precedents from the French past are no more helpful. The obvious conclusion is a truism of political science: the new constitution itself is less important than the spirit in which it is applied. And this reflection in turn suggests the problem of the coming elections and the role of a constitutional opposition in them. As the autumn electoral season opens, it is becoming evident that the regime of the future depends in large part on the fashion in which the campaign itself is conducted. Will it be a kind of personal plebiscite, with no more than token opposition, or a true election, in which the voters are offered a real alternative?

This is the central issue for those rare political leaders among the non-Communist left with sufficient personal resiliency to surmount the shock of last May. In the center and on the right, the underlying evolution is fairly obvious: through all the reshufflings and regroupings, the solemn announcements of the formation of new movements and parties, the drift is toward a vast, if loosely allied "party of order," loyal to de Gaulle. Among the moderate left, things are far less clear: the Radicals are in

chaos, and Guy Mollet is barely able to impose a minimum of conformity on a Socialist party that the investiture vote split down the middle. At the same time, it is isolated individuals from among the Radicals and the Socialists who are beginning to provide the leadership for a constitutional opposition in embryo—the Union of Democratic Forces organized in early July on the initiative of the dissident Socialist Daniel Mayer. Its original adherents included some of the most distinguished names in French politics: André Philip, Edouard Depreux, François Mitterand, Pierre Mendès-France—all of them long-standing opponents of the policy of repression in Algeria. But the extent of its popular following is still undetermined. And in its electoral tactics it faces a most difficult choice: should it oppose the new institutions themselves, in the constitutional referendum that will precede the parliamentary elections, or hold its fire and conduct its opposition solely *within* the framework of the Gaullist constitution?

The latter course was what Mendès-France advised. And as late as mid-summer this seemed the part of political wisdom. For it was difficult to oppose the draft constitution without offering any alternative to it, and such an alternative was entirely lacking. The constitution of the Fourth Republic was unmourned: indeed, its last years had seen almost universal agreement that the executive needed strengthening. The parliamentary elections, however, are quite a different matter. The whole future course of the new regime may depend on the part played by a constitutional opposition, alert to every violation of personal liberty.

GENERAL DE GAULLE originally came to power on the understanding that he would take swift action in a desperate emergency. So far he has been unable to do this. He was appointed to do the extraordinary. What he has accomplished to date has been quite ordinary. Like the governments of the Fourth Republic that he has condemned so mercilessly, he has been forced to temporize and to postpone.

Let us try, however, to give him the benefit of the doubt. Granted that de Gaulle succeeds in curbing the army and in bringing Algiers to full obedience, granted that he proposes a liberal solution for the Moslem insurrection, granted that a constitutional opposition becomes a reality—and these are all conditions that currently are far from being fulfilled—even then our problem of definition will not be solved. For even under optimum conditions (so far as political liberty is concerned) de Gaulle's regime will remain a personal one: its character will still depend on the pressures impinging on the General himself. This brings us right back to the two de Gaulles with which we started—de Gaulle the exponent of archaic grandeur, de Gaulle the 20th-century man. Similarly, it raises anew the question whether nostalgia for a glorious past can be reconciled with the technical modernization of French society and the French economy. The more discerning observers do not think so. They find de Gaulle's own psychological contradictions mirrored in the contrasts that split his following. In the vast heterogeneity of the support that he presides over rather than commands, they see two sharply opposed groups as alone capable of pursuing a coherent and effective policy.

The first, of course, consists of the "colonels" and those of a similar turn of mind. I have presupposed that they will be reduced to obedience and effectively harnessed to the new regime. But this does not mean that their power will be ended. In fact, the clipping of their wings might have the very opposite effect. If and when the Algerian war is brought to an end, the army will have to be transported home and re-integrated with the main stream of national life. And at this moment the military may have their great chance. With the termination of the long cycle of colonial wars, their talents will be set free for other employment. And in the home country they will find a constituency prepared and waiting for them. This constituency is made up of all those with a nostalgia for the past, whether in terms of economics or in terms

of national policy. Pinay expresses the views of the more prosperous and liberal-minded of them; a couple of years back Poujade broadcast the complaints of the smaller people, pushed by economic desperation toward a primitive chauvinism and authoritarian demands. There are exceptions to the equation between economic conservatism and a nationalist mentality, but most of the time they go together. This vast constituency currently lacks direction. Is it too far-fetched to suggest that the military may eventually be able to supply it? The experience of German and Italian fascism has shown how an old-fashioned type of national conservatism can strike an alliance with a new force that is far more imaginative and revolutionary. And it has also shown how this revolutionary force can in turn evolve in a more conservative direction.

The second group capable of effective action consists of the modernizers—the enlightened businessmen and civil servants. These people want to develop the tendencies that are already pushing French society and the French economy toward the model of its more “advanced” neighbors and allies—Germany, Belgium, Britain, and the United States. They want to expand industrial production, to rationalize the agrarian economy, and to reduce the enormously swollen apparatus of distribution. Once people of this sort followed the lead of Mendès-France—now they look to de Gaulle. For they know that only a strong and efficient executive can hope to combat the entrenched economic interests that have had a stranglehold on successive French parliaments. Their mentality is “technocratic” and “neo-capitalist”: it is by no means necessarily authoritarian. But under present conditions they, like so many other Frenchmen, see no alternative to the personal rule of de Gaulle.

OBVIOUSLY the ultimate future belongs to this latter group. And in the far future also the structure of French life will almost necessarily be democratic. The very tendencies which these people are trying to accelerate imply a democracy of the homogene-

ous and conformist type that we have come to associate with advanced industrial nations. It is difficult to think of the eventual solution for France in any other fashion. But in the short term, the conservatives are more likely to have the upper hand. Although the modernizers are numerous among the French elite, their electoral base is narrow. The current paralysis on the left—both Communist and Socialist—has frozen in place the constituency from which they might otherwise be able to draw recruits. Moreover their attitude on imperial questions is in conflict with de Gaulle's most cherished beliefs. By implication, if not always in conscious theory, the modernizers think in terms of a “little France” wholly absorbed in the task of its own self-improvement. The dominant mentality of the present hour lays the stress on a national mission and on grandeur overseas.

Thus the French apparently feel the need of one last flight into illusion before settling down, as the Germans and Italians have already done, to the workaday task of taking their normal place in an industrial world. Germany and Italy also went through their period of illusion—and we call it fascism. In France the phase of transition and adjustment is likely to be briefer and less oppressive. I have met no Frenchman who predicts a full-fledged fascist regime for his country, but the majority of those I have encountered are anxious and preoccupied. What they anticipate for the immediate future is a Republic decisively led, and under military and conservative auspices. Democratic forms, they suggest, will be preserved, and the parliamentary assemblies and the political parties will appear to be much as they were before. But their real role will have changed: a great deal of their activity will be merely formal. Freedom of speech and of the press will technically remain intact—but their effective range will be reduced by government pressure and a growing conformism. Nostalgia for a glorious past, an apathetic acceptance of the official line, and a gradual erosion of liberty: these are the prospects for the immediate future that the French see before them.

IRAQ AFTER THE COUP

The Pan-Arabs Take Over in Baghdad

RAY ALAN

ONLY the politically illiterate will charge Gamal Abdel Nasser with the July 14 coup in Iraq, but it is undeniable that a vicious Egyptian-Syrian propaganda campaign had helped create the emotional climate responsible for the worst atrocities of the uprising. Cairo Radio had been describing Nuri es-Said as a traitor and the "Arab Satan" for years, and Nasser's ally Salah Bitar, then Syrian Foreign Minister, eighteen months ago formally proposed that the Arab League "try" Nuri Pasha for treasonable collaboration with Anglo-American imperialism and, if necessary, order his "execution."

An Egyptian broadcast beamed to Iraq on the occasion of this year's Id el-Adha festival expressed sympathy with the Iraqi Moslems "forced to celebrate the holy feast under imperialist domination." When the Lebanese revolt broke out Cairo Radio informed its Iraqi and Jordanian listeners that their rulers, like Lebanon's President Chamoun, would "soon hang"; while during the first half of July, Nasser's "Voice of the Arabs" and "Voice of Free Iraq" repeatedly urged the Iraqis and Jordanians to revolt.

Propagandist words had been backed by conspiratorial deeds. As long ago as the fall of 1955 Iraq's British-supervised security service uncovered a plot to assassinate Nuri es-Said, organized by the Egyptian military

attaché in Baghdad, Lieutenant-Colonel Mohamed el-Hinnawi, who had also inspired a number of bomb outrages and the formation of a "Free Iraq" committee within the Iraqi army whose aim it was to overthrow the Hashemite regime. After the arrest of three of his henchmen, Hinnawi fled to Cairo (where he was given a senior appointment in the official Middle East News Agency) and the direction of Nasser's clandestine operations in Iraq was confided to the Syrian military attaché, Colonel Azem. In the winter of 1956 Nasser secured the formal alliance of an important Iraqi figure, Rashid Ali el-Gailani, leader of the anti-British rising of 1941, who traveled to Cairo from his exile in Saudi Arabia; thereafter Egyptian liaison with the pro-Gailani Istiqlal party of Iraq improved.

Economic pressure was likewise applied in the hope of toppling Nuri. When, on Egyptian orders, the Syrian army sabotaged the Iraq Petroleum Company's main pipeline in 1956, the Syrian Foreign Minister declared that the blow was directed against Nuri as well as the West: the pipeline would not be reopened until Iraq acquired a "national" regime. It was, in the end: because of Syria's own need of the revenue the oil transit brought her, and also because Nuri threatened to agree to the construction of a new IPC pipeline across Turkey, bypassing Syria.

But when all this has been noted, it is hard to dissent from the summing up of a Western-educated and temperamentally pro-Western Iraqi diplomat in Beirut who took down King Faisal's portrait and declared for the new regime immediately on receiving confirmation that the formidable Nuri was safely dead. "On July 14," he said, "the Hashemites reaped what they and the Brit-

IN THE July COMMENTARY, the impact of the Algerian war on France was discussed by RAY ALAN, a noted political observer with close personal experience of Arab affairs. Now, Mr. Alan takes up the subject of the recent military coup in Iraq and throws light on the chief leaders, their affiliations and orientations, and the broad forces behind the new regime, insofar as they are known to experts stationed in the area.

ish had spent the previous twenty years or more sowing. Gamal Abdel Nasser simply lubricated the combine-harvester." The timing of the coup, the mechanism of which had been planned months earlier by Brigadier-General Abdel-Karim Qassim (now Prime Minister) and his associates, was decided not by Nasser but by an order transferring Qassim's brigade to Jordan—presumably to buttress King Hussein against rising unrest, though some officers believe they would then have been transferred to Lebanon. After initial denials their friends now admit that the authors of the coup agreed from the outset that King Faisal, Crown Prince Abdul-Illah, and Nuri must be killed so as to avoid any possibility of their escaping and legitimizing a British intervention as in 1941. Shortly after the attack on the royal palace, Iraqi troops encircled the British base at Habbaniya and denied it communication with the outside world to make doubly sure (trebly sure, if, as seems probable, the sacking of the British embassy in Baghdad was part of the same precautionary plan).

THE marvel was that the Iraqi oligarchy had survived purely internal stresses so long. The present writer reported in COMMENTARY in March 1954: "The closer one's scrutiny, the stronger one's impression that Iraq's whole political edifice, from foundation to summit, is as shoddy and as unsteady as a Baghdad slum." Nuri es-Said was the most hated man in the Arabic-speaking Near East; and, despite its claim to descent from the Prophet, the Hashemite royal family was never more than patchily popular in Iraq. (Something of a legend was built up around the memory of Iraq's first king, the statesmanlike Faisal ibn Hussein, but the only Iraqi ruler popular in his lifetime was the anti-British Ghazi who died in an automobile crash at the age of twenty-six.) The Hashemites were Sunnis (orthodox Moslems) whereas most Iraqi Arabs are Shiites. (Iraq's Kurds, to be sure, are Sunnis, but they disliked the Hashemites because they were Arabs.) The difference be-

tween Sunnis and Shiites is sometimes compared to that between Protestants and Roman Catholics; in fact it is much greater. Above all, few articulate Iraqis ever forgot that it was the British who installed Faisal in Baghdad in 1920 after organizing a Nasser-type plebiscite showing a 96 per cent vote in his favor. "Politics running on wheels greased with extremely well-melted grease," was how the Orientalist and political officer Gertrude Bell, who helped organize the plebiscite, described the operation—a phrase Nuri quoted approvingly more than once. It is a phrase that says a great deal about Anglo-Hashemite political relations—all merchandising and no content—from the campaign to put over Faisal I in 1920 to the election last year whereby Nuri secured a parliament favorable to the Baghdad Pact; it sums up the over-confidence, the indifference to social evolution, and the belief in the infinite gullibility of the Arab masses, which led Nuri to a hideous death in the dusty robes of an old woman, and Anglo-American diplomats and security chiefs to express their astonishment at an event every Baghdad beggar knew was inevitable.

Some time before the coup, this writer was given a copy of a letter that had been smuggled out of what English-speaking Iraqis called "Nuri's concentration camp" at Naqrat es-Salman. Its writer had been arrested for criticizing the government. So had most of his fellow internees, only a few of whom had a clearly defined republican or socialistic orientation; some were workers who had tried to form a labor union. (Officially, i.e. according to Nuri, they were all Communists or Zionists.) Their living quarters, he wrote, were "best described as tombs. . . . There are no windows and no light can enter. Not even a child can pass into them without bending. Many of the internees have become consumptive without hope of recovery and those who live with them are exposed to infection. . . . Water is scarce, meat and fruit are non-existent. . . . There is no doctor to attend the sick."

In 1952 Nuri issued a decree making it an offense to criticize the conduct of elec-

tions. During the 1952 electoral campaign he bought tribal votes by transferring tracts of state domain to the more influential sheikhs. On the eve of the 1954 election, which cleared the way for the creation of the Baghdad Pact, he banned four political parties and thirty-one newspapers and periodicals. The normally pro-Hashemite Lebanese daily *el-Hayat* described the Baghdad Pact parliament as "a Chamber of Relatives." "For the first time in history," it noted, "a Prime Minister has appointed all his relations to parliament: the only relatives of Nuri es-Said who do not sit in the Chamber are those he has already appointed to the Senate. . . . Eighty per cent of the deputies were imposed on the electorate by the government." Yet all that Western diplomats seemed to notice about Iraq was the fact that, as the State Department's Henry Byroade naively remarked, its rulers "speak out strongly against Communism." A leading U.S. news magazine even gave Iraq the headline: "A Strong Link in Middle East Chain."

Asked at a major press conference, only a few days before laying the foundations of the Baghdad Pact, whether he intended to join any Western or Western-inspired pact, Nuri replied: "No, definitely not." After the pact's creation he declared repeatedly that it was "directed primarily against Israel." Asked why the Western powers were supplying Iraq with such vast quantities of arms if, as he claimed, Iraq had undertaken no obligations toward the West, Nuri threw his hands in the air and laughed: "Who knows? Maybe they're mad!" Historians at a loss to explain this phase of the West's Middle East antics may one day concede him a point there.

THE West's discomfiture in mid-July was all the harder to understand if one recalled that Iraq has known more military coups d'état (seven in all) than any other Near Eastern country. In the middle 30's, dissident generals even ordered the Iraqi air force into action against the civil government in Baghdad. Moreover, it has for some

years been the accepted pattern of Arab politics that the new military, mercantile, and professional middle class, denied electoral access to power, should wrest it from their dominant hereditary and/or landowning oligarchies by military force. The more arms Britain, America, and Russia pour into the Arab states, the more they inflate the importance and power of the officer corps, the easier it becomes for the latter to seize power, and the likelier it is that the new middle class regime will degenerate into a military dictatorship. Syria, Egypt, Lebanon (1952), Jordan (briefly, in 1956 and 1957), and Iraq had already, in varying degrees, illustrated this process. On July 14 Brigadier Qassim and his collaborators merely brought it to fruition in Iraq, having taken pains to digest the lessons of Rashid Ali's defeat in 1941. Tomorrow it may be Saudi Arabia's turn, and the U.S. officials who have gone out of their way to bring into being and equip that country's increasingly restless military caste will no doubt be the first to express their amazement.

Civilians outnumber officers in the new Iraqi government (though the administrative purge now under way is expected to herald fresh military appointments to key civil service posts) and the emergence of a full-blooded military dictatorship on the Nasser model is by no means inevitable: much will depend on external developments and the new regime's economic competence and social perspicacity. Colonel Mohamed Abdessalam Aref, the assertive young Deputy Premier and Minister of the Interior, who played a major part in whipping up the frenzy of the mob on the morning of July 14, has been tipped as the Nasser of the movement, but Qassim, who is Defense Minister and Commander-in-Chief as well as Premier, looks to be made of sterner stuff than was Neguib in Cairo. Their principal civilian allies, Mohamed Mahdi Kubba and Sadiq Shenshal, are also strong-minded characters with a following in both the army and the street.

Mohamed Mahdi Kubba, now fifty-two, was vice-president of the pan-Islamic, pro-

Nazi Muthanna Club in the middle 30's. In 1946, with Sadiq Shenshal and other former supporters of Rashid Ali (Shenshal had been Rashid Ali's director of propaganda, and later fled to Germany where he made several pro-Nazi broadcasts in Arabic) Kubbah founded the Istiqlal (Independence) party, which appealed at once to lower- and middle-grade army officers, merchants, politically underprivileged "intellectuals," and rambunctious youths of all classes. Anti-British, anti-Turkish, anti-Christian, and anti-Jewish, infected to some extent by Nazi "race" theories, the party was outstanding even by Arab standards for its virulent xenophobia. Its leaders' skill in manipulating the mob is attested by their organization of the great anti-treaty riots of 1948 and 1952. Istiqlal has consistently advocated a neutralist foreign policy, and from 1952 on collaborated with the Communists against Nuri. Mohamed Mahdi Kubbah praised Egypt's neutral stand in the Korean war. He has said that "even if the West atones for its errors in Palestine" the Arabs should not offer the West bases or assistance: the furthest they can go is to undertake "not to attack the West." On the inter-Arab plane, the Istiqlal leaders would like to see a union of Iraq, Syria, and Kuwait, governed from Baghdad: they have never appeared enthusiastic over the idea of Egyptian domination.

Brigadier Qassim's and Colonel Aref's relations with the Istiqlal are believed in Baghdad to be a flirtation rather than an infatuation, Aref being more closely in sympathy with the party than his chief is. They both appear to share its views on the desirability of Iraqi leadership of the Fertile Crescent states. They would be likely to affiliate to the United Arab Republic (Egypt plus Syria) only if they felt themselves insecure or in need of some spectacular gesture to compensate for an economic or diplomatic reverse. Iraqis generally take a highly possessive view of their country's oil income, and objected to the Hashemite union with Jordan not only for political reasons but because it involved their subsidizing Hussein's desti-

tute kingdom. They are in no hurry to subsidize Egypt, whose grievous endemic poverty is worsened by Nasser's reckless military expenditure. The portraits of Nasser which blossomed in every quarter of Baghdad in the first few days of the new regime were thinning out by the end of July, and pro-Nasser slogans have been obliterated by military work parties. Baghdad Radio has broadcast a call for closer economic ties between the Iraqi republic and "Aleppo and northern Syria" (not the United Arab Republic as such): Aleppo's traditionally Iraqi-orientated business and intellectual circles would exchange their economically disadvantageous tie with distant Egypt tomorrow for one with a potentially prosperous Iraq, given the opportunity.

THE constitutional gap left by the liquidation of the monarchy has been filled temporarily by a three-man Council of State presided over by Major-General Najib er-Rubai, a wealthy sixty-year-old conservative. Rubai won this distinction by participating in an abortive Saudi plot to assassinate Nuri; the latter, prevented by the rules of the inter-Arab *jeu de massacre* from executing or imprisoning a plotter enjoying King Saud's personal protection, mockingly appointed him Iraqi Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and advised him not to return to Baghdad in a hurry. The Council's other members are Colonel Khalid Naqshabandi—a brisk, vigorous Kurd with little time for the Nasser mystique, but even less for Western pact-mongering—and Mohamed Mahdi Kubbah. As Rubai is a Sunni Arab and Kubbah a Shi'ite, the Council of State is thus neatly representative of Iraq's three main communities. The composition of the Cabinet—not all of whose members were privy to the plot—was equally carefully worked out to win the authors of the coup the widest possible acceptance. After Qassim and Aref, its most important member is the Istiqlal co-founder and wartime Nazi propagandist Sadiq Shenshal who has been appointed Minister of Information and "National Guidance." The Foreign Minister, in con-

trast, is the French-educated Dr. Abdel-Jabar Jomard, an anti-pact neutralist but culturally a Westernizer. (He was purring loudly at British and American diplomats within forty-eight hours of the coup.) Brigadier-General Najib Talib, Minister for Social Affairs, is an admirer of Nasser who spent some time at Sandhurst, the British military academy which vies with Harrow school in the production of anti-British Arab leaders. The cool, competent Baba Ali, Minister of Public Works, is that rare Near Eastern phenomenon, an "Americanized" Kurd: when his father, the famous Kurdish rebel Sheikh Mahmud Barzinji, was expelled by the Hashemites into Persia, Baba Ali was packed off to a British college in Alexandria, Egypt, and from there went to Columbia University.

There is even a disciple of the late Harold Laski in the Cabinet, in the person of the Finance Minister, Mohamed Hadid, a wealthy Mosul notable. Educated at the American University of Beirut and the London School of Economics, he helped Kamil el-Chadirchi launch the National Democratic party whose political philosophy had something in common with that of the pre-war British Labor party. Disillusioned by Ernest Bevin's cynical exploitation of Arab nationalism and above all by Bevin's decision to make the Hashemite regime in Iraq the "cornerstone" of his Near Eastern policy, the National Democrats veered off into neutralism and soon became strongly anti-Western. Bevin and his advisers not only cold-shouldered groups like the Iraqi National Democrats, which an enlightened policy could have saved from Moscow's embrace, but actually encouraged the Arab governments to suppress them. It is hardly surprising that they reacted with a violently leftward jerk. Their organ, *Sada el-Ahali*, put the blame for the Korean war on "American aggression" and in 1954 they entered into an electoral pact with the Istiqlal and the Communists whereby all three groups agreed to campaign for nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company and certain other Western-owned enterprises, and for a neu-

tral foreign policy. Yet informed Iraqi observers favorable to the new regime attach no ideological significance to Hadid's appointment: they regard it as a purely technical and tactical one, a sop to keep the National Democrats happy while the army-Istiqlal coalition tightens its hold on the country. Hadid is a mild-mannered rationalist who scarcely speaks the same language as his Istiqlal colleagues. He has no control over the ministries for Economic Affairs and Development, both of which would have to be dovetailed into any ambitious program of nationalization and social reform.

THE Iraq Petroleum Company (which is British-managed but owned by American, French, and Dutch as well as British parent companies) seems certain to be nationalized one day—probably overnight, for propagandist rather than ideological reasons, to divert attention from a failure or setback in some other sphere; but for the time being official circles in Baghdad are assuring Western representatives that they will settle for a revision of the fifty-fifty profit shareout in their favor. An Iraqi official has declared "off the record" that the Russians are willing to extract and market Iraqi oil for only 10 per cent of the profits, but this may be no more than a bid to soften up the IPC in advance of negotiations. Of Iraq's average annual oil income of \$200 million a year, 70 per cent has hitherto been devoted to long-term development projects and 30 per cent to the ordinary budget, but owing to the Suez crisis—in particular the sabotage of the IPC's main pipeline—revenue dipped sharply in 1956-57. A showdown now with the IPC would result in a severe financial crisis and unemployment both in the oil fields and on development projects—an inauspicious beginning the new regime clearly wishes to avoid.

Development money was, on the whole, spent wisely by the old regime, in accordance with a rational British master plan, and publicly accounted for. But while it enriched contractors and merchants and raised property values, its benefits had not yet seeped

down to the peasants, living at subsistence level, who make up about 75 per cent of Iraq's population; and to the average townsman "development" all too often signified luxurious new villas and television antennas for the entrepreneurial and mercantile middle class, but a mud shack in a slum for himself. The fact that this prosperous, if hitherto politically underprivileged, middle class has now come to power will not of itself appease the awakening peasantry and urban proletariat, once the ecstatic echoes of July 14 have faded. For Iraq's masses July 14 was only half a revolution. Like all such regimes, the Qassim coalition is promulgating a stop-gap, cheer-raising program of minor rural reform and urban improvement, for which funds are to be siphoned off longer-term projects. But before long it will have to decide whether to take the plunge into a fundamental reorganization of Iraqi society that will bring it into conflict with the powerful landowning sheikhs and an important section of its own nouveau riche following—or, like Colonel Shishakli six years ago in Syria (and Nasser in Egypt) to buy time by exploiting mob xenophobia and picking a succession of foreign quarrels. The past record of the Istiqlal party and the political and economic inexperience of the military chiefs might lead one to expect that the latter course will be chosen, except for a small number of positive factors: Iraq possesses a sounder and much faster-expanding economy and a cleaner administration than Syria and Egypt when Shishakli and Nasser took over; the new rulers already have for their guidance an excellent blueprint for nationwide development, and the men and funds to put it into effect; they also have the flops of Shishakli and Nasser in the social and economic fields as a double warning against following their example.

AS NOTED above, the Baghdad mob (accompanied by a detachment of armed soldiers) gave the same priority to the sack-ing of the British Embassy as to the attack on King Faisal's palace. And just as Britain could have had no more appropriate Prime

Minister at the time of her Suez debacle than Sir Anthony Eden, godfather of the Arab League, so, on Baghdad's day of wrath, she could have had no more fitting Ambassador to Iraq than Sir Michael Wright. Political chickens have a startling propensity for developing vulturine characteristics in the Near East, and it is only just that those who hatch them be on the spot when they return to roost. No one had done more than Sir Michael to yoke successive British Foreign Secretaries to the Hashemite regime in Iraq. Unfortunately for the Ministers who lapped up his advice, few diplomats were more tragically out of touch with Iraqi sentiment. Did the 1948 riots which wrecked Bevin's projected Anglo-Iraqi treaty indicate that the idea of a military alliance with Britain might, perhaps, be a wee bit unpopular in Iraq? Nonsense! It was all a matter of technique and timing: scare the day-lights out of the Arabs with the Zionist bogey, and they'd clamor for a treaty. . . .

The rambling, rather dingy "house by the river" looked more like the "secretariat" of a small backwater colony than a modern embassy: its very appearance grated on Iraqi susceptibilities the reminder that the Kingdom of Iraq had to a great extent been shaped by decisions taken within its walls. But Iraqi nationalists might have been less harsh on Nuri Pasha had they realized the weight his words carried there. Nuri was no mere puppet: if, for example, he learned of the presence of two junior members of the British government at a pro-Zionist gathering in London he did not hesitate to fire off a letter of protest—and his protest was received with something like deference. "If I want to know what the British are going to do next in the Near East I watch Nuri," the Turkish Ambassador said. "Not because they will have told Nuri, but because he will have told them."

The July 14 coup liberated the British Foreign Office (as well as the Iraqi people) from Nuri's stifling embrace. Anglo-Iraqi relations may be a few degrees less fervid from now on, but they will be that much healthier. The emancipation extends to other

Western powers, too. French officials in the Levant saw something doubly symbolic in the sacking of Britain's Baghdad Embassy on—of all days—July 14, and ebulliently urged Paris to recognize the new regime before Britain and America: released from their stultifying forty-year-old feud with the Iraqi Hashemites, they feel themselves a long stride forward toward the French-Arab rapprochement which both General de Gaulle and his able and scholarly Foreign Minister, M. Couve de Murville, desire. Mr. Dulles, liberated from a politically onerous and militarily treacherous illusion, can now take a fresh hard look at the “northern tier” and the Near East in general. He will find the issues plainer, the perspectives clearer. He should be able to recognize the folly of funneling arms into unstable states that require them only for internecine quarrels—and for use against the West's friends. He may even conclude that since a majority of Arabs are attracted by neutralism it is better

to have them neutral with our blessing than against us.

Left to themselves, the Iraqi and Egyptian leaders will have quite enough to occupy them in putting their internal affairs in order and settling the future of Syria, Kuwait, Jordan, and possibly Saudi Arabia. True, there is always a possibility of their moving away from their difficulties in the direction of Israel: like the Arab League, they may be tempted to plaster over their discords with anti-Israel provocation and propaganda. But Western statesmen can no longer be in any doubt as to how to nip that problem in the bud. The failures of the old school have at least taught a valuable lesson in that subject. If the Western powers can make it clear that they are not prepared to contemplate the whittling away of Israel, they will both spare themselves further blackmail on this issue and help the Arabs transfer their political energies to more constructive purposes.

THE SIREN OF THE KITCHEN

DAVID GALLER

or all her day foundered between sink and stove,
 As raves would have us think. To watch her hand
 Beguile us pigs at supper with sharp stews
 And a kind clout, one learned that such scenes derive
 From some tradition: her praise stung like a brand,
 Disgrace bred rage, and rage broke down as blues
 That made despair worth dredging. Our whole lives
 Could have been spent unraveling sweetness from
 Her hate! Instead, how guileful we have become,
 Reeling between a Scylla that contrives
 To snap off, one by one, our heads that sprout
 Decisions, and black pit of mothering doubt.
 No, that is not all. Sometimes, we gaze back
 Across the simmering leagues, and we hear out
 The music of her eyes, flashing from their rock.

DAVID GALLER, a young poet, is a native and resident of New York. His verse has been published widely in the literary journals, and this is his third appearance in COMMENTARY.

ARLINGTON—ANOTHER LITTLE ROCK?

School Integration Fight on Washington's Doorstep

WILLIAM KOREY and CHARLOTTE LUBIN

THE volcano of hatred and violence that erupted in Little Rock last September is now rumbling on the doorstep of the nation's capital. This September all eyes are focused on Arlington, Virginia, where a small number of Negro children, recently given the blessing of a Supreme Court decision, are contesting Virginia's "massive resistance" program, the most open challenge yet offered to the Court's 1954 ruling outlawing school segregation. Seven of the eligible Negroes have been kept from entering white classrooms for two years—so long that one of them has now been graduated from high school—while Virginia has been exhausting every appeal to the Federal courts. There is nothing left now for Virginia but to flout the Court decree directly.

A series of laws passed by the 1958 session of the state legislature requires that Governor J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., must close any school that becomes integrated. The local school board and the local governing body—in Arlington's case, the County Board—may jointly request that schools be reopened, but, in contrast with an earlier law which permitted local option, the Governor is not obliged to reopen the school. And even if he

WITH Arlington, Virginia, threatening to become another Little Rock, two experienced observers here analyze the background of the local struggle over school integration. WILLIAM KOREY, a University of Chicago and Columbia graduate, has lectured at Maryland University and served in various capacities with organizations devoted to intergroup relations. CHARLOTTE LUBIN, a sociology graduate from Columbia, has held staff positions in liberal organizations and is at present engaged in educational and publicity work for the Electrical Workers Union affiliated with the AFL-CIO. Both make their first appearance in COMMENTARY.

permits the schools to be reopened, state funds are automatically cut off from an integrated school system. Finally, by the so-called "Little Rock" law, the Governor can close down all schools in the local area if Federal troops are brought in.

It was Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia who first announced, in February 1957, the "massive resistance" formula. A complex foundation of legal devices designed to uphold a sagging segregationist structure was then erected. Nowhere was a gap to be permitted. As Governor Almond remarked, one falling stone might lead to an avalanche. If Arlington crumbled before the onslaught of integrationist forces, so too might the rest of Virginia, and after Virginia the entire crazy-quilt pattern of Southern resistance. Thus, whatever happens in Arlington this fall may become the model for the rest of the South. Yet Arlington is one of the most "un-Southern" of communities below Mason and Dixon's line. A rapidly expanding city on the southern threshold of the District of Columbia, Arlington is directly connected with D.C. by four bridges; but its real tie to the capital is by the purse strings. More than half the personal incomes and consumer expenditures of Arlington can be traced to Federal employment, which has put the bulk of Arlington families in the upper-middle-income category. Federal aid equals approximately 12 per cent of the current revenue of Northern Virginia.

In addition to economic attachment there are cultural, social, and civic ties that make Arlington citizens regard themselves as part of Greater Washington. Washington newspapers are widely circulated in the area; national politics are followed with great interest; plays, concerts, lectures, and other events in D.C. are heavily attended by Ar-

lingtonians. Most of the population are new to Arlington, and many of these are Northerners in origin. Transients in many cases, they have been attracted to Arlington by the availability and quality of its municipal services—public education, community recreation, health programs. The median number of school years completed by Arlington residents is 12, as compared with 8 for the rest of Virginia and less than 10 for the U.S. This high educational level probably explains in part the community's intense interest and active participation in civic affairs.

Less than 6 per cent of the county's population is Negro. There are four Negro schools and 44 white schools in the county. Of 22,677 pupils in Arlington public schools, only 1,432 are Negroes, but estimated on a geographical basis, the total of Negro pupils eligible for integration into white schools is 189. All of these factors—the large number of Northerners and transients, the high level of education and large degree of civic responsibility, together with the tiny proportion of Negroes—probably account for the relatively limited amount of race prejudice, in spite of an all-out hate campaign conducted by professional racists over the past three years.

ON SEPTEMBER 4, 1958, in addition to the original small group, more than two dozen Negro youngsters who have recently applied to white schools may, under Federal court order, walk into integrated classrooms in Arlington County. (It is now apparent that the so-called "Charlottesville plan"—a complex system of devices to disqualify Negro applicants by special examinations, interviews, and other pressures—will be used by the state to prevent the recent applicants from even registering. This plan, however, cannot affect the original group, and because it may be declared unconstitutional, it may not even affect the additional applicants. On advice of counsel, all Negro applicants have refused to appear for special interviews ordered by the State Pupil Placement Board.) Under the laws of Virginia, the Governor must then order the closing of the

integrated schools, and unless an injunction forces his hand, the decision to reopen the schools rests solely with him. His public statements to date indicate that he will not reopen the schools, except by the elimination of an entire class that is integrated. "Any school closed anywhere in Virginia will be the direct result of the exercise of inordinate power vested in the NAACP by the Federal judiciary," he said early in May.

Before his election in November 1957, Governor Almond was not opposed to a local option plan. During the campaign, however, he identified himself with "massive resistance." In his inaugural, he said: "I cannot conceive such a thing as a little integration any more than I can conceive a small avalanche or a modest holocaust. . . . To sanction any plan which would legalize the mixing of the races in our schools would violate the clear and unmistakable mandate of the people. This I cannot do. . . ." Shrewd observers of the Virginia political scene estimate that three factors were responsible for Almond's embracing "massive resistance." First, his Republican opponent had advanced the idea of local option, so he felt he had to be against it. Second, after Little Rock, moderation tended to be identified, in Southern eyes, with integration and surrender of states' rights, thus pushing the hard core of Southern Democrats into an uncompromising segregationist stance. Finally, Almond was politically dependent on the solidly segregationist 4th and 5th Districts in southside Virginia; in these areas he could count on a loyal 100,000 votes, while the same number of votes in the northern 10th District were uncertain.

Having set his course in an extremist direction, Governor Almond stuck to it. Late in May he refused to reappoint a conservative Richmond banker, Thomas C. Boushall, a supporter of local option, to the state board of education. To replace him, Almond appointed an ardent segregationist, William Storey, Jr., South Norfolk school superintendent. The Governor had been encouraged in his stand by Federal Judge Lemley's "Little Rock decision" (recently overruled)

calling for a "moratorium" if integrating orders bring on "impairment of educational standards and demoralization of the faculty and student body." Almond called the ruling "most wholesome" and said he was "more convinced than ever to resist to the utmost the mixing of the races in the public schools of Virginia."

Governor Almond has said he hopes the violence which occurred at Little Rock will not occur in Virginia. But he has hinted that the "peace and tranquillity" may be broken by "explosions, inflammatory feelings, threats, or undercurrents." Although the Governor has expressed his desire not to "say or do anything that would inflame the passions of the people," there are those who believe he has invited violence by his public allusions to its possibility. These citizens point out that Governor Faubus, too, prophesied violence—a prophecy which some of his supporters arranged to fulfill.

In Arlington County and nearby, there are individuals and organizations who have long peddled the racist line and who would welcome any opportunity to make Arlington the major battlefield for a final test of massive resistance. For three and a half years the "Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties" have been grinding the hate mills of Virginia. With thirteen chapters throughout the state, the Defenders have an estimated statewide membership of 7,500, and less than 100 in Arlington, although its local leaders boast a figure of 1,200. Jack Rathbone, head of a local plumbing concern, executive secretary for the Arlington Defenders and its chief spokesman, predicted "racial disturbances" in telegrams to the Arlington chief of police and the press on the day seven Negro children were registered in white schools in Arlington last September. The chief targets of the Defenders were those white citizens of Arlington who had joined the Negro complainants in school suits, or who simply spoke out in defense of the Negroes. When their names appeared in the press in connection with these activities, they were besieged day and night by obscene and threatening telephone

calls, as well as letters and telegrams. When asked later about his activities in connection with the harassment and threat of violence, Rathbone replied: "Why, we just take every advantage of every opportunity to ridicule these people. We don't mean any harm."

"A lot of people are afraid of the Defenders," Dr. E. B. Henderson, a leading officer of the North Virginia NAACP, said. "They would be likely to picket the school in case of integration. They have a lot of influence over well-wishing people in Arlington. They just about ran the Orndorffs out of town."

Mr. and Mrs. Jack Orndorff joined the Thompson Case, the original suit to bring about integration, on behalf of their son Eugene. Together with their friend and neighbor, Mrs. Barbara Marx, who filed on behalf of her two daughters, they complained that so long as segregation prevailed their children were discriminated against, in that they were being deprived of a democratic environment, a chance to know persons of different races and creeds. All three were subjected to constant harassment by telephone, telegram, and letter. Three days after the suit was reported, the Orndorffs bowed out, and later moved to Maryland, but Mrs. Marx stubbornly remained.

A SPECIAL target of the Defenders is the youthful Ross Weston, pastor of the Arlington Unitarian Church. Weston has spoken out against segregation from the pulpit many times, attacking the extremists. In November 1957, he denounced the Byrd machine as "totalitarian" and compared Byrd Democrats with the "brutes of prehistoric times." The Defenders sent Weston and other Arlington citizens a reprint of an editorial which contained an attack on his sermons. In the margin was a "special note," from the Defenders: "It is now open season on squirrels. There is no bag limit on the two-legged variety this season. . . . Hunting with firearms or bow and arrow is prohibited in Arlington County, but the use of the horsewhip is still legal and most effective."

ive. The 4400 block of Arlington Boulevard is not a state-protected game preserve." Weston's church and parsonage are at 4444 Arlington Boulevard. Commenting on the circular, Rathbone said: "You've heard of tar and feathers, haven't you? Well, that's one way to get rid of a scoundrel"; asked if it was a threat, he said: "It's in English. Read it and decide for yourself."

Another leading Defender is Charles William Carter, who works for a brokerage firm in D.C. Carter was a regular columnist for the *Virginian*, a slick bi-monthly which specializes in racism and anti-Semitism. A typical excerpt from a recent Carter column reads: "The Jew's money is his power and he is merciless in its use. . . . Typical of this is his use as a catspaw of the Jewish-financed and led NAACP, intended to gain for the Jew the coveted social equality and power he craves. . . . The South's problem—its implacable enemy—is not the Negro but the Northern Jew. . . ." He concluded by obliquely threatening the Jews with expulsion from the U.S. Another Defender, Mrs. Vivian Jarrell, chairman of a Defender real estate committee whose objective is to secure space for some 4,000 private students when the hoped-for closing of the schools takes place, repeatedly appeared on an audience-participation radio program in Fairfax and read portions of well-known "hate" literature. The station management finally reprimanded her, calling her attention to the fact that the literature she was promoting was cited by the House Un-American Activities Committee as "neo-fascist."

The Defenders have not limited themselves to attacking school integration; a secondary target is the system of education itself in Arlington. They have unsuccessfully called for the abandonment of the core curriculum, for censorship of library books, return to letter grades at the elementary level. They have attacked the cumulative record files, and demonstrated against speakers whom they found objectionable.

Two years ago the Defenders were a small band of reactionary extremists who enjoyed little influence and even less respect

in the community. Since that time, however, their attitude has been more and more in tune with official policy, and the amount of noise they have made has brought them influence on the state level. According to Rathbone, "The tide is turning and the Defenders are no longer conducting a rear guard action. The self-appointed mentors of our lives and our children's lives have placed themselves on target. This we have been waiting for."

ARLINGTON citizens fear that violence may be instigated by outsiders. Several community leaders, including former School Superintendent Edward Rutter, are worried about the likelihood of intervention by "hate" groups from Maryland, D.C., and southside Virginia. The organization most feared is the Seaboard White Citizens Council, led by John Kasper, the man behind the violence in Clinton, Tennessee, in September 1956, and in Nashville, Tennessee, in September 1957, the latter climaxed by the bombing of an elementary school. "We will spill blood before we will bow to this creeping Federal dictatorship," Kasper said in 1956. In almost the same breath he claimed credit for Virginia's original "massive resistance" program, passed in 1956 under former Governor Thomas B. Stanley. In the late summer of 1956, Kasper's outfit published a pamphlet, *Virginians on Guard*, which was mailed to every legislator of the Virginia General Assembly, then in special session to consider "massive resistance" laws. The pamphlet proposed a fifty-point program ranging from Virginia's issuing its own currency to her purging from electoral lists all "nomads" from the North. It called for the outlawing of all laws for compulsory education of school-age children. "Governor Stanley's plan, which came out a short time later, contained at least 35 per cent of this, and in some cases, even used the same language," Kasper claimed.

The president of the Seaboard White Citizens Council is a twenty-six-year-old native Arlingtonian, Eugene Collton. Boasting a deep admiration for Hitler, Collton

states: "Niggers are not difficult to get along with until the Jews get hold of them." He has openly warned that violence will befall Jews if Arlington integrates.

Another segregationist group operating nearby is the Fairfax Citizens Council. The Council has published a sheet called "The Shocking Truth," a smear attack on such organizations as the National Education Association, the Ford Foundation, and UNESCO, that was used by a state investigating body to harass the NAACP and others. Mimeographed letters addressed to 700 Arlington school teachers, urging them to join "the Governor of Virginia, the Virginia Assembly, and the overwhelming majority of our Virginia citizens in this fight to preserve our liberties," were mailed by the Fairfax Citizens Council in June. The Fairfax Council sponsored the appearance of Amis Guthridge, a leader of the Little Rock White Citizens Council, who was given the unusual privilege of holding a private meeting in the Hall of Delegates of the State Legislature, in February 1958, at the time the Virginia General Assembly was deliberating on the new massive resistance laws. Guthridge called the Little Rock incident a Communist conspiracy that was also being planned for Virginia. Among other groups labeled as part of this conspiracy were the National Council of Churches of Christ, some PTA groups, the NEA, and, of course, the NAACP.

There has been a series of anonymous mailings of racist pamphlets and letters to seniors at Washington-Lee and Wakefield High Schools in Arlington. The first quoted Abraham Lincoln as being opposed to social and political equality for Negroes. The second contained a 32-page booklet, *White Man Awaken*, by Gerald L. K. Smith. It accuses "the Communists, the Jews, and the demagogues" of fomenting racial strife. A third contained the same issue of *Common Sense* which had been circulated among Little Rock students. It stated that the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People is controlled by Communists and Jews. A fourth contained a defense of

Gerald L. K. Smith and a crude cartoon showing "brotherhoodism" being funneled into the public's brain by the press. Then in February of this year came a letter exposing a "conspiracy" by a Communist named Israel Cohen, who was later proved to be non-existent. The most recent mailing, in April 1958, contained a warning to students against being seduced by "cunningly deceitful . . . brotherhoodism propaganda." After a significant number of parents and students protested the contents of the mail in telephone calls and letters to Arlington school superintendent Rutter, Rutter asked the postmaster to stop the mailings. Learning that they were not in violation of any postal regulation, Rutter said that it was "most unfortunate" that the postal service "can be used with impunity." However, Rutter added that he believed the students "ignored" the mail, that they "recognized it for what it is—un-Christian, un-American, and undemocratic."

THE evidence indicates that Arlington is going to fight to keep its public school system, which ranks as one of the best in the nation. The first to offer defiance to the State of Virginia was State Senator Armistead L. Boothe, of Alexandria. When the bill to force closing of a school even if the locality wanted to operate it at its own expense was first introduced in the State Legislature, Boothe said: "Do you think in the shadow of the capitol of the United States, just across the historic Potomac River from a capital named for our first President, George Washington, the most important capital on earth today, with all eyes of the world focused upon it, topped by the hills of Arlington where Lee himself lived— . . . do you think the schools these people have built and paid for are going to stay closed, even with all the might of the commonwealth of Virginia thrown into the battle? . . ."

"The County Board has promised to keep the school open at any cost," Mrs. Elizabeth Campbell, an Arlington leader of the United Church Women and a former school

board member, asserted. Her husband, Edmund Campbell, is a D.C. lawyer, who has been a sparkplug of an Arlington organization to keep the schools open. "Perhaps in September," she speculated, "you will see the strange phenomenon of the Governor sending the state militia to Arlington to keep the local police from opening the schools."

"If the schools are closed in September, you might see a huge demonstration of moderates parading outside the schools, demanding that they be opened—intelligent, educated, respectable people who ordinarily wouldn't come out for such a demonstration, but under the circumstances there may be no other way for them to express themselves, and to focus public attention on the problem."

The overwhelming majority of Arlington citizens are determined to keep their schools open even if it means some integration. In May, 23 leading Arlington citizens from various walks of life organized a Committee to Preserve Public Schools. Its membership has since skyrocketed to 3,000. More than two-thirds of Arlington's 39 white Parent-Teachers Associations have expressed support of the Committee and many of these organizations have pledged funds totaling more than \$1500 to support the organization. Arlington County's Council of Parent-Teacher Associations has voted unanimously to oppose the closing of public schools if integration occurs. The Northern Virginia PTA group has gone even further and has called on local PTA's to support only those candidates for public office who oppose closing of the schools. Other influential groups who have urged their members to support the Committee and to work toward keeping schools open in an integration crisis are the 460 member Arlington Citizens' Committee for School Improvement, the socially important Arlington Civic Federation, and the active Arlington League of Women Voters.

THE Arlington School Board bears the responsibility for the operation of the schools. Two years ago the Board was elect-

ed by the citizens of Arlington. Upon hearing, however, of a plan for limited integration proposed by the Board, the Virginia Legislature promptly killed the elections, and Board members are now appointed by the County Board and operate under the watchful eye of the Governor and the General Assembly. James G. Stockard, until recently chairman of the Board, said that "We have done absolutely no planning since about two years ago. Arlington does not have the initiative in this." Later, Stockard emphasized: "I have no intention of placing myself in contempt of court"; he made it clear that the School Board will refuse to close the schools. "The Negro children will be registered," he stated. His view is not, however, the view of the entire Board. Recently, a militant segregationist, Robert Peck, was elected chairman of the School Board following some confused maneuvering. Another segregationist was chosen as vice-chairman. Two of the Board members are liberals; the fifth and last School Board member will probably vote with the liberals in the event of a showdown on keeping schools open.

Four of the five members of the County Board have expressed their determination to keep the schools open. "Public schools are not going to be put out of business," asserted Herbert L. Brown, Jr., who pledged that the Board will "provide the moral support this September so sorely needed to run our schools." "It is unthinkable that our children will go without schooling," Ralph Kaul, the chairman, said. Candidates for nomination to the County Board on the Arlingtonians for a Better County ticket have made strong pledges to keep the schools open and to compel state authorities to pay "our fair share of money to maintain public education," by injunction if necessary.

In the event of violence, Arlington can count on a crack police force backed up by the County Board, and not likely to wink at rioting. In response to a suggestion to set up a riot squad in preparation for any disorders arising over desegregation, Police Chief Major William G. Fawver expressed

confidence in the ability of the present police force to handle such a situation. "All our personnel are trained to act as riot squad men," he said, adding that the Arlington force has riot-breaking equipment on hand at all times.

Arlingtonians have been advised that the earliest and most effective legal relief which they could obtain would be a temporary injunction, and if necessary a permanent injunction, against state authorities, prohibiting them from closing the schools. There are several grounds for appeal to the Federal courts. The primary basis would be that the state's action in closing any school—or all schools—in Arlington County, while all segregated schools in the state remained open, would deprive Arlington pupils of the equal protection of the laws, and thus violate the 14th Amendment. By this logic, the only valid recourse open to the state against a court order to desegregate Arlington County public schools would be the discontinuing of public education throughout the state. Another charge which could legitimately be made by the people of Arlington County is that the sole motive for closing the schools is to resist integration. Finally, parents may complain that closing the schools for any appreciable time will result, from the very nature of the educative process, in an educational loss to children for which they can never be compensated.

Even assuming that the Governor agrees to release each school affected by integration and permit it to be operated by the county, or that Arlington citizens obtain an injunction, there is still the state provision requiring the Governor to cut off all state funds to an integrated system. Federal financing is possible but not likely. "I don't know where we would get the money to pay for the maintenance of schools locally," Dr. Rutter has said. "We might curtail our program," he suggested. "Two other possibilities would be to raise taxes or call for voluntary contributions."

Arlington would have to raise its taxes about 20 per cent, it has been estimated, to compensate for the loss of state aid to its

schools. The added taxes could conceivably be raised in a high-income community like Arlington. There may also be the possibility of an injunction against the state preventing it from withholding funds as a violation of taxpayers' rights. Because it is a relatively high-income area, Arlington contributes a great deal more to state revenue than it receives. Last year, Arlington paid \$9 million in taxes to Virginia, and got back \$1.3 million for the operation of its schools. Some citizens have called for a "taxpayers' strike" to obtain withheld funds.

WHILE Arlington moderates are getting set for a fight to keep the schools open, the segregationists are preparing for a stand-by private school system for use in order to keep desegregated schools closed. The 10th District Educational Corporation, established by the Defenders, would, in addition to preparing for a private school system, also volunteer "free educational services to public school authorities in order to maintain operation of schools in strict accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth." "We're setting up our own schools," Rathbone explained. "We've got churches, private houses, and vacant commercial property lined up for use." Rathbone also mentioned the possibility of giving classes through closed-circuit television to segregated classrooms.

Arlington segregationists are part of a statewide group, "the Coordinating Committee to Maintain Efficient Education in Virginia," which has organized for the purpose of offering advice and help to localities threatened with integration in setting up private segregated schools. However, no responsible leaders of the community have identified themselves with the group that is organizing private schools. Rathbone's boast that the churches are ready to provide classrooms seems flimsy in the light of the strong opposition by Arlington church leaders to private segregated schools. In May, the Arlington Council of Churches voted unanimously to oppose the use of the facilities of churches "in any educational activities intended as a substitute for the continuation

of the public school system in Arlington." Following the Council of Churches resolution, 28 ministers signed a statement opposing the use of churches for private school classrooms and objecting to "enforced segregation." Rathbone maintains that if his group needs churches for emergency classrooms, they will go to the congregations, not the ministers. "We are reasonably confident that the white congregations will respond to the needs of any displaced white pupils," he has said.

In spite of all the sound and fury little has actually been done by the segregationists to recruit teachers or administrators or to plan a curriculum for a substitute school system. "Of course," Rathbone says, "we'll stick to the fundamentals in our private schools—we'll have to curtail art and physical education and all those frills." Rathbone's model school, which opened in the middle of July, was quickly closed by county officials for failure to meet building code and sanitary regulations. His ally Carter said of the private school system: "When the NAACP and its supporters succeed in closing all Virginia schools, its temporary success may mark the end of public education as we know it. That which evolves, however, may be a concept of education so superior that it will sweep the country and end, once for all, the Communistic trends of public education. Private enterprise must and will furnish the type of education parents want, not that dictated by educational crackpots."

If schools are converted to a private basis to escape a Federal court order, the county would lose its Federal aid which, it has been estimated, would boost taxes another 20 per cent. Federal aid has been high in Arlington because of national legislation providing assistance to schools in federally impacted areas.

THREATS of harassment and intimidation by the Defenders and other segregationist groups have caused the Arlington School Board, and even the State Pupil Placement Board, to refuse to release the names of the

Negroes who have applied for entry to white schools. The names and addresses of those involved in the original suit, however, have been published. "We wouldn't hesitate to put economic pressure on these niggers," Rathbone has asserted. "We know the names and addresses of those who applied last year, and also where their fathers work. And we'll find out the names of the others. One parent is the custodian of an apartment house and the owner of the house is in our group. If his two kids try to go to a white school next fall, he might be out looking for a job." In the face of these threats parents of the children involved in last year's case, except one, have declined to comment on whether they would seek admission to a white public school again. The one exception, Mrs. Arthur Costley, announced that, in addition to her two sons who had already applied, her daughter, Anita, would seek admission to a white school this fall. Several days after this announcement had been printed in the newspapers, with her name and address, Mrs. Costley received a telephone call asking for her daughter Anita. She told the caller that Anita was not home. The reply was: "Give her this message—once a nigger, always a nigger."

State Senator Charles R. Fenwick, of Arlington, wrote to the Committee to Preserve Public Schools, suggesting that the "simplest" way to keep schools open was to persuade the Negroes not to apply for admission to white schools. "Your Committee can utilize a legal way of keeping our public schools open by meeting with the parents of the Negro children and pointing out to them the consequences of their insisting on sending their children to white schools. Should this result in the parents deciding not to persist in this procedure, both you and they would be performing a great public service to the community." Shortly thereafter, Rathbone called Mrs. Peter Henle, an officer of the League of Women Voters, and one of the leaders of the Committee and asked her if her organization were planning to follow Fenwick's suggestion. When she replied in the negative, Rathbone declared,

"Well, I think I'll go visit some of the niggers myself."

Looming in the background of the controversy between the county and the state is the specter of Federal troops marching into Arlington, a stone's throw from the capital. While many would welcome Federal intervention and aid, others fear it if it means more than financial and legal assistance. "God forbid," exclaimed State Senator Boothe in speaking of the possibility of Federal force, a sentiment echoed by many Arlingtonians. On the other hand, there are groups in Arlington who are considering a direct appeal to the President. "We'll have to plead with the President to take over the financing of the schools," Reverend Ross Weston has suggested. "The closing of public schools in Virginia to circumvent the law of the land constitutes a national emergency. Even if the Governor permitted us to reopen the schools, the community cannot afford to do it alone. The Federal government will, at least, have to subsidize the reopening of the schools."

In a recent letter to President Eisenhower, Representative James Roosevelt asked the President to assume leadership now to prevent another Little Rock in the fall, citing Arlington as an example of a potential trouble spot. Earlier, Roosevelt had advocated that Federal funds be provided to operate racially integrated school systems deprived of state financial support. But at a press conference on May 14, the President said he would not try to predict the role of the Federal government in future

school crises, though he added that Federal court orders must be obeyed. "I did not send troops anywhere because of an argument or a statement by a governor about segregation. There was a court order, and there was not only mob interference with the execution of that order, but there was a statement by the governor that he would not intervene to see that the court order would be executed."

Both of these conditions—explosive demonstrations and refusal by the Governor to see that the Federal court order is carried out—are not unlikely possibilities in Arlington this September. But as late as August 6 the President told his press conference he had no plans to head off the tension arising from the September school openings, although he later hinted that troops might be used to force compliance with court orders.

The echoes of Little Rock have been heard from New Delhi to Caracas. The United States cannot afford the blow which would be dealt its international prestige by another such disaster, and one occurring in the shadow of the capital. But if there is uncertainty about the intentions of the White House there is no doubt about the determination of most Arlingtonians. Unlike the Little Rock citizens who capitulated to the pressures of the state government and the segregation leaders, the citizenry of Arlington is prepared to stand its ground for law and order and the free public school system. If another Little Rock occurs, it will not be because the majority of Arlingtonians have not made a determined effort to avert it.

PROBLEMS OF ISRAEL'S ECONOMY

Much Still to be Resolved

ALEX RUBNER

IN THE 1948-58 period, the State of Israel has become a solid political unit and a recognized military power in the Middle East. Socially, the "ingathered exiles" have been integrated within the existing framework of the Jewish community which had been constructed during the British Mandate over Palestine. Though the majority of its residents were born outside Israel, Hebrew has become—in fact as well as in law—the common unifying bond of the country.

But economically—has the country advanced and is it today less dependent on outside aid than it was ten years ago? Admittedly, a deliberately engineered inflation has reduced the purchasing power of the Israeli pound (£) in 1958 to one-third of its 1948 value, but (except for a few rentiers and owners of rent-controlled houses) most citizens have not been adversely affected by this financial juggling, and their standard of living has improved during these years. Official propagandists have measured Israel's economic progress in terms of the number of new houses and farms, the growth of the industrial potential and power supply, the absolute increase of the national product, etc., etc. In some ways this is a correct method of appraising material advance, par-

ticularly since the national product of Israel grew during this decade at a faster rate than that of most other countries. Nevertheless, I intend to argue that this is not a measuring rod which can prove a reliable guide to Israel's economy.

The basis of Israel's material fortunes is outside help. A consolidated balance of payments for the years 1948 to 1958 shows a deficit (on current account) exceeding \$3 billion. According to my estimates the political and charitable support in 1949—when the Jewish population was about 900,000—amounted to \$130 million. In 1957—when the Jewish population had grown to more than 1,800,000—outside aid was received to the tune of \$380 million. Thus annual (charitable and political) aid per capita had risen during the decade from \$143 to \$218. Dependence on outside help has increased rather than lessened. In the opinion of official circles this absolute and relative increase in foreign aid is commendable, since it will hasten the completion of investment projects which in turn will lessen the dependence in years to come. Yet there has been sharp criticism of the use to which much of this outside aid has been put; both supporters and opponents of the government have voiced severe strictures on the diverting of some investment funds to consumption purposes and the utilization of investment capital for grandiose, but commercially unremunerative, projects. Some extreme critics (for one, Eliezer Livneh, a former leader of the dominant party, Mapai) have even suggested that foreign political and charitable aid is demoralizing the country and represents an impediment on the path to economic independence. What follows is meant neither as indictment nor apologia, but as an analysis of those forces which, in

Most previous summaries of Israel's economic position have focused largely on the political framework. In the present essay, ALEX RUBNER makes an attempt to deal with more specific problems of capital investment, expenditure, currency control, etc. Mr. Rubner, an economic consultant resident in England, where he graduated from London University, has spent a number of years in Israel; one of his jobs there was that of economic adviser to the Ministry of Finance, and he is the author of a forthcoming book on Israel's currency controls. This is his first appearance in COMMENTARY.

my view, have exerted the most powerful influence on the economic conduct of the State of Israel.

1. *External Political Considerations*

Dependence on foreign economic aid has occasionally swayed the political and military decisions of Ben Gurion, but those in charge of the economy had constantly to heed the explicit or implicit conditions laid down by the powers who donated or loaned foreign currency to Israel. Hence many of Israel's supplies could not be ordered from the cheapest markets of the world, but were perforce obtained from suppliers in countries aiding Israel. (Political considerations have led in some cases to the export of hard currency products in payment for soft currencies.)

The Arab states meanwhile maintain a boycott of firms trading with Israel. Except through smuggling, Israel cannot buy goods directly from its geographical neighbors, nor will the latter buy legally from it. The Arab boycott has induced a number of American, British, Dutch, and German firms to terminate economic activities in or with Israel, and fear of displeasing their Arab customers has been a not unimportant factor in dissuading certain firms from starting operations in Israel. Until a short time ago, the Israeli Foreign Office propagated the view that the Arabs are suffering a greater material loss from this boycott than the alleged victim. Lately, however, the official attitude suggests that the Arab boycott is costing Israel something like \$100 million annually. The U.S. State Department is known to have evaluated the situation rather differently, and it seems, more realistically. The economies of Israel and of the Arab states are not in fact complementary. The boycott has increased Israel's expenditure on transport, insurance, oil supplies, and other items (both directly and indirectly); it is fallacious, however, to suggest that Israel's balance of payments would be radically improved if this boycott was no longer enforced.

The "neither-peace-nor-war" atmosphere has engendered an integrated military ma-

chine which (measured in real terms) probably accounts for a larger percentage of the national product than the army of any other country in 1958. The official budget tells us little about the true fiscal burden, because the direct appropriations for the Ministry of Defense are supplemented by disguised subsidies. The army itself only consists of a small professional core, but it is supplemented by national service recruits who serve from two to three years, and by an army reserve said to consist of 250,000 men and women. All able-bodied men up to the age of fifty must serve every year 30 to 46 days full-time duty, and their wages are paid from a special payroll tax. There is also a one-month-per-year "service" for certain heavy equipment, trucks, etc., etc. The Israeli army may obtain effective control over real resources, without a specific parliamentary financial vote, in one of many ways. Let us assume, for example, that it has an annual requirement—in peacetime—of 2,000 trucks, and that parliament votes funds sufficient only to acquire 1,000 trucks. Other regulations, however, enable the army to "recruit for one month annually all the trucks of the country"—a yearly call-up of, say, 12,000 trucks. Large firms solve this problem by maintaining a fleet of twelve trucks when their commercial requirement is only eleven. During the yearly call-up of their vehicles, smaller firms hire trucks from outside contractors to perform the tasks of their "recruited" equipment.

A para-military organization trains school children, and the rural settlements have to arrange (apart from their ordinary duty as reservists) certain guard duties in conjunction with the army. During times of emergency, special levies of hundreds of thousands of workdays are imposed for the construction of fortifications by civilians. Lastly, Israel has had to pay in cash commercial prices for most of the arms it has purchased from abroad during this decade, and this expenditure must clearly be measured in terms of tens of millions of dollars. Then again, transport, water pipes, industrial and farm equipment (and of course the lives of the

settlers and soldiers in the frontier settlements) have been subjected for years to the damaging attacks of infiltrators. Consequently, military considerations have left their impress on all walks of life, and security—rather than the optimum economic regard—determines the layout of agricultural settlements, the type of irrigation system, and the location of industrial and power plants.

2. *Immigration*

At one stage the mass immigration into Israel constituted a world record and was a major economic problem for the country. In 1949 the Jewish population increased by more than 30 per cent through immigration, while in 1958 a 3 per cent rate would be regarded as a tremendous achievement. Immigration is therefore no longer an important economic issue, and the further anticipated increase of the Jewish population is expected to result from the high net birth rate rather than from net immigration.

The decision to proclaim that all Jews throughout the world had the right to come to Israel was a political accomplishment which crowned the efforts of the Zionist movement; it became, however, also an anchor to which the fund-raising drives were firmly fixed. The readiness of the new state to absorb all Jews often meant that socially undesirable, or aged and non-working members of self-liquidating Jewish communities, were the first to come to Israel, while young able-bodied or well-to-do Jews found it easier to emigrate to other countries; not infrequently they did so after a temporary sojourn in Israel. (Actually, the charitable contributions made, via the Zionist appeals, for the purpose of absorbing immigrants to Israel increased in inverse proportion to the number of immigrants.)

The economic burden of immigration was aggravated not only by the relatively small percentage of newcomers who could be turned into useful members of the labor force, but also by certain non-economic considerations which hindered a rational absorption policy. The fear which haunted the leaders of the state was that a large propor-

tion of the immigrants might re-emigrate or become politically hostile to the government. Consequently, new immigrants were provided at tremendous cost with dwelling places, household goods, and other amenities, so that within a short space of time the majority enjoyed a standard of living comparable to that of most of the older inhabitants. In 1949 and 1950 it was still widely believed that the mass of unskilled immigrants might depress existing wage rates and tempt some employers to draw upon immigrants for labor at non-union rates. The Histadrut saw to it that the new immigrants had no choice but to join it, and thus the threat to union standards was averted. For reasons of socialist ideology, the Histadrut objected to the introduction of unemployment insurance or the making of cash welfare payments, because these were regarded as "degrading," and the eventual solution was to allocate workdays to the unemployed, on the model of the WPA projects at the beginning of the New Deal.

3. *Agriculture*

Agriculture in Israel cannot be explained only, or even primarily, in economic terms. The Zionist movement built up the "Return to the Soil" as an ideal which blended intimately with the concept of a sovereign Jewish state. Those following agricultural pursuits are regarded—or should we say: were regarded?—as belonging to the elite of society, and leaders of Israel's political parties boast about their children's exploits as farmers. This traditional Zionist bias in favor of farming was continued by the State of Israel; one-third of all gross investment was devoted to agricultural settlement, though farmers provided but 10-13 per cent of the national income. The policy of allocating scarce factors, on a priority basis, to the furtherance of Jewish farming was, however, not pursued for the purpose of generating the optimum amount of material values. Farming was accorded the noble mission of "purifying the economically unclean occupational structure" as a Zionist leader once put it. New settlements were laid out so as to insure a

wide dispersion of the population throughout the land, and farmers were particularly encouraged to settle in places regarded as militarily vulnerable.

Agriculture thus became to a large extent an attribute of political, social, and military planning; this circumstance can be studied best in relation to irrigation policy. It is by now established that Israel is not short of agricultural land, but rather of water to irrigate crops. When an American economist, Marion Clawson, was invited by the Israeli government to examine its water policy, he was shocked to discover that water was transported—or planned to be transported—in expensive pipes (for which fuel and power-generating machinery had to be imported) for a distance of up to 160 miles—from the northern tip of the Jordan to the semi-arid south of the Negev; furthermore he found that in order to make possible farming in hill settlements, irrigation water was pumped sometimes to a height of more than half a mile. Clawson made the seemingly obvious comment that water obtained under such conditions would make agricultural production in the south of the country and on the hills an economic absurdity. In his view the limited water supply of the country should be distributed in such a manner as to provide farmers in the plains and nearest to the sources of water with sufficient irrigation facilities. He proposed that so long as farmers in the north could make use of water for additional agricultural output, the irrigation pipes to the Negev should not be laid. For this he was fiercely attacked. It was pointed out to him that the Negev must be irrigated with the waters of the north, not because the south could produce more crops, but because political considerations demanded a farming community in the south.

Two other non-economic elements of considerable weight must be mentioned because of their impact upon the structure of Israel's agriculture. The planners of the Ministry of Agriculture and of the settlement department of the Jewish Agency tend to regard capitalist farming as reprehensible. As

practically the whole of Israel's farming land is now in the hands of the government or the Jewish Agency, it became possible to prevent the settlement on the land of persons who wished to purchase land or acquire long leases and engage in private farming; the handful of exceptions merely prove the truth of this generalization. Apart from buying a farm established in pre-State days, the only practical way by which one can become a farmer in Israel today is to join a political grouping and thus become affiliated to a kibbutz or "moshav" (small-holders communal settlement). Indeed, the only organizations to receive farming land from the Jewish Agency and the government have been the kibbutzim and moshavim. Incidentally, only a nominal rent is charged for even the best agricultural land, because the charging of an economic differential rent is regarded as an infringement of socialist principles.

Those who have the power to dispose of agricultural resources are likewise opposed to the employment of hired labor by farmers. It might have been thought that the division of agricultural resources amongst old and new kibbutzim and moshavim would have obviated this danger. In fact, however, the employment of outside labor has become such a serious issue in communal settlements that stern measures had to be taken by the socialist leaders of the Histadrut to eradicate these practices. Yet in the past few years several companies owned by the Jewish Agency and/or the Histadrut have been given leases of large strips of public land for the employment of hired labor on the production of cash crops. This digression from the orthodox attitude toward capitalist farming has been justified on the ground that these companies are "not in private hands."

The high water cost, the inflexible labor supply per agricultural unit, and the inevitably small strips of land allocated to individual settlers within the framework of moshavim—all these were not until 1954 a serious obstacle to agricultural production, because the greater part of Jewish farming output consisted of high-value crops, poul-

try products, and milk. Now, however, the market for these goods is saturated, and any further agricultural expansion can only take place by cultivating cash crops, e.g. cotton, oil-bearing plants, etc. Most agricultural economists regard the present structure of Israel's agriculture—outside the *kibbutzim*—as detrimental to the efficient cultivation of these cash crops.

4. Investments

I have computed the investment volume of Israel during the eight-year period of 1949-56 in real terms and have arrived at data which show that Israel's gross investment constituted about 22 per cent of the total available resources at the disposal of the economy during these years. This high investment rate was however entirely dependent upon the large import surplus, and there is evidence that there was actually some dissaving in the domestic economy; hence but for charitable and political outside help, even the existing pre-State productive capacity would not have been maintained.

Whilst this investment rate was among the highest in underdeveloped countries, Israel suffered a great disappointment, for the anticipated wave of individual, private investments from abroad failed to materialize, and almost the entire investment finance was channelized through the corporate bodies of the government, Jewish Agency, Histadrut, etc. During the British Mandate, thousands of Jews living outside Palestine made individual investments, particularly in real estate and citrus groves; since 1948 there have been few private investments of this kind, while by legal and illegal means much of the foreign private capital was repatriated. Despite the much heralded concessions granted by the government to foreign investors, few genuine investments were made. Even fewer were the cases in which entrepreneurs from the Western world established factories, and remained to manage them personally—Dubiner from Canada and the Dunskeys from South Africa would probably themselves admit that they are the two "eccentric exceptions."

It is of course easy to understand why few Jewish entrepreneurs have gone to live in Israel, but it is still strange that persons who donate large sums to Zionist drives, or buy bonds issued by Israeli public corporations, stubbornly refuse to make individual investments in equity holdings of private firms. The Israeli government has underwritten the sales of bonds by several Israeli public corporations. Legally the purchase of these bonds is of course an investment, but the persons who buy them do so for charitable motives and regard the "investment" as a supplement or alternative to their open philanthropies. Sir Simon Marks, the *doyen* of Anglo-Jewish philanthropists, has on occasion rationalized this attitude publicly. Israel's charities have benefited over the years by something like \$8 million through the generosity of Sir Simon and his family, but on principle he has not invested a single dollar in the Jewish economy of Palestine or Israel. "I do not want anyone to say that I am making money out of my love for Zionism; hence I am limiting my support to charitable donations." No doubt this is one explanation, but there are surely other reasons why those who (in America and elsewhere) head the subscription lists of Israeli charities have no intention of making an individual investment. Yet it can be argued that the benefit accruing to Israel from an individual investment may be larger than the donation of the identical sum to a charitable cause.

Capital is therefore a factor the disposal of which is almost a monopoly of the government-Jewish Agency-Histadrut sectors. When people in Israel speak of "raising capital" they do not refer to the preparation of an issue or the selling of stock or borrowing from banks: they usually mean that they must go to the economic offices in Jerusalem to persuade the officials of the importance of their project and obtain financial loans from public funds. Industrial enterprises can usually raise as much as 80 per cent of their capital by loans from the Development Budget. Mortgage capital from the public sectors can sometimes cover as much as 95

per cent of the housing costs received. Agriculture, according to official data, between 1949 and 1954 obtained 91 per cent of its investment capital from public funds—in 1955 the proportion had risen to 98 per cent.

As is apparently inevitable in a system under which the final investment decisions are made by officials—however disinterested and devoted they may be—the economic aspect of directing capital primarily to projects giving an optimum return is passed over. We know that Israel is no exception to the general rule that underdeveloped countries are prone to pay undue attention to the “international demonstration effect” of new capital schemes. There is also a tendency to prefer the allocation of public funds for the acquisition of fixed equipment on large-scale projects and to view small-scale short-term projects with less favor.

5. Foreign Currency Control

Israel's external trade is filtered through a dual-control administrative machine: the “competent authorities” of various Ministries which grant import and export licenses, and the “foreign currency department” of the Ministry of Finance, which authorizes the buying and selling of foreign currency. In 1958 Israel's foreign currency controller can claim that he has put the Brazilian, Schachtian, and Siamese controllers to shame, for he has instituted more simultaneous exchange rates than any other country.

The several hundred exchange rates (linked to legal import or export licenses) which are in effective operation in 1958 vary (in my estimate) between .5 I£ to 15 I£ per dollar. The officials who determined these rates—often ad hoc—employed various criteria for their pricing policy. Diverse rates applied to suppliers of dollars categorized as immigrants, charitable institutions, investors, tourists, sailors, Israeli government departments, Israeli recipients of proceeds from merchandise exports, Israeli recipients of proceeds from invisible exports, etc., etc. Each of these groups was again subdivided and split up into smaller administrative categories. The Ministry of Finance

was usually eager to ascertain the purpose to which the Israeli currency resulting from an exchange of foreign currency was intended to be put, and in accordance with their liking (or disliking) of the plans, effective prices for the dollars were laid down. Those Israeli residents who applied for allocations of foreign currency to finance authorized imports were quoted different prices by the Ministry of Finance, depending upon a number of subjective and objective conditions. The foreign currency controls also entailed the operation of bilateral-payments agreements with eighteen countries, and this gave rise to broken cross-rates. As exchange rates generally were a matter for personal negotiation, merchants and industrialists from all parts of the country trekked to Jerusalem to bargain for the best terms. An American consultant to the Israeli government was so astounded at the situation he had been invited to study that he wrote in his report: “. . . the consequence of the prevailing system of administrative discretion is that entrepreneurs find there to be no more profitable way to spend their time than in negotiating with the government.”

The results are not difficult to imagine. Astute merchants engaged in profitable “switching” between exchange rates; it was not uncommon to import an article with allocated foreign currency at a low rate (i.e. a cheap I£ price per dollar) and re-export it at a high rate (i.e. a dear I£ price per dollar). During the major part of Israel's ten years of foreign currency control, indirect encouragement was inadvertently given to the suppliers of dollars *not* to exchange them at the official rates, but rather to utilize them for the purchase of luxury goods that were then imported into Israel and resold at an effectively higher price than would have been secured if the dollars had been officially exchanged. (As charitable institutions were selected for punitive exchange rates, they also made some use of this subterfuge.) In addition to these semi-legal methods, a large and effective black market in Israeli currency came into being, and between 1949 and 1954 few tourists or

investors exchanged their money except through these dubious ways.

WHY did Israel deliberately operate these controls in this unique manner? One can only hazard guesses as to the real reasons, but the following elements were undoubtedly important constituents of the system: First, the figures of Israel's exports were artificially inflated by the sale of merchandise produced in "dollar packaging plants," which were in fact an exchange of Israel's hard currency income for soft currencies. The multiple exchange rate system also enabled the government, indirectly, to subsidize exports without formally altering the nominal exchange rate. Secondly, the Executive was able to increase its command over resources without any specific parliamentary approval. (The Knesset votes a given sum of I£ as a budgetary appropriation for a certain government department; if these funds are to be used for imports it depends largely on the discretion of the foreign currency controller how many dollars the stipulated sum is the equivalent of.) Or take the vexed issue of keeping down the wage rates, which in Israel are pegged to the cost-of-living index by a firmly built-in escalator clause. It may sometimes be inconvenient for the government to appear before parliament and ask openly for a money subsidy to keep down the cost of certain food items which are imported. Hence the Executive has found it most advantageous to achieve the same aim by the allocation of foreign currency (for imports with a heavy weight in the cost-of-living index) at a low rate. The government found this system also suitable for discreetly rewarding those whom it regarded as economically virtuous factors, and to discourage the operations of the less meritorious elements. The point is not that this power was exercised for purposes not approved of by the majority of the people; I merely want to emphasize that the system opened the back door for acts which the Executive did not wish to carry out openly.

Again, the Israeli government found it expedient to use the multiple rate technique

to devalue its currency *de facto* but not *de jure*. One of the main reasons for this was that the government's contractual obligations were mostly couched in Israeli pounds pegged to the "official exchange rate." This applied to many of the internal and external bond issues and the counterpart funds of the American grants-in-aid. During the years 1949 to 1953 this subterfuge was of considerable significance for the charitable organizations: while the black market rate fluctuated up to its maximum of 2.8 I£ per dollar and the "luxury goods rate" was even higher, the Ministry of Finance paid for the transferred dollars of the UJA, Hadassah, "Friends of the Hebrew University," and similar bodies, at the official rate of .357 I£ and later at .714 I£. The Israeli authorities in those days were still afraid of openly taxing charitable contributions or—as they did in the 1954-58 period—instituting a special punitive exchange rate for such foreign currency receipts; hence they maintained the fiction of a legal rate at which "untaxed" charity dollars could be exchanged without undue opposition.*

A leading government economist has defined the aim of currency controls as being the purchase of incoming dollars by the authorities at the minimum I£ prices, and the sale of these dollars on the Israeli market at the maximum I£ prices. The Executive thought itself the monopolist and monopso-

*I was appointed in 1953 to the Horovitz Commission which had been set up to examine whether Israel should abolish foreign currency controls or not. In closed session there appeared before us the governor of a respected academic institution who had just returned from a fund-raising drive in the United States. His evidence was prompted by the desire to protest against the punitive rates for charity dollars. He proceeded to outline a certain financial operation by which he had transferred dollars to Israel, and I recall interrupting his evidence to exclaim: "But this is a transgression of Israeli law. . . ." The witness replied unperturbed: "Yes, my action was illegal, but I regard myself as the trustee for the donors who intend the full equivalent of their monetary contributions to go to a designed purpose. If the multiple rate technique is employed to tax such contributions, I feel that I am morally bound to transfer these funds illegally to my institution."

nist of all foreign currency going in and out of Israel; consequently it resorted to what is known in technical language as "price-discrimination and the splitting up of the market." Carried to its logical conclusion, such a policy leads ultimately to the determination of individual prices for every large transaction, and indeed the reality turned out to be not far from this ideal. The person who did more than anyone else to develop this technique was a former "*yeshiva bochur*" well versed in the art of "*pilpul*" who after a short career as an army chaplain had become a civil servant and specialized in the construction of dozens of "original" exchange rates. His staff utilized the power of the exchange controls to buy foreign currency from individuals at a low rate and sell it in turn at a high rate. These foreign currency controls provided such an extreme defense of home industry that they seriously distorted the domestic price-and-cost structure; it has been estimated that in December 1957, whilst the official exchange rate was 1.8 £, Israeli products were produced at a price of up to 17 £ per cif price of one dollar of import substitutes.

6. A Socialist Society?

The leaders of the Jewish Agency and of the Israeli government have never hidden their belief that Israel should be a socialist state, and at every one of the three general elections the three socialist parties received an absolute majority of the votes. How far has Israel's socialist society been built? If one divides Israel's economy into four sectors, the following applied at the end of 1957 as to national income generated in places of employment: (a) Managed directly by the state and the municipalities, 30 per cent; (b) Managers and/or owners organized within the framework of the Histadrut, 33 per cent; (c) Controlled and financed by charitable and political institutions, e.g. Jewish Agency, Hadassah, Hebrew University, 10 per cent; (d) Private sector as residual item, 27 per cent.

These are rough estimates, and they probably exaggerate the role of the private sector;

if one used the criterion of "ownership of capital" the proportion would be even smaller. The Israeli government and the leaders of the Histadrut tend to be embarrassed by the publication of such data, for they fear that it may frighten donors holding non-socialist convictions. The Minister of Finance has stated in the Knesset that he regarded it as an unpatriotic act for some Israeli to have translated into English statements which appeared in the Hebrew press criticizing the projected establishment of a factory to be financed in part by a Zionist philanthropist in the United States. But despite such clumsy suggestions, Israel is enough of a political democracy to allow the basic facts about the structure of its economy to be known outside its frontiers.

At present, thanks in part to the support of Pinhas Lavon (the Secretary General of the Histadrut and perhaps the strongest man in the country after Mr. Ben Gurion) a radical change in the composition of the three non-private sectors is taking place. The state is taking over many of the functions which were previously performed by the municipalities, the Jewish Agency, and the Histadrut. Paradoxically, this trend towards nationalization is supported by the non-socialist groupings, and opposed by the extreme left-wing elements.

This new development is connected with changes in the field of external finance. At one time, Zionist funds constituted almost half of Israel's dollar income; hence the Jewish Agency was allocated certain fields of activity which were its exclusive domain. Now, the donations collected by the World Zionist Organization supply Israel with something like one-eighth of its foreign currency income—less than the value of German reparations. The Israeli civil service has therefore taken over enterprises controlled in the past by the Jewish Agency. In some cases joint government-Agency companies have been established to manage undertakings formerly under the sole direction of the World Zionist Organization, and plans are afoot to deprive the Agency of its last exclusive domain—control over the land-

owning and "land-redeeming" Jewish National Fund: a joint corporation will in future administer all public lands owned by the Agency and the government.

Left-wingers in Israel used to be divided in their opinion on the course of construction of a socialist society: would the private enterprise sector decline at the expense of the Histadrut, or would the nationalized sector of the state absorb it? Mapai leaders like Hillel Dan argued that Israel's path to socialism lay in the strengthening of the Histadrut, and many leaders of the latter fought bitterly for years against the growing economic influence of the state. When two years ago the leadership of the Histadrut was taken over by Lavon, an important shift took place. Aided by the socialist heads of the economic ministries (Eshkol and Saphir), Lavon succeeded in deposing Hillel Dan from the control of "Solel Boneh," the powerful Histadrut conglomeration of industrial, commercial, and building undertakings. To the disgust of orthodox labor socialists, and to the delight of non-socialist circles, Israel has returned to the old-fashioned method of transferring economic power to the state. The Histadrut has been divested of certain powers by the new Ministry of National Insurance; the socialist-directed part of the general school system and the labor exchanges have also been nationalized. Now there is talk of the Histadrut giving up further functions to the civil service—the Kupat Holim medical service, the transport cooperatives, its pension funds.

Already there have been cases of the state taking over Histadrut enterprises. One can also notice a slightly different attitude in government offices towards such enterprises. It would be an exaggeration to say that they are no longer privileged and have to wait in the queue together with applicants from the private sector. Nevertheless, Histadrut demands are now more carefully scrutinized, and the government has not hesitated to prosecute Histadrut enterprises for black market activities and other illegal behavior. There is a clear tendency to turn the Histadrut into a trade union federation

and check its dominating influence over production and commerce. Whether this trend will be reversed and Lavon's new policy halted, depends largely upon the internal discussions now going on within Mapai.

7. Conclusions

This essay has set out some major features that have decisively shaped the economy of the Jewish state. They help to explain Israel's astonishing dependence on outside material aid. One must be fair, however, and differentiate between objective factors (e.g. the need to purchase arms, and the Arab boycott) and subjective ones (e.g. the building of a socialist society, the attempt to raise living standards) which have made the balance of payments so precarious. Yet the question remains: Can the situation be improved? Is there a remedy?

It has been suggested that the donors to Zionist funds might exert a beneficial influence on the course of Israel's economy by channeling their donations into "productive" fields. On many counts this is not a commendable proposition; it is also impractical, for the Jewish communities of the world have been unwilling to interfere actively in the internal affairs of Israel. Again, businessmen and some economists have argued that the balance of payments could be improved if the Jewish donors of charitable funds switched to private investments and/or settled in the country. But the experience of the last decade shows the prospects of immigration from the Western world and appreciable private investments to be practically nil.

One useful remedy which I believe would substantially improve Israel's foreign currency position (though clearly it will not solve the bigger problem of the dependence on charitable and political aid) would be to abolish the foreign currency controls and—after a further radical devaluation of the Israeli pound—establish a unitary exchange rate. Finally, there is the advice given in many reports by foreign and Israeli economists: cut down the standard of living and lower wages, which in turn would decrease

the demand for imports and make exports more profitable. The Israeli government has not hesitated to spend large sums upon fees for native and foreign specialists in order to be given this advice. Yet the level of consumption has gone up gradually but steadily. It is easy to appreciate the dilemma of the political parties which find themselves in the position of being offered increasing amounts of donated and loaned resources, and are yet told to lower living standards. Israel is after all not the only political democracy in which the rulers pay more attention to elections than to the lamentations of economists.

A proper presentation of Israel's external trade shows that net proceeds from merchandise exports does not cover more than about 10 per cent of the total foreign currency proceeds. In the view of most foreign observers this lopsided relation constitutes a problem which must be tackled immediately. Actually Israel's position in this respect is not unique in the world, and several other econ-

omies finance similar deficits by invisible exports. But more important is the fact that Israel's leaders do not believe that, unless immediately corrected, this distorted relationship between merchandise exports and imports represents a threat to the existence of the state. The Israeli government is glad to hear of any proposals which would increase exports and diminish the need for a constantly rising volume of imports; but it will only pay attention to remedies which do not interfere with the political, military, and social requirements of the state. And if economists cannot provide such remedies, Israel's leaders will regretfully point out to their critics that they have survived by not paying attention in the past to pessimists. "Something is bound to turn up . . ." sums up the attitude that inspires the architects of Israel's economy. It may shock social scientists, but it is a determinate factor to be taken into account when one suggests economically practical solutions.

AS YOU MAKE IT

ELIZABETH BARTLETT

Your bed
They said
So shall you lie on it

But I found rocks
Were kinder than clocks
And did not cry on it

They meant
Content
Without a sigh on it

But I found stars
Much clearer than bars
And kept the sky on it

No crown
Or down

Held me in tie to it

But I found jewels
In the deepest pools
Where none could spy on it

They thought
I ought
So I could die on it

But I found ends
More than made amends
And did not try for it

My head
When dead
Will know the why of it

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THE HORNS OF MOSES

Old Symbols and New Meanings

NORMAN COHN

THERE are Jews still alive who can remember being told that they could not possibly be Jews because they had no horns on their heads. Until recently this belief was fairly common in backward rural areas both in Europe and in the United States—areas where normally no Jews were to be seen. It may well persist in remote corners even today.

The fantasy of the horned Jew is an old one and its history in Europe can be traced back to the Middle Ages. There are 15th-century woodcuts that depict Jews in their ordinary garb but crowned with horns. Even ecclesiastical and secular authorities sometimes allowed this popular fantasy to influence the ordinances by which they regulated the dress of Jews. In 1215 the Fourth Lateran Council had decreed that, in order to make intercourse—particularly sexual intercourse—between Christians and Jews as difficult as possible, all Jews must wear a distinguishing mark on their clothing. This decree was generally observed; and although the distinguishing mark was usually a wheel of yellow felt sewn on to the front and back of the robe, sometimes it took the form of horns. Thus an ecclesiastical synod meeting at Vienna in 1267 ordered Jews to wear a horned hat and authorized the secular lords to fine any Jew who failed to do so. The ordinance was repeated as late as 1418, and

in still sharper terms: any lord who failed to enforce it was to be excommunicated. In France too, for a generation before their expulsion in 1306, Jews had to wear a horn, in this case fixed to the middle of the yellow wheel itself. This horn was felt to be so shameful that rich Jews used to buy exemption from wearing it, even though they still had to wear the wheel. It was thanks to a special act of royal clemency that Jews were permitted to remove the horn when traveling.

Yet on the head of one particular Jew horns were a symbol not of infamy but of majesty. One has only to recall the famous figure of Moses which Michelangelo executed for the sepulchral monument of Pope Julius II and which is now in the church of S. Pietro in Vinculi in Rome. The Lawgiver is grasping the tables of the Law in his right hand, his head is raised and turned to the left with an air of overwhelming authority. From the midst of the thick clusters of hair there stand out, as though in menace, two short, pointed horns.

Michelangelo was conforming with tradition, for throughout the Middle Ages Moses had been portrayed with horns. The authority for the practice lay in the passage in the Book of Exodus which describes the lawgiver's final descent from Mount Sinai. Here the English versions of the Bible, both Authorized and Revised, tell how the children of Israel were afraid to approach Moses until he had put a veil on his face, because "the skin of his face shone." But the Vulgate, the only official Bible of the medieval Church, says "*quod cornuta esset facies sua*," "because his face was horned." It has been argued that this reading is based on a misunderstanding of the Hebrew text or else that the Hebrew text itself is corrupt, but

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both arguments can be contested. The interpretation given in the Vulgate is to be found in the Midrashim too, and it may well represent the original sense better than the English Bible does. It is more than likely that the horns of Moses came straight from a symbolism that was already ancient when Moses was alive. And from that same symbolism, though by strange and devious routes, came the horns that medieval Christendom imposed upon its Jews.

If one tries to trace the symbolism of horns to its origin one finds oneself led very far back indeed. The marvelous cave paintings which are the glory of the Magdalenian culture that flourished in France and Spain toward the close of the last Ice Age abound in horns and horned figures. A celebrated painting in the cave of the Trois Frères in the French Pyrenees shows a figure standing erect on human feet, but with the body or at least the skin of a hairy animal; the head is surmounted by a massive pair of antlers. This painting is perhaps twenty thousand years old. To the same period belong the so-called *bâtons de commandement*, sticks of bone or horn, some of which are carved with figures of men dancing in the skins of chamois; here too the most striking features are the horned heads. It would seem that what these figures represent is the god or spirit whose task it was to insure the multiplication of horned beasts; or else perhaps human magicians who themselves represented that god or spirit.

In their sub-arctic environment the Magdalenians did in fact live by hunting the mammoth, the rhinoceros, the bison, and the reindeer, which provided them not only with food but also with their clothing and their weapons of bone and horn. And meanwhile their highly skilled artists, working sometimes two miles beneath the ground, in darkness lit only by a feeble flame from a lump of fat and moss, painted and engraved multitudes upon multitudes of horned beasts. Here the motive was certainly to multiply and obtain control of the animals on which men depended for their survival. In these paintings too it is the head

of the animal that is emphasized, as though the representation of that alone were enough to bring the animal into being. Many paintings show the horned head alone—at Lascaux there is a series of heads of bulls and red deer arranged in file.

IT is certain that already in those early times horns themselves possessed a special symbolic value. In the art of the Magdalenian period one sometimes finds an antler painted by itself, with no context at all. Sometimes reliefs showing horns were combined with sculptures of vulvae, those stock symbols in fertility cults. And these works in turn recall a sculpture dating from a still earlier period, the Aurignacian. In a rock shelter at Laussel in the Dordogne there is a bas-relief carved perhaps fifty thousand years ago and showing a female who has been called the most ancient goddess known. This extremely maternal figure is about to drink from a bison horn, which archeologists have interpreted as a horn of plenty, filled perhaps with some liquid of life intended to make the drinker, a fertility goddess, conceive.

Horns were indeed valued for purposes quite other than the multiplication of horned beasts. They were for instance regarded as helpful to the dead. This was the case already with that forerunner of *homo sapiens* known as Neanderthal man, who flourished from about one hundred thousand to about twenty-five thousand years ago. Inside a mountain cavern in the region of Bokhara there has been found the grave of a young Neanderthal man—and it is encircled by five pairs of large, branching goat horns, carefully arranged. Many Magdalenian graves present a similar appearance. At graves in Wales and France and in Central Europe there have been found, obviously deliberately set with the dead, mammoth skulls with their tusks, a rhinoceros skull with its horn, and numerous skulls of deer and reindeer with their antlers. Sometimes a body was buried in a stone hut and then scores of antlers might be heaped against the wall. In the Middle Stone Age burial grounds on

the islands of Téviec and Hoëdic, off the coast of Brittany, some of the skeletons are crowned, and others covered, with stags' antlers.

The same use of horns at burials is to be found today in some primitive tribes, and its meaning is known: the horns are conceived as guardians of the dead, ever ready to protect them and supply their needs. Similarly in many parts of the world, including Europe, horns and especially the horned skulls of bulls are still fixed on the gables of houses, or over the doorway, as a protection against evil spirits and a guarantee of prosperity. The *mano cornuto*, the making of horns with the fingers, is an age-old device for warding off the evil eye. Horn amulets, often portraying a bull's skull, have been very generally used as a defense against sickness and all misfortune. Still widespread among Africans today, this form of protective magic was familiar to the Jews of 17th-century Europe. Thus we read in the *Sefer Zekira* of Zakaria Plungian, written about 1700: "If a child cries ceaselessly, put a goat's horn under its pillow, then it will stop. If a pregnant woman has bad labor pains, let her hold the right horn of a goat in her hand, then she will give birth easily."

As late as the 19th century Jewish communities in Eastern Europe tended to attribute similar magical properties to the *shofar*, precisely because it was a horn. The *shofar* would be blown in order to ease a difficult birth. In cases of demonic possession the sufferer would be taken to the synagogue and the *shofar* sounded; this was intended to put the demon to flight. A restless ghost that was disturbing the living could also be laid by sounding the *shofar*. In such practices Eastern European Jewry was faithfully following a tradition reaching back to the medieval Cabbala, which prescribes that before the sounding of the *shofar* one must pray: "O destroy Satan!" And beyond the Cabbala the tradition goes back to the Babylonian Talmud. For in one passage in that Talmud the sounding of the *shofar* at the New Year is presented not as a royal salute to the Divine King but as an in-

genious method of outwitting Satan. When Satan hears the first blast of the *shofar* he is overcome with panic, and when he hears the second he is convinced that it is the trump of the Last Judgment. This plunges him into such confusion that he is utterly helpless.

THAT a horn used as a drinking vessel brought good fortune was very commonly believed in antiquity, and by peoples as diverse as the Jews, the Greeks, the Romans, the Celts, and the Germans. This fantasy survived into the last century in Scotland, where it was believed that medicine was efficacious only when drunk out of a horn, especially one taken from a living animal. It was precisely because of this pagan belief in the supernatural potency of a drinking horn that the Church in the early Middle Ages forbade converts from paganism to drink from a horn. Only if there was no other vessel at hand might a horn be used, and even then only after the sign of the cross had been made over it.

And always the horn retained that peculiar virtue as a repository of rich productive power and a source of fertility that it had possessed when Aurignacian artists sculpted their goddess at Laussel. The cornucopia was originally associated with the goat Amaltheia, from whose horn fruits were presented to the infant Zeus; but as a symbol of fruitfulness it could be associated with any being who was a bountiful and abundant provider. How many fairy tales tell of a magic drinking horn from fairyland! Nor is the cornucopia merely a local European symbol; there is a Bantu story of an ox whose right horn produces food on demand. Sometimes the horn of fruitfulness has been raised to a cosmic scale. In ancient Iranian belief fruits sprang endlessly from the horn of the primal ox Gayomart; while in Germanic mythology water trickles perpetually from the horns of the stag Eikthyrnir to feed the rivers of the underworld.

The significance of horns was vast and one may reasonably ask why. On the living animal horns were certainly powerful

weapons—but the value that human beings attached to them was too manifold to be explained in these terms alone. Rather, the explanation would seem to lie in a complex of pre-scientific notions concerning on the one hand the nature of the cosmos and on the other hand the body and its functioning. The cosmos was conceived in terms of a life-power which was concentrated in certain specific types of object. These objects included, for instance, the vulva, the phallus, the bull, the snake, blood—and also horn. The reason why horn was felt to be a focus of life-power seems to be that it was thought of as solidified semen. It was believed (as it is still commonly believed in India) that semen was stored in the head; and as horns grew out of the head, they must be an issuing of the semen inside it.

Semen itself was held to be the very stuff of life, the vehicle of that *psyche* that was the source of all strength. The possession of semen made a male, whether beast or human, not only potent in procreation but also fierce and aggressive. Horns were therefore a concentration of life-power, powerful to generate life, powerful also in defense and attack. It is because it has been regarded as a uniquely potent concentration of life-power that powdered rhinoceros horn has always been highly prized both as an aphrodisiac and as a strength-giving tonic for warriors. The horn of that fabulous creature of medieval folklore, the unicorn, seems to have had a similar significance, for a unicorn could never be taken by force but would run gladly to a maiden's breast.

HORNS were power: so gods were imagined with horns as soon perhaps as they were imagined at all. Admittedly it is uncertain whether the erect, horned being who for the past 20,000 years has been presiding over the mass of horned beasts in the cave of the Trois Frères is a god or merely a magician. But certainly many of the gods who were worshipped in the Bronze Age civilizations of the Fertile Crescent were horned; and this was true not simply of animal gods but also, and most significantly,

of gods who had never had animal forms. The very ancient Egyptian god Khnum, who created the bodies of men and gods on a potter's wheel, is represented as a man with the head of a ram, with horns either curved or long and projecting, sometimes even with two pairs of horns. And the two great gods Re and Osiris, whose rival cults overshadowed all others, were both sometimes portrayed with horns.

The chief god of the Hittites, the weather god, lord of rain and thunder, was originally represented as a bull and always remained associated with a bull as his sacred animal. In Babylonian religion those gods who have human form normally wear, as a sign of their divinity, a headdress with two pairs of horns; the god Ramman even has four pairs, two in front and two behind. Many of these Babylonian gods carried the epithet "bull" after their names; and this is true also of the old Indian gods as they appear in the Rigveda. And what specifically symbolizes the power of the god is always the horns. Thus in the Rigveda we find the god Agni invoked in these terms: "Pierce the vexatious foe with your two horns, which are perdurable and sharpened by Brahma; pierce the oncoming monster with your flame!" In the Buddhist lore of Tibet the death-god Yama has bull's horns; he is stopped from depopulating the land only when he meets a Bodhisattva who is similarly equipped. In the Persian Avesta it is explicitly stated that the divine power of the god is concentrated in his horns. Of the god of victory, the son of the supreme god Ahura, it is said that he appears now as a wild boar, now as a ram, now as a buck, and now as a bull "on whose horns divine power manifests itself."

Horned gods survived into the Iron Age. Dionysos-Bacchus was originally represented by a bull, and in Macedonia his train of ecstatic female devotees wore horns in imitation of the god. Given human shape this god retained his horns and the epithet "bull-horned." Pan, who represented nature above all in its lustful, animal aspect, was originally a goat; and when later he became human he

never lost his horns. The same is true of that multitude of lesser folk who were associated with Pan, the fauns and satyrs. Among the Celts who inhabited France during the four centuries preceding the Roman conquest, the horned god seems to have been the greatest of the gods. An altar stone dug up at Paris shows him as a bearded figure with stag's antlers, from each of which hangs one of those twisted rings of gold that signified wealth. Above the figure is inscribed the name Cernunnos, which itself seems to mean "the horned one." In a monument found at Rheims the same god squats, an antique and majestic figure, between the younger gods Apollo and Mercury, who have to stand. He is pouring out a stream of acorns and beech mast that falls between the watchful figures of an ox and a stag, carved beneath him. On other monuments from France and Jutland the same horned god appears and always he is accompanied by symbols of plenty: rings of gold, purses and bags, horns and horned beasts. From a tablet found in Hungary we learn that a funerary college held its meetings in the temple of Cernunnos. Like Pluto, this Celtic god is lord of the underground world and at once giver of plenty and patron of the dead. And by his appearance he recalls strikingly that mysterious antlered figure in the cave of the Trois Frères.

THERE was of course one religion in the Ancient World in which the horned god could have no place. Because the God of Israel was pure being, absolutely transcendent, not immanent in nature at all, Israel was bound to regard the symbolic representation of divinity through "graven images" as irrelevant and blasphemous. But the peoples who lived on all sides of the Israelites worshipped horned gods. Even apart from the pantheons of Egyptian and Babylonian religion, it was in the form of a bull that Ba'al was worshipped by such peoples as the Canaanites. For Israel too the temptation to turn to the worship of horned beasts was always present and it was regarded as the most deadly of temp-

tations. The power which had brought the people up out of Egypt could only too easily be identified with that power which for countless thousands of years men had felt to be concentrated in horns. It was because of this that the Lord had such good cause to complain to Moses: "They have made them a molten calf, and have worshipped it, and have sacrificed thereunto, and said, These be thy gods, O Israel, which have brought thee up out of the land of Egypt." It was because of this that Jeroboam, trying to secure his rule over the people of Israel, "made two calves of gold, and said. . . Behold thy gods, O Israel, which brought thee up out of the land of Egypt." And it was natural for the Gentile prophet Balaam, when impelled to salute the great deliverance, to use that same symbolism of horns: "God hath brought them out of Egypt; he hath as it were the strength of an unicorn"—meaning, it seems, "a wild ox."

In the religion of Israel itself horns were fraught with symbolic meaning. They were integrated into the ritual, and not only in the form of the shofar. The so-called "horns of the altar," those peculiarly sacred objects that were sprinkled with the blood of sacrifices at the consecration of priests and at the sin-offering, have been recognized as originating in real horns. A fugitive seeking the sanctuary of the altar would take hold of these horns. Indeed the age-old belief in the power of horns to protect and save—the belief that once placed antlers on Paleolithic graves and that still makes people wear amulets of horn—finds expression even in the very praise of God: "He is my shield, and the horn of my salvation, my high tower, and my refuge, my savior; thou savest me from violence. . . ."

The power of the horn could be displayed by human beings. It was the power that gave victory and glory to individuals and to nations; the loss of which brought defeat and shame. In the "visions" of Daniel and of Zechariah the various horns stand for particular princes, mighty and victorious in battle. Here we have to do with metaphors so consciously elaborated as to be almost a

code, but elsewhere the same metaphors have all the vigor of spontaneity. To Israel threatened by enemy nations the Lord says: "Arise and thresh, O daughter of Zion: for I will make thine horn iron, and I will make thy hoofs brass: and thou shalt beat in pieces many people. . . ." And of Jacob's line it is prophesied: "His horns are like the horns of unicorns: with them he shall push the people together to the ends of the earth. . . ."

IT is the same thought that lies behind the dozen or more passages in the Scriptures which refer, some to the exalting of horns, others to the cutting off of horns. God can exalt the horns of men, as in the praises of the psalmists: "In thy favor our horn shall be exalted"—"My horn shalt thou exalt like the horn of an unicorn"—"He also exalteth the horn of his people, the horn of all his saints. . . ." And God can cut off the horns of men, as in the warning of Amos: "Ye . . . which say, Have we not taken to us horns by our own strength? But, behold, I will raise up against you a nation, O house of Israel, saith the Lord God of hosts. . . ."; in the warning of the psalmist: "Lift not up your horn: Lift not up your horn on high: speak not with a stiff neck. . . . All the horns of the wicked also will I cut off; but the horns of the righteous shall be exalted"; or in the despairing cry of Jeremiah: "He hath cut off in his fierce anger all the horn of Israel. . . . The Lord . . . hath caused thine enemy to rejoice over thee, he hath set up the horn of thine adversaries." On this last passage a Midrash of the 7th century C.E. comments: "There are ten horns in Israel: 1) the horn of Abraham, 2) the horn of Isaac, 3) the horn of Joseph, 4) the horn of Moses, 5) the horn of the Law, 6) the horn of the priesthood, 7) the horn of the Levites, 8) the horn of prophecy, 9) the horn of the Temple, 10) the horn of the anointed King. All these horns were set on the head of the people Israel, but when the people had sinned they were taken away again, as one puts it."

The man of extraordinary, god-given power imagined as a horned animal—this is a

truly archetypal fantasy, and one that can be traced in the most diverse cultures. In early Egyptian monuments, Pharaoh is shown as a huge bull smashing walled towns with his horns and impaling his foes on the points. The *Iliad* tells how Agamemnon stands out from his fellow kings as a bull stands out from the grazing cows. Celtic kings and heroes bear such titles as "Bull of the Province," "Bull-Phantom," "Prince Bull of Combat." And in the most varied cultures men have worn horns as a symbol of the power within them. The warriors of many peoples of antiquity wore upright horns on their helmets; the same custom obtains amongst some African peoples today and can be detected also in the spiked helmets of Imperial Germany. In the cathedral of S. Gennaro at Naples there is a 13th-century fresco showing twenty-one knights of the family of Minutoli; twelve of these have curved bull horns on their helmets and these were the knights who had distinguished themselves in combat.

One single warrior of antiquity was believed to have possessed bodily horns—Alexander the Great. In a 6th-century Syrian legend Alexander says to God: "I know that you have made horns grow on my head so that I might overthrow the kingdoms of the world"; while later authorities, including the Koran, refer to Alexander as "the two-horned one." Now this surely throws much light on the origin of the horns of Moses. For like Alexander, Moses was seen as a unique, semi-divine being, as preeminent among prophets as Alexander among conquerors. It was because he was set apart from all men by the immediacy of his contact with God that he was granted in concrete form and as part of his person what others could only possess figuratively: the horns in which divine power was concentrated. And these horns were also intended to insure the safety of Israel and to overwhelm its foes—a thought which, strangely enough, is preserved in the formula used when the miter is set upon the head of a newly consecrated bishop of the Roman Catholic Church: "We set on the head of this Bishop, O Lord, Thy

champion, the helmet of defense and salvation, that with comely face and his head armed with the horns of either Testament he may appear terrible to the gainsayers of the truth, and may become their vigorous assailant, through the abundant gift of Thy grace, who didst make the face of Thy servant Moses to shine after familiar converse with Thee, and didst adorn it with the resplendent horns of Thy brightness and Thy truth. . . .”

BUT what of those other horns, the horns that medieval Jews had to wear as a badge of infamy? Those were borrowed directly from the demons of medieval Christianity, and these in turn were descended directly from the horned beings who had played so large a part in earlier world pictures. More specifically, medieval demons are the horned gods and spirits of Roman religion, rejected and converted into evil monsters. Augustine, writing early in the 5th century, identifies fauns and suchlike with devils; many trustworthy folk, he adds, swear that these creatures are continually pursuing women and having intercourse with them. And just as Pan had headed the train of goatlike nature spirits, so now the hordes of demons had their king and captain in the Devil, Satan.

The Scriptures tell of a Satan who, when he assumed animal form, took that of a serpent or dragon; it knows nothing of a Satan who is half human, half goat. That shape is taken over from Pan. The horned, hairy monster so familiar in medieval art is in fact recognizably Pan, only a Pan who has shed his carefree joviality and whose passionate animality has acquired a terrible

ferocity. At times one even encounters in medieval records, under the name of the Devil, a horned god who is far older even than Pan. In the 4th century a companion of Martin, Bishop of Tours, was gored by the Devil in the form of a bull.

Now whatever the views of theologians and the upper clergy, the populace of medieval Europe did not see Jews as unambiguously human. They thought of them as uncanny beings, helpmates of Satan and like him incessantly striving after the ruin of Christians and of Christendom—“*dyables d'enfer, ennemys du genre humain*” (“devils from hell, enemies of mankind”), as a French miracle play has it. In the synagogue Jews were believed to worship the Devil in the shape of a cat or a toad, invoking his aid in making black magic. True, when they were seen Jews seemed to have human forms like anybody else, but this was merely an added ground for vexation. What nature had imprudently obscured human ingenuity could make plain; and so in popular art and drama, and in the ordinances of bishops and princes, horns were imposed upon the Jews.

In the symbolic language of the time Jews were thereby pronounced to be demons. In vastly older symbolic languages what had been wished upon the Jews was the outward sign of an indwelling force which at different epochs had been potent to multiply and control wild beasts, potent to protect against sickness and danger, potent to overthrow embattled hosts, potent finally as a vehicle for the will of the one God. But that was something suspected neither by the Christians who bestowed the horns, nor by the Jews who wore them.

LIFE IN THE U.S. ARMY

Fantasyland, Peacetime Variety

HARRIS DIENSTFREY

ON HIS first or second day in the United States Army, every soldier receives, gratis, Department of the Army Pamphlet 21-41, *Personal Conduct for the Soldier*, the effect of which on anyone's personal conduct is negligible. Some young soldiers, tense and looking for tips, skim the pamphlet during basic training; a few read it completely and carefully. It is written in the style of an academic and inadequate English teacher who pictures his audience as a group of sex-, passion-, and feeling-less children, spoiled slightly by overindulgence. With the exception of one paragraph, *Personal Conduct* describes a rigid politeness never experienced in any army. If every soldier from now to the last Armed Forces Day should read it, its effect would be as significant as washing one less tray during KP.

The Army isn't any James Jones place, either: 1958 is not 1941. Nor is it a Norman Mailer land (which housed marines, in the first place): peacetime is not wartime. With the continuing cold war and the years of draft, the Armed Forces have changed. They involve so many Americans now, either directly, through six months or two or three or more years of service, or through kinship, that one result is a two-way process of accommodation: the public to the interference of the draft, and the services in general to an increased public supervision, the product of public indignation—the McKeon case

(Marines) is a good example, or, in the Air Force, the Wheeler incident (he wanted no haircut), and, in the Army, the Shult incident. (Shult was a clerk typist. One of his teachers called him a "mathematical genius" and publicly attacked the Army's assignment. Shult was transferred within a week.) After all, the public's argument runs, there's no war on; the services can't excuse their occasional sadism, or previously greater indifference to individuality, by the expedience of battle and the necessity of discipline. The Army has changed too, the Old is not the New, and *Personal Conduct* isn't either.

The first few days in the Army are still scary enough to provide some stories with which you can either amuse or frighten your friends, whose amusement or fright depends more on their draft status than on your intent. My first day began in the Whitehall Recruiting Station, in New York, where I received a physical, was fingerprinted, and recited some information concerning to whom the government's \$10,000 insurance was to go if I were killed. (This insurance was discontinued as of December 31, 1956, approximately two months after I was inducted; eligibility for the GI Bill and mustering-out pay for anyone entering active duty on or after January 31, 1955, had been terminated already. "What do we get besides two years?" a friend of mine once asked.) Several busloads of us were driven to the Fort Dix Processing Center, where, in the next few days, we would get our clothing, receive various physical examinations, take a battery of tests to help determine our military jobs, and from where we would be sent to our basic training unit.

We arrived at the Reception Center after dark and arranged ourselves, after considerable instruction, in two ranks, one line of

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men directly behind the other. Just as the sergeant began to speak, another soldier—it was hard to make any distinctions that early in the game; we knew he was a soldier because he wore a *uniform*: we still wore “civvies” and were embarrassed by them—a soldier walked by, hands in pockets. The sergeant suddenly yelled out: “Goddamit, trooper, you get your goddam hands out of your pockets. You can play with your ----- at night.” (*Personal Conduct* speaks to this point directly: “Profanity and vulgarity . . . do not make the thoughts of a person more effective.” It is wrong.)

The sergeant was not an alien sadist, only a bored twenty-year man. His words were not a violent personal attack spoken with the purpose of humiliating, but a magic incantation, an impersonal response to a stock situation, pronounced with no real feeling and under the assumption that they would have only one response: hands-out-of-pockets. If the sounds produced no confusion and embarrassment and/or, specifically, no immediate withdrawal of the soldier’s hands, this might cause bitterness, for then the sergeant, who had a considerably higher rank than the two-day-old and bewildered trainee, might become confused, reacting, on a much lower level, like the guard in *From Here to Eternity*, astonished at Prewitt’s lust to kill him. But as children become accustomed to their parents’ nonsense and no-meaning commands, so all soldiers become emotionally impervious to emotionally impersonal actions. The speed with which new soldiers do this, and the degree to which they likewise become impersonal, measure their acclimation.

Most new soldiers are nervous and uncertain; they have never lived in a world created and bound by rules whose magnitude and specificity they can only guess. And they must face this terror immediately. Must one mark his clothes with the kit being sold at the end of the first pay line? Does buffing new boots make them easier to polish? Do you have to arrive at your basic training unit in a pressed uniform? The sergeant answers yes to each question, and each soldier pays

one dollar for the marking kit, fifty cents for buffing the boots (which polish no better when buffed), and sixty-five cents for the uniform pressing. Within a week everyone realizes that all the answers should have been no, but it is some indication of the new soldier’s psychological condition that this realization doesn’t prevent similar behavior in the future. In our basic training company, for example, we were talked into buying not only wax, mops, brooms, and cleanser for the floors we had to clean, but toilet paper (this particular story is too long to go into) and a buffer as well. Recruits are open to the simplest kind of economic exploitation. In the Army world, like changing from civilian to military clothes, being exploited is a way of being initiated.

BASIC training has two purposes: to prepare the individual for combat and to accustom him to discipline. The first is a matter of physical stamina and developing a few manual skills, the second a matter of personal behavior. Though a drastically overweight person might have some difficulty, there is little trouble physically. I was in no physical condition when drafted, as underweight as I remain, and the only occasion I felt truly exhausted was after a “speed march,” four miles in fifty minutes, carrying a light pack, a weapon, and wearing a full uniform. I had as much trouble breaking in my two pair of combat boots as I did in meeting any other physical requirement. And learning what the Army has to teach, which is very little (and inadequate, I’d argue) and taught badly, is less difficult.

Becoming accustomed to discipline involves greater problems. For one reason, soldiers who issue commands, especially in training outfits, either don’t recognize or refuse to remember that discipline and harassment overlap. As long as they can recite the impersonal excuse, that the order was given in the name of discipline (think of the difficulty in trying to prove that a single specific order was *not* given to promote greater discipline), they can command what they like and remain secure, legally and

psychologically. Although such a situation allows, possibly even stimulates, sadistic behavior, I met no one whose actions deserved the name.

Responsibility and power were misused, but the issue was one of status instead of psychopathic behavior. One tried to prove that he held a rank and had power (a major cause of harassment), or that he deserved the rank he held and that from the Army's viewpoint he could use it properly; the rank wasn't used to release individual hatreds and fears. To command and to be obeyed signified and validated the chevron on the sleeve or the insignia on the collar. What is the use, in terms of self-image and military function, of being, for example, a sergeant who is not obeyed? (This question causes more tension in some ranks than in others. As a private, I trust sergeants more than corporals, and both more than officers.)

But neither physical tests nor ridiculous commands cause the central problem of basic training; the situation's newness does. It is a newness that contains danger not novelty, that combines with a loneliness, the product of feeling you have no one you can talk to or whom you know although you are in a crowd everywhere, all the time, to produce in turn the realization that no one knows your *entire* name. The immediate panic lasts at least several weeks: it is as if each man can depend only on himself and his own secret cunning.

The three or four fellow trainees who first do something noticeably wrong usually become targets of continuous harassment; having spotted them, the cadre ("teachers" of a basic training unit) focus their irritation on them again and again. (This way too the cadre doesn't have to learn too many names too quickly.) Unconsciously or not, one very quickly accepts the belief that he lives within a system that contains limited amounts of punishment and reward. If someone else gets into trouble, you are saved; if they have played it safer, you lose.

The entire "social" problem of basic training is this: what are the limits to which you can help the other person and still save

yourself? From what do you save yourself? Court-martial? Personal humiliation? Physical maltreatment? Extra push-ups? These are the rumors. (And push-ups are more than rumors.) But who knows? You are alone in a world of strange rules and strangers. Everything is new, nothing is clear. Hence, the problem of being a "good guy," of simultaneously helping others and still protecting yourself.

FOR some reason, this is the one situation where *Personal Conduct* touches reality. "Lend the other fellow a hand when he needs your help," it says. "For a little help you'll get more thanks than you may deserve." Right as rain; true as true can be. Gratitude for helping someone make his bed, or for showing another how to disengage the trigger-housing group from an M-1 rifle, or for sweeping under someone else's bed when he hasn't enough time, none of which takes more than five minutes, is quick, sure, and lasting. The helper becomes a good guy, the kind of person anyone could and would ask to come along to the movies. (This is significant, for movie-going is one of the soldier's major recreations, and especially, almost exclusively so, in basic training.) Some people can't be asked because they are aloof, either by choice, timidity, or in the other's eyes. But the slight aid of bed-making or weapon-cleaning bombs the barriers and destroys the inhibitions. What matters most is the apparent *risk* one has taken, the friendship one gives when friendship and help seem most needed and busy self-interest appears most natural.

Good samaritanism increases as basic training ends and as the number of questions trainees ask each other decrease. The question is the trainees' typical (and eventually maddening) form of conversation, used less as the apparent risks of being a good guy become smaller. One learns the rules of the game, the Army environment becomes more stable, and there are fewer problems and more time for friendship. The big job of basic is over.

In basic training the soldier first faces the

peacetime Army's most uncomfortable tasks, KP, guard duty, and parades. (For an example of a still existent barbaric torture, parades can't be beat; like stoning people to death, their ostensible purpose is completely negated by the enormous personal discomfort involved, and the practice should be abolished.) In basic the soldier observes the Army's tradition, among the non-commissioned, of buck-passing, and, among the commissioned, of officers' attempts to impress higher officers. These facets of Army life are much more important after basic, for one leaves it to enter a world in which the importance of various problems change and other elements dominate.

II

SOLDIERS, career men included, refer to civilian life as "the outside"; the terminology of leaving the service and of the time spent in it is also prison talk: "When are you getting out?" and "How long have you been in?" Although the world of the university student is probably as different from "normal" civilian life as is the Army world—it might be as isolated, as self-contained, for one thing—the student rarely names two worlds; the soldier always does. On the other hand, the officer, a gentleman by act of Congress, lives in a country-club world, and regardless of the ways in which this world is similar to or different from the non-officer's, it is to the latter and to his army that the above and the following refer.

The Army is a topsy-turvy fantasyland, and talk of "outside" and getting there is a clue to its uniqueness. Some characteristics pertinent to the creation of this fantasyland are the pay, once a month, regardless of work done; three daily meals and a bed (three hots and a cot), broke or not; the same routine each day; work that never ends, never is different, and which men perform, whatever their original talents, at only moderate speed and with moderate interest because it was never very interesting to begin with; limited types of social situations and face-to-face contacts; plus life in a complexly and invisibly structured world

one never made or voted for and can hardly hope to affect, which operates through channels so bureaucratic and endless, that all regulations, supersessions, rescindments, and whatever, are accepted with equal diffidence and a belief that all of them are only differently flavored frostings for a cake that will always taste the same.

The Army is a world with no sharp edges, everywhere the same dull-gray make-believe—a fantasy in the sense that it is suspended in time and nowhere rooted to any community. It is a changeless place in which beds are made similarly in Panama and Germany, in 1939 and 1957, by privates and by sergeants; it is a place where grown men live by children's rules and can receive or hand out, makes no difference which, two hours of extra duty each day for fourteen days to punish walking on the grass or touching a polished brass doorknob. For the ordinary lower-echelon soldier, whatever change occurs is unimportant; he lives in an inanimate infinity surrounded by a vacuum.

Inspections and the soldier's work illustrate how the everyday *content* of the Army is a function of this disconnectedness. Inspections are the results of hours, days, and sometimes weeks of extra work, depending upon who inspects. Although inspections are valid in theory, in practice they become a game mirroring regulations rather than indicating how men live: the higher the officer, the longer the preparation; the longer the preparation, the less the inspection reveals. In some instances, they are a method of harassment.

Daily inspection of one's area and bed aren't much of a problem; the bigger inspections are—of foot lockers, where one's underwear must be rolled in a certain fashion, and wall lockers, where all shirts must be buttoned, and for which everything is shined, polished, or waxed (usually more than once). Some companies demand that pieces of cardboard be placed in the underwear to eliminate every possible wrinkle. Everyone involved realizes that the inspected perfection is mock, that conditions were different a week ago and will be different to-

morrow. Beyond this fact, and the additional mockery that people know it, inspections are regulated by rules absurd in their specificity: to be neat and clean is not to have one's shirts buttoned. The strange, unknown rules of processing and of basic training gain a new dimension.

Inspections, as they are conducted, are symptomatic of the Army's life-unto-itself, of its lack of contact with the everyday habits of living men. Perhaps a peacetime situation intensifies this characteristic, for then the Army loses much of its purpose. An Army's mission is to fight and win wars; during peacetime, though, it must sustain itself so that it can fight when needed. During peacetime the men in an army can do only two things: prepare for fighting (that is, train) or service the organization's internal needs. In basic training one does the former and therefore feels related more or less to something beyond the Army; after basic most do the latter, and therefore see the Army's fantasy life more clearly. (This distinction isn't very hard. After a while, regardless of job, the fantasy is overwhelming.) As much pride as one can take in oiling a minor part of a monstrous and overly complicated machine, so much pride can he take in his Army job. His work is as interesting and as meaningful, though often not as important, as the act of oiling. Boredom is another leveler in an almost flat world.

THE Army does more than remove some normal stresses of civilian life—like worrying about a job or making ends meet—to replace them with ungenial paternalism and tiring, ridiculous pasteboard. It does more than offer jobs in which one can take little pride or satisfaction. In doing these things it helps create a personality.

Men who face the daily boredoms and the same irritations drink with each other afterward at the same non-commissioned officers' club, and daytime's fellow workers become nighttime's fellow players. The criterion for being either or both is to be in the same unit. Friendships are formed on the basis

of facing the same problems, the same officers, the same nightly and week-end pleasures; usually they go no further. The enlisted man or non-commissioned officer makes and loses friends as rapidly and as often as he is moved from one post to another, and this fluid life of static activities and static relationships helps make the career soldier a public and uncertain man. Nowhere has he any chance for depth. The Army, in addition to these other factors, with its bureaucratic structure and masculine atmosphere, creates a man who is surest with other men during playtime, but who is less capable when he must order them about, a man who is unimaginative with women and slightly afraid.

The two-year soldier is also affected by the Army's fantasy, though not as strongly nor as permanently as the career man. (The six-months soldier, either Reserve Forces Act or critical skills, has a different sense of time, and for him the Army is different yet.) A US friend (meaning the initials that precede his serial number: US designates two-year service; RA indicates a longer time) once told me, "I date girls here I wouldn't walk down the street with at home. You'll do it too. That's the way the Army is. You'll see." This may be as much excuse as it is explanation, but, conversely, it is as much explanation as it is excuse, and by substituting the phrase "have friends" for "date girls" it speaks as meaningfully about Negro-white relations in the Army as it does about a soldier's sexual relations.

Being in the Army is being nowhere. Not only are you away from the home's *gestalt* of do's and don't's, public and private, but being in the Army means that you belong to an organization that connects with the community at large in a way you have not previously experienced, and this fact is as true of the connections between one's particular post and the specific community it adjoins. Moreover, being a US in the Army is being there for two years, and thus whatever the Army is, one's experience in it has a definite temporal limit (some people count the number of seconds they have left).

Whatever the Army is, in other words, it is transitory, just as one's relations are with most of the men he meets, and similarly, with the women he meets. The soldier's purpose is short-run—to laugh, have a good time, to make out; the civilian's long-run—ultimately, to get married. (For the girl too the situation must be different. The soldier is something like the Stranger; the civilian more like the Neighbor.)

For a definite time the soldier has been released from the old rules, he has the chance to take a risk. Despite a buried anticipation of the lucky windfall of meeting the "special" girl, of meeting a Stranger who is actually a Neighbor, the soldier's conception of himself in relation to women changes from the one he had as a civilian. Before he was the cautious male, wary-eyed, manipulating his sexuality more than his sex, applying mental definitions of good or bad wife. Now he is the roving male, desire-driven, sexually alert, unsentimental, and superior. So he does go with girls he wouldn't be seen with at home and, likewise, sleeps with them, questioning and fearing less his responsibility, or the girls' beauty and sensitivity—or lack of them.

This is one kind of extreme. Not everyone hunts the dark corners and under the red lights, that is, the beaches, hotel bars, and department stores. But there is a change. People who would not have done so in civilian life, now look covetously at the handsome girl moving across the restaurant. Others merely hoot in the movies (a rarer sound back home) whenever a pretty girl appears on the screen. All these are various kinds of risks, caused less by living-the-way-the-Romans-do or by keeping-up-with-the-Joneses, than by release into a temporally limited, bureaucratic man's world of nowhere.

THE Negro is a different problem. For many white soldiers, the Army and its two years of service is the first occasion (for some the last) to meet a variety of Negroes. Now that the services are integrated, white lives with black, which means more than

working and, at times, playing together; it means closer familiarity with habits and behavior. Though there may be more strain than I see—is the slur more or less apparent to the snubbed?—the Negro and the white live together with ease. (The *Richmond News Leader* reported that the fathers of at least three of the nine Negro children attending Little Rock Central High School "have seen military service.") The particular idiotic commands of a corporal are usually considered no more idiotic if he happens to be a Negro, even though some whites do make a "form-content" distinction: as a Southern PFC said, "When you salute a nigger, you salute the uniform. You don't salute the man." A Northern counterpart to this argument is that though they, Northerners, definitely aren't anti-Negro, after living with the Negro they can sympathize with the Southerner's point of view. (The trouble with this argument is that the characteristics which presumably lead to sympathy are equally applicable to economically lower-class whites.) Yet the large majority of soldiers, which also includes this last group, those who would never use the word "nigger" and are in favor of school integration but aren't so sure about integrated housing, find one or several Negroes they especially like, people who surprise them by being some kind of exception to whatever group they see when looking at each single black man. (This observation, with the proper semantic changes, also holds for the anti-Semite, but is not as true for the anti-foreigner, the type of person who observed, after the Hungarian revolution and at a time when 19,000 Hungarian refugees had emigrated to the United States, that there probably were more damn refugees in the country than Americans.)

But partly because the Army is make-believe, one can live with the Negro, work with him, drink and play with him, and can still believe some dark, dreary dream of him; and the tension between the reality and the dream, between exception and generalization, is slight. Some soldiers argue that outside it is different. Outside people have to work for a living; outside people are on their

own; there what one receives is commensurate on the average with what he deserves. A more general way of saying this is that what happens on the inside is not valid and/or is not to be taken seriously because it isn't real. There isn't any relation between outside and in, and the Negro who is thought to be okay on the inside is on the outside a Negro and thus subject to another interpretation.

An attempt to describe the differences and the relations between civilian life and the military organization, other than the fact that the latter offers certain kinds of protection to the former, might develop this racial good feeling and could help sustain it in civilian life. But all official Army seriousness, which takes the forms of Troop Information lectures and monthly talks by a chaplain (a different religion each month, if possible) mixes Douglas MacArthur, Norman Vincent Peale, and a version of "Be happy in your work." Heterogeneity of the audience is one cause; conceptions of their intelligence another. Except for an occasional soldier impressed by a chaplain's remonstrance that one should believe in God because faith benefits each man's own physical safety, they seem to bore everyone. One can't talk intelligently to an audience unless he assumes that they are intelligent, and the Army and its spokesmen do not make this assumption. To make it would indicate a change in the Army's fantasy life.

Perhaps bureaucracy creates bureaucracy and fantasy more fantasy, but neither is indestructible, and serious talk for the two weekly hour sessions of Troop Information—a decent fifteen-minute presentation of world events each hour would be a beginning—and the chaplain's monthly "character guidance" could start the process. The fact that the Army proscribes such seriousness (Troop Information people are taught not to say anything inflammatory), not only does harm to the Negro-white relations just discussed, but completes the Army's great wall of fantasy. What could have been a window serves as the last brick in the wall that silence cemented.

III

THE Army, with no sharp edges, is equally the world of many distinctions, officer and non-officer being the easiest to observe and describe. The Negro-white distinction, more overt in civilian life, partially disappears in the Army or becomes less clear and more liable to exception. The distinction between the educated (this usually means college educated) and the non-educated (high school and under), however, is a prevalent one in the Army, and one not much discussed. A difference more or less covert in civilian life, where business interests bridge it, the Army experience strengthens the difference and, occasionally, institutionalizes it. What is a neutral fact, that some people have gone to school longer than others and know more facts and theories, becomes, for the educated soldier, a judgment relating to good and evil. Though many people only talk about education, they are making a moral judgment about a style of life.

From the educated's viewpoint, the Army interrupts his career. School is interrupted, research is stopped, perhaps permanently, law practice is forestalled, and someone at home may be getting the position you couldn't try for until your service was completed. Military service is a national obligation in theory only (Switzerland taxes those who, for whatever reason, don't fulfill their military service), and the necessity of a standing peacetime army and/or patriotism are unsuccessful in explaining any of these interruptions and insufficient as compensation.

The other side of the coin is that the Army has very few positions for anyone with a college education. This fact is especially important now that the Army has reduced its strength by releasing men who received low scores on tests taken when processing. These men, regardless of their actual accomplishments during their time in service, are termed "untrainable." One man who received an early discharge because of his scores had two years of college, did the same type of work I do, has returned to college, but in processing, "didn't give a damn."

The educated, on the other hand, are "trainable." Most of them become clerk-typists or supply or personnel clerks; some, classified Scientific and Professional personnel, are assigned to the Army's research program. The personnel clerk prepares and helps process allotment forms, leave records, individual history records, travel vouchers, and so forth—all extremely repetitious clerical work. The researcher fills an administrative position which rarely demands more specific knowledge than a high school education offers. The function of his job is to conduct the research, usually unimaginative and inadequately controlled, according to schedule; he doesn't offer suggestions about the research itself. "How many times do I have to tell you," a captain told a friend of mine for about the fifth time, "that your job is not to decide whether this or that is meaningful. That's not your job!" In terms of what his education prepares him to do, the educated two-year man is useless to the Army—anyone with a decent high school education could perform almost any of his jobs—and such uselessness creates an existential boredom and an inner tension.

The waste is obvious, and the Army's belief that the college-educated can't truly be utilized in their fields is incorrect. For one example, the social scientists, usually considered the prime example of military uselessness, could develop, among other projects, a more useful Troop Information program or better housing conditions or, most important, a classification and assignment program—including classification of "scientific and professional"—that worked.

FOR the educated this is one part of the story, his career interrupted and his Army work meaningless. Being treated the same as the non-educated is another; here boredom and inanity again fuse. Everyone performs the same official duties: cleaning latrines, standing guard, KP, etc., etc. A contingent of the educated resent these duties, arguing that the activities are beneath them or that their background indicates they should do something more use-

ful. But their disturbance is based on more yet than the sharing of unpleasant duties. Everyone, in addition, is harassed the same way, is cursed at and ordered about by the same ridiculous, non-educated sergeants. All, indifferently, are treated, at best, indifferently. The non-educated may resent this as much as the educated, although because of their background they accept it as an unchangeable aspect of life, but the educated feel insulted, and they decry this verbal bullying as the muckrakers shouted corruption. And they direct their resentment not only against the Army but also against the non-educated. Resentment doesn't sponsor the belief that such treatment is insolence with respect to *all* men, but rather the belief that leaders, educated ones of course, are always essential to guide the sheep, that the non-educated must be handled so, and that the educated are trapped and suffer because of the sheep around them.

The educated's social background obviously determines his attitudes as much as his education does. He expects certain privacies—to read, or while going to the toilet or taking a shower; he is accustomed to a certain range and definite amount of noise and expects others, for example, to respect his sleep by keeping radios off and voices down; and, for complicated reasons, bodily contact disturbs him and he dislikes roughhouse—the determined, playful wrestling that occurs in the barracks or just standing in the chow line. These are all cultural standards of behavior, characteristic of a style of life.

The standards of the non-educated are different, more aggressive or spontaneous, depending on one's viewpoint. They demand and give less privacy, make more noise more continually, and push, jostle, and wrestle each other as a matter of course. To the educated, this behavior is unacceptable; it is animal-like and indicates a lower degree of civilization. (In some companies, the non-educated are called "animals" or "bodies." And some officers use the latter word, or "peon," to refer to privates and PFC's.) A moral judgment is made: it weighs and defines the whole man. A short unnoticed

jump, and the educated can speak of *natural* differences.

BUT two typical statements of the educated reveal an ambiguity in this largely unconscious argument, as well as its twin basis: "What can you talk to them about?—i.e., vocabulary, motives, and interests are, apparently, too different to allow communication; different education, in short—and "But they don't want to better themselves"—i.e., there are two groups, the educated is superior, and the non-educated should emulate it; different styles of life, in short. Both statements say that the educated should determine the standards of judgment, determine the subjects of conversation, and, of course, judge who and what is superior. The non-educated are simply defined out of whatever higher categories of being are discussed. For one reason, they don't recognize the superior group, don't want to better themselves and become like it. Both statements also indicate an attempt to cross a gap and to send communications down from on high, revealing how we are all, in various ways, touched by the American dream and story of mobility. This attitude is partially a belief in "the obligations of position"—since I'm higher, I'll help you up a bit—but it is also a response to an attitude the educated recognize only implicitly. For what is surprising is the rapidity with which people who left school either before or immediately after high school assume that the college graduate is superior. Though the non-educated often deny the importance of education, they are not always so sure they should. The response to this uncertainty is another uncertainty. Sometimes the non-educated are uncivilized—but, sometimes, less uncivilized; sometimes, possibly, they *do* want to better themselves.

If the college graduate assumes equality or acts *as if* both he and the lesser educated are equal as men, although each has different interests, the latter assumes that the former is superior in many ways. He is a solver of problems, dispenser of fair judg-

ments, giver of advice. The kind of person one can go to. If the non-educated had run a successful business before being drafted, which is rarely the case, then the seeming success, ability, and future of the educated is not as impressive. If not—grounds for other judgments are flimsy at best—the educated, aided by their verbal abilities, set the standards, and when not used as a weapon or an obvious sign of superior distinction, an education becomes just that; the word and signs of education carry much the same authority as the word "officer" and its concomitant signs. Thomas Heggens's *Mr. Roberts* shows that the officer who pulls no rank and minimizes the "officer-enlisted men" distinction to something like a distinction in job responsibility and not a fundamental difference in nature, is the officer the enlisted men respect most, at least in the "peacetime" conditions of the book. The same mechanism is involved in both situations: acknowledgment of superiority, provided the supposed superior assumes a stance of equality. Yet even without that stance, the power of both officer and educated man is deemed significant: both have made it or will, both are with the ways of the have's. Who knows what they can tell? Who knows but what they *may* be superior?

The distinction between educated and non-educated is one more example in the great History of Versus, to be included with the men *vs.* women, the haves *vs.* the have-nots, the black and the white, rural and urban, and all the rest. Beyond its significance in the Army setting, it illustrates at least two other important problems: the inhibitive snobbery of much higher education, and the tendency to judge whole men on the basis of different motor characteristics and linguistic abilities. It exemplifies how stratification into a moral hierarchy causes resentment on the one hand, and arrogance on the other, and how, if the moral judgment is kept implicit, what tends to result is imitation from below and manipulation from above. The distinction is the product of an institution in which work and actual achievements are less meaningful than the

fact that each man has a rank to fulfill—"a man is as a man does" becomes, in the Army, "a man does as a man is"; private, corporal, and sergeant do as Army regulations say they do—a fantasy world in which the ability to do is often the ability to talk, seldom the ability to achieve.

IV

WHEN someone answers, yes or no, he does or doesn't like the Army, he is talking about his everyday feelings: the anger, the enjoyment, the depressions, the excitement that together make up the daily psychological texture of Army life. When he explains his answer, the explanation says something about this texture. Most two-year men dislike the Army, but explaining why is a tough job. Most of these same two-year men, when their two years are over, exclaim, "It really wasn't so bad. You know, in its own way, it was a lot of fun." Why is the dislike so hard to describe? Why the change later? Do people forget? Or do they become more reasonable? Were they just being childishly antagonistic?

The daily psychological stance of the soldier is a kind of manic-depressiveness. Like the manic-depressive, he sees the world differently, he feels it differently. After the service, the good times weight his past for precisely the same reason the present was so difficult to explain: in retrospect the anger and despair he felt seem to have had insufficient cause. While he is a soldier, he slides, helter-skelter, from annoyance to enjoyment. He suffers from an emotional short-circuit, and trying to explain it to someone whose circuit is complete is like trying to describe the taste of oranges to someone who eats only apples.

Once a week, every soldier gets fresh sheets. In the morning, he tears his bed down, folds sheets and blankets (in a prescribed manner), and puts them atop the folded mattress. He changes the sheets at the supply room later in the day. He makes this swap the same day of every week. How can he describe the annoyance it causes? How can he explain the fact that it is an-

noying? That it is, should be absurd. True, one must make one's bed after duty hours, but that's only an extra ten minutes' work, and it rubs the wrong way. Thinking about it makes him annoyed. Or standing retreat, a ceremony held when the flag is lowered. At the most, it takes another ten minutes and involves wearing a clean uniform, and, possibly, having polished shoes and a haircut. Irritation, logically, is ridiculous. But the irritation is there. A more blunt example: how can one explain (or, after the service, *recall*) the immediate despair he feels when he discovers his name on the KP duty roster? And only those in the Army can know what it means to be wakened a half hour earlier than usual.

Now parades, guard duty, and KP are the special triumvirate of such supreme annoyance that the feeling they produce amounts to despair. To the two-year man, these duties are the most shattering instances of a basic situation in which, like the action of a dripping faucet, emotional effect is completely disproportionate to immediate cause. In the Army, moreover, the faucet drips sporadically, in sudden explosive spurts, and each man knows that the terrible drip which finally will drive him mad will never come. The Army and the services in general provide the subject of so much humor because all one can remember after the nightmare is that it happened, not what made it so scarifying. Yet, like the nightmare, the despair is no less real for being so intangible.

This is only half the story. The soldier is on the middle of a mostly level, suddenly madly tilting seesaw, and he slides into annoyance or enjoyment with equal grace. Occasionally the Troop Information lectures are cancelled. Oh, the abounding joy then! When the individual exercises so little control, the cancellation is a true gift of the powers that be.

Books have been written about the good times in the Army. For some soldiers there may be more sociability during their two-year tour of duty than at any other time. Laughter comes almost unexpectedly, out of little more, on most occasions, than a few

words and a couple of beers. Cut off in certain ways from reality, restrained for two years in a time pocket where one's legitimate activities seem meaningless, each soldier is thrown on the imagination and good will of every other, and often the camaraderie established seems a new experience.

The texture of everyday Army life produces, psychologically, the attitude of the manic-depressive; outwardly, it is seesaw sliding; annoyance and enjoyment form an emotional space-time continuum. Most statements about disliking the Army refer to this strange and disturbing condition, for while one experiences it, the worse half—the part one would change if he even had the slightest chance of doing so—seems to be practically the whole of it. There are less subjective, less transient, reasons for dislike that combine general emotional response. As an institution, the Army is simply indefensible. The well-known caste system of officers and enlisted men, comic as it is, is also repugnant; the Army's paternalism, its assumption that most men are incapable of rational thought or intelligent decision, is degrading; its elephantine size and bureaucratic structure is inefficient, causing badly organized defense cuts and drawing money that could be used for better purposes (urban renewal, for example or, for that matter, a better farm program); and corrupt, in the values it preaches and in the way it teaches men to behave.

It's obvious that the Army isn't an evil

trap for everyone. The rural and small-town boys, for example, aren't affected the same way as the city boy. To some two-year men, the Army is a release, a world where old impossibilities become probable, one which opens up possibilities for new voyaging. But at the center of the trap, or the release, when it is one, is the fantasy, until the Army, at times, represents an organizational, real-life projection of *Waiting for Godot*, where everything is suspended and nothing has meaning. Fantasy provides the hub, the spokes, and the outer rim for the entire process, trap or release: it creates the sense of being cut off. It operates in basic training as well as afterward; it makes white-Negro friendships easier to achieve, while, contradictorily, making educated-non-educated friendships more difficult. It is the prime fact of the Army as a social experience.

The Army can be both trap and release. There is a current argument, and a true one, I think, that too much literal realism is unhealthy and that to grow and mature one needs fantasy as much as he needs anything. The Army is a moratorium upon reality, and as such, for a time, it can be a restful, healthy experience. This argument does not contradict the other, that, institutionally, the Army is indefensible; in fact, a fantasy which is institutional and impersonal has little depth. The fantasy is extreme, and the longer the extreme the greater the danger. The moratorium becomes a trap, and there is depression, not health.

THE OTHER CHEEK

A Story

JAY KAPLAN

OVER twenty years have passed since all of this happened, and probably I do not really remember it accurately, yet I cannot be very far wrong. The details are too clear in my memory. . . .

It was early December. I was nine and a half. We lived in the University Heights section of the west Bronx; our block was the eighteen hundred block of Loring Place. My school was a school which has since come into some prominence—Public School No. 26, the education lair of Robert Strom, the “\$64,000 Question” phenomenon.

What things are like there today when December rolls around, I do not know. But in my day, the coming of December raised certain problems for me. Although the school was at least a third Jewish, December was purely the month of Christmas. None of the teachers I had ever made mention of Chanukah, or even asked about the mysteries of the odd candelabras they may have glimpsed in some shop window.

There was, of course, no attempt to inflict any sort of worship on the class. But since it was a holiday—and a kind of a national holiday—surely some celebration was in order. Cards were made for the poor in orphanages; sometimes there was a play—not of the manger variety, but illustrative of the Christmas spirit; caroling was treated as a pleasant diversion, not only in assembly periods but in occasional classroom sessions.

When I was only six, my father had spoken quite seriously to me. “Soon,” he said, “it will be Christmastime. Christmas is not our holiday. They may do things in

school to celebrate Christmas—but you will not do any of it. You will sit quietly and do nothing . . . or do homework . . . or do whatever else the teacher may tell you. But if the name Jesus or Xmas or a tree like this is in anything—(and as illustrations for both words and pictures, he had a stack of clippings which he had used over the years with my older brother)—this is not for you. If your teacher asks, you tell her politely this is not your holiday. Say your father said so.”

From near the door, my mother burst in. “Tell him about Mary,” she said. “Tell him! Anything with Virgins is also not for him!”

I was not embarrassed that first year; but in the next two, my self-consciousness grew; I was the only one in my class who did nothing at all. The other Jewish children either participated un-self-consciously, or used one technique or another to avoid real participation. In the fourth grade, at age nine and a half, I decided to speak to my father.

“Papa,” I said, “this week . . . in school . . . they’ll begin with some of that Christmas business—”

My father spoke through his newspaper. “Well, it can’t be helped. A good country. But in some things—thoughtless.”

A few seconds passed. “Papa,” I said, “I been thinking. Instead of doing nothing at all—”

Now my father put aside his newspaper. “Yes. Go on.”

“I could do what a lot of the other kids do. Not draw the cards as good as I can really do it. Or be sloppy with my printing. Or just move my mouth when I sing.”

“No,” my father said. “You do nothing.”

“But Papa,” I said, “I’m the only one.”

“In this country, it’s all right to be the

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only one." His voice stayed even and soft, but very definite, very full. "If no one else wants to be just what they are—you can be it anyhow. You're not hurting anyone. This isn't your holiday. You don't believe in it. So you don't do anything."

IT WAS another week before Christmas came to P.S. 26. In that week I tried several times to raise the issue again with my father; but each time I subsided after only a few words. Somehow, I couldn't muster any enthusiasm for arguing with him. To be absolutely honest, the Christmas season never seemed to have any appeal for me. Perhaps it was that all the sidewalk Santas in the Bronx looked so bedraggled and unjolly, standing beside their iron kettles and clanging their bells. Or possibly it was that the bare figure of Christ on the Cross (as I saw it in a churchyard some blocks away) always struck me as forbidding and a little eerie. The manger scene, in some obscure way, reminded me of my relatives coming to call and passing me by to make a fuss over my baby sister.

So I had no heart for a struggle with my father. Or was it something deeper?

Whatever it was, I sat in school those days, not exactly calm but not frightened or apprehensive. Finally, the announcement was made: joyous Noel was upon us; we would share our joy with those less fortunate than ourselves, and make cards for the poor children who had no parents and no real home. Drawing paper was given out; a variety of cutouts was offered to use as tracing figures—a Christmas tree, a fat Santa, a huge stocking.

On the board our teacher—call her Mrs. Allen—printed two messages. *Merry Xmas. Season's Greetings*. These we were to print by ourselves.

Mrs. Allen was a stout, bulky woman who looked clearly older than my mother (my yardstick of age in those days). That would have put her near forty. Perhaps she was beyond it, although (at least as I remember) her hair was all brown and her skin was not wrinkled. She had a voice which was

gravelly, even though it was nearly always pitched at a very soft level. She used to walk about the room as we children worked. Perhaps that was prescribed in the Teacher's Guide of the day, but she really seemed to enjoy it. She used to move a few steps and pause, and survey—then nod or look perplexed—then move and pause again. For the child under scrutiny, it was possible to feel her nod or her frown even without looking up.

That December afternoon, sitting with my blank drawing paper before me, I felt Mrs. Allen frown. I was holding my pencil, and staring at my desk top, and I felt her there, and somehow I managed to sit absolutely quiet.

"You're not working, Jerome," she said. Oh, so softly. . . . "Don't you feel well?"

"I'm all right," I said.

"If you don't get started soon, you won't have time to make a good card."

"I'm not making a card," I said.

"Not making a card?" Mrs. Allen said. "Why not?"

"This isn't my holiday," I said. "I don't believe in it."

Mrs. Allen moved closer. "Some little orphan is going to be very sad—if he's the one not to have a card."

"This isn't my holiday," I said.

"Look," Mrs. Allen said. "You can print *Season's Greetings*. There's nothing wrong in printing *Season's Greetings*."

Probably it was not just chance: the colorless, odorless, non-sectarian message. Mrs. Allen was a planner—or again, was it the code for all such activities? Still, there were the cutouts; and to my nine-and-a-half-year-old mind, all was not quite as it should be. So my back stayed up, and I spoke the magic defensive words. "My father said *no*," I muttered. "My father said *nothing*."

There was a silence of a few seconds. Then Mrs. Allen said: "Very well, Jerome. You may read your history book while we continue to draw."

This was not punishment: it was not intended as punishment. I am bound, in all honesty, to say here and now that Mrs.

Allen had never singled me out for punishment or reward, up to that time. Nor did I think to myself, as she passed along the aisle, that I had made an enemy. I had no reason to think that. Her discipline was strong; her homework assignments were longer than the other fourth-grade teachers; but we had never found her to be vindictive.

The next day or two—perhaps three—all was serene in the classroom. Christmas was unmentioned. Mrs. Allen seemed hardly aware of my existence. I got no dark forbidding glances, and my name was called only in its due time.

Then, one afternoon, we had a music period, and midway in our singing Mrs. Allen paused and spoke of the next song we would sing. It was, according to her soft explanation, a song much beloved “all over the world.” A song translated into many different languages. A song of peace and hope. A song of all people who ever hoped for a better world. And yet, she continued, all of us knew it. It began with the word “Silent. . . .” Now what was it?

The answer came in many voices. Then she led the class into the song. The temptation to move my lips was strong. In our music work, it was her gaze—not her feet—that traveled painstakingly to each of us; and this gaze I felt—once, then again, then again. My lips all but twitched. The temptation to mouth the words grew stronger. And yet, something held me back. It was somehow Mrs. Allen herself. She seemed to look at me too often. I felt almost a kind of demand.

Elsewhere in the class, there were others only moving their lips. Surely she knew. Surely she recognized it. I could see it myself—out of the corner of an eye. Why was I the one singled out? It was unfair.

The carol ended. Another was introduced. Again we were led into song and again I was silent. More minutes of discomfort, indecision, resentment. More glances. I glanced determinedly at the floor; my throat was dry and choked. Still another carol followed. I heard Mrs. Allen come to my side of the room, but she stayed up in front of

the class, serving with dignity in her role of conductor or choirmaster.

Finally, the singing over, the rest of the day settled into the old ordinary pattern. Occasionally, as I worked, I would feel some vague indefinable discomfort—and glancing up, I would find Mrs. Allen at another part of the room, but with her eyes on me. Perhaps I was oversensitive. Had anything really happened, after all? Mrs. Allen had not even spoken disapprovingly to me.

A few more days passed. All was not serene. I could not shake the feeling—the sense—that there was something between Mrs. Allen and myself. I did not speak of this at home: somehow, it seemed to be a thing that belonged to me alone. What could I have said, anyway? What was there to say?

IT WAS on a Monday that everything exploded. The time was perhaps one-thirty; most of our cultural, semi-recreational activities were placed in the afternoons. What we had just finished doing, I do not remember; but suddenly, out from a drawer came her large book of music. She was seated at that moment, but she soon rose and stood before us, leaving the book on the desk.

“Boys and girls,” she said, “before we begin our singing, I’d like to tell you something about music. Most of us don’t appreciate just what music really is. It isn’t only words and a tune. It’s a special kind of language. It’s one way that people who don’t speak the same language can still feel like friends. That’s why music is often called the universal language. When people come to a different country, and they don’t understand anything at all in the country, they can still understand the music. If it’s happy, they can feel that. If it’s sad, they can feel that, too. And sometimes—to show how friendly they feel toward the people who are singing—they hum along . . . or sing along. And it doesn’t matter if the words don’t come out just right. It’s the friendliness that counts. Even if they’re told by someone what the words mean, and they don’t really believe or feel what these people feel, they can still

sing. It's a mark of how friendly they feel.

"Singing together is a way of saying: *I like you. I feel friendly to you.* And the world needs that. The world always needs more friendliness."

Once or twice, while she was speaking, she'd looked over at me. And I'd looked aside. Now, after a few more comments and an introduction, she carried the class into the lesson. The opening selection was announced as "O Come All Ye Faithful. . . ."

The voices rose. Silent and somehow fearful, I heard the words loud in my ears:

*O come, all ye faith-ful, joy-ful and
tri-um-phant,
O come ye, O come ye to Beth-le-hem;
Come and be-hold Him, born the King
of an-gels.
O come, let us a-dore Him,
O come, let us a-dore Him,
O come, let us a-dore Him,
Christ, the Lord . . . A-men.*

The carol ended. There was a long silence. Then, abruptly, it came: soft yet frightening. "Jerome. . . ."

Guiltily, I raised my glance. Mrs. Allen's face was serious but showed no anger. When she spoke—after a moment or so—her voice was somewhat thick. "Will you please come up here, Jerome."

I moved up the aisle. The hot glare of my classmates' attention was all around me. At the head of the aisle—still a few feet from Mrs. Allen—I paused. Somehow, my eyes remained focused on her face.

"Jerome," Mrs. Allen said, coming closer, "I noticed you haven't been singing. Last week . . . and now today."

"Sometimes, I sing—" I said, irrelevantly.

"I understand," Mrs. Allen said. "When you don't sing, it's for a reason."

"It's—" I began falteringly.

"It's just that Christmas isn't your holiday," Mrs. Allen said. "Well, that's true. Christmas isn't everyone's holiday. But the feeling of friendliness—that's something you have, I know. Even if some of your classmates celebrate different things than you celebrate, you still want to say to them—I

like you. I hope you have a good time on your holiday. Isn't that so?"

"Yes," I said.

"Well, we can say that by singing with people."

"No," I said, "I can't. These songs—"

"It's the words," Mrs. Allen said. "I understand. You can't say certain words. It doesn't seem right . . . for you to say them." Now she paused. "Well—I know how we can fix that. We all want to be friendly, and we all want to have a good time and sing together—so I have a song we can all sing. I'm sure you learned it when you were in the lower grades. It's a beautiful little song the English children sing. It's called 'Deck the Halls . . .'" Now she turned to the class. "Is there anyone who can sing it all the way through—just to refresh our memories?"

One of the girls raised her hand. Mrs. Allen nodded her recognition. The words came tinkling out.

*Deck the halls with boughs of holly,
Fa la la la la . . . la la la la . . .
Tis the season to be jolly,
Fa la la la la . . . la la la la . . .
Don we now our gay apparel,
Fa la la . . . la la la . . . la la la . . .
Troll the ancient Yuletide carol . . .*

"There," Mrs. Allen exclaimed, "not a word in it that everyone can't sing. Is there? Just a song about children enjoying themselves. We'll all sing it together now."

I started to turn to go to my seat, but Mrs. Allen said: "No. You help me, Jerome. You help me lead the class. That'll be fun."

A gesture of her hand brought absolute silence to the class. Then, with another gesture and her own voice rising clear, it began. "Deck the halls with boughs of holly, etc., etc."

But for me—no words would come. Though the carol had no mention of Christ, the Lord—or Mary—or the infant Jesus—I couldn't sing. By any name, by any words, it was a Christmas song to me. Anger was rising within me; but even stronger than anger at that moment was a feeling that I would not let myself be duped. It was some

kind of trick—what kind I could not have explained.

Suddenly I was nudged. "Sing, Jerome," Mrs. Allen said, "sing."

I shook my head.

"Sing," she said.

Much of the class was still by now, watching what was happening. The other voices were a weak chorus: "See the blazing yule before us, Fa la la la . . . la la la la . . . Strike the harp and join the chorus . . ."

"Sing!" she said.

Now—with anger and hate filling me—I shouted: "No. I won't!" Blindly, I fled for the door—brushing her as I passed.

A few minutes later, one of my classmates found me in my place of hiding—the boys' bathroom. It was one of the other Jewish boys. "The singing is over," he said. "You can come back now."

I shook my head, not even looking at him.

"It's all right," he muttered, "she said she wasn't going to punish you."

I went back with him, and went to my seat without looking at anyone. I did not feel like any kind of hero. I felt curiously marked . . . stamped . . . branded. . . .

I was in my seat when Mrs. Allen came slowly down the aisle and paused near-by. "Jerome," she said, but her voice was strong

and clear enough so that it could be heard throughout the class. "It's all over. We'll forget about the whole thing. If you feel you can't sing, then you don't have to sing. And I want you to know . . . even though you hurt me, I forgive you. I've never been shouted at like you shouted at me, and I've never been pushed like that—but I forgive you. I forgive you because that's what I was taught to do"—and here she paused—"in my home. Other people may teach different things in their home—but that's what I was taught. It's called 'turning the other cheek.' It means a person should forgive . . . and try to be friends with other people . . . no matter what."

There may've been more. I heard nothing. I sat there, hating her, wishing her dead, wanting to die myself or be somewhere far away.

Within a day I had stopped wanting to die. Within a few days I had stopped wanting to be far away. Within a month I had stopped wishing her dead.

I have never stopped hating her.

I have not even tried.

I will not lie about it, either to myself or to anyone else. The hate I feel, though dimmed by the years, still somehow seems right and clean to me. . . .

HENRY JAMES AND THE JEWS

A Critical Study

LEO B. LEVY

AS A writer who consciously sought to create an art in which the values of traditional society make a primary claim, Henry James was faced with the difficulty of judging social, religious, and ethnic groups existing outside the framework of such a society. James's reactions to the Jew—whom he perceived as the mythical figure of anti-Semitic lore—and to the alien—whose presence on American soil aroused acute distrust—reveal a general uneasiness. The Jew is the center of a complex range of feelings; the alien, a focal point of anxiety at a particular historical moment. With his imposing talent for malicious condescension, James typically, but not invariably, fixes upon the Jew the full force of a carefully regulated disdain. Consider, for example, the aspersion—scarcely more than a quick glance—cast upon Jews at the fashionable watering place of Folkestone, in the British tale, "Glasses": "There were thousands of little chairs and almost as many little Jews; and there was music in an open rotunda, over which the little Jews wagged their big noses."

The charged brevity of this communicates a thoroughly upper-class attitude. In "The Pupil," the disreputable Moreen family is defined with the assistance of a reference to the shop-keeping Jew: "Who had poisoned their blood with the fifth-rate social ideal? Clever as they were they never guessed how they appeared. They were good-natured, yes—as good-natured as Jews at the doors of

clothing-shops! But was that the model one wanted one's family to follow?"

In another story, "Covering End," the introduction of "a matron of rich Jewish type, with small nippers on a huge nose and a face out of proportion to her little Freischütz hat," accentuates James's feeling about the vulgarity of tourists intruding upon things they cannot understand. The Jewess (who is one of a crowd of sightseers inspecting the estate saved for its hereditary owner by the American heroine) brings the tale to an end with a flourish of dialect humor. Glancing at a portrait, she asks, "Who's *dat*?" and the heroine replies, "Oh, that's my future husband!" This episode throws some light on the curious conditions under which James was likely to notice the Jew. "Covering End" is based on a play in which there is no mention of a Jew; and, further, when James made still another play of his tale, he went to the trouble of removing the allusion in the story. *Summersoft*, the original comedy, specifies "A Visitor" whose aspect is "pleased, loud and cheerful," and who properly enunciates "Who's this?" *The High Bid*, the play which followed, presents a "Chatty American Lady" whose question, "And this *Funny* one—?" cues the curtain line.

Did James think that his English readers would appreciate the Jewess of his story, but balk at a stage presentation? The theater filled him with a sense of precarious exposure, and the freedom to be "himself," he often noted, was in the medium of fiction. A primary motive in his excision of the caricature must surely have been his association with Jews in the theater. A willingness to make exceptions appears in his admiration for the Jewish actresses of the Théâtre Français. The low and ill-bred Jew of the shop or resort is one thing, but Rachel and her

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kind are quite another. Miriam Rooth, the actress-heroine of *The Tragic Muse*, is a composite fictional version of the Jewish actress as James saw her, and her portrait—the most extensive James has given us of a Jew—is itself a study. We see her first as a gauche young woman with a tendency to fatuity, but of real charm and extraordinary gifts. The question of her Jewishness is put in the service of her struggle for identity and development. James perfectly dramatizes the awkwardness of being a Jew: introduced by way of the cliché that all Jews are clever, Miriam now grasps at her Jewishness in the hope that it will make her “interesting,” then tries to compensate for it with absurd claims to “aristocratic” origins, and finally resolves her dilemma with a comment on Rachel: “I don’t care if I’m of her tribe artistically . . . I’m of the family of artists—*Je m’en fichel* of any other!” In this fashion, the Jewish element in *The Tragic Muse* is pushed into the background. Once Miriam’s uniqueness as an exotic creature of grotesque contradictions and astonishing abilities is established, James turns to her transcendent identity of artist, tacitly accepting Miriam’s opinion that the style of the Jew is acceptable if it is also the style of the artist. From this point on, the taboos that surround her have to do with another kind of awkwardness—as an actress, Miriam has no social standing. She therefore becomes representative of the creative alienation from society with which James is strongly identified. But even here James backs down—one cannot permit one’s sister to call on her, one can marry her only if she renounces her career.

THE cosmopolite Jew must have been familiar to James, but in *The Ambassadors* he expresses a certain incredulous wonder (and approval) at the special act of tolerance which admits him to the salon. Thus Little Bilham tells Strether of the elite circle that gathers at Gloriani’s studio: it is composed of “ambassadors, cabinet ministers, bankers, generals, what do I know? even Jews.” The assumption that James himself is speaking here is supported by his employ-

ment of a common paradox. The Jew gains social acceptance by virtue of a native cleverness which is also the basis of his constitutional defects, and hence the cause of his rejection. There are many instances of Jews exhibiting an unreliable combination of sensibility and avarice. The father of Miriam Rooth (“only a Jew stockbroker in the City”) “. . . had the artistic temperament; that’s common, as you know, among *ces messieurs*.” After his death, his wife soon parts with the fruits of his profitable dealings, “not having the safeguard of being herself a Hebrew.”

Less complex versions of the predatory Jew are “the demons of Jews” who have supplied Mrs. Gereth of *The Spoils of Poynton* with her treasures, and the moneylenders of *The Awkward Age* who are farcically imagined to victimize old ladies. One is sharply reminded, in encountering these transient glimpses, that the pursuit of money is an unvarying preoccupation of the Jamesian villain. Kate Croy’s immorality in *The Wings of the Dove* is terrifying, but James is never contemptuous of her. Her greed is compassionately treated. The avaricious Jew, however, dwells in a moral ghetto, outside the warmth of James’s humanity.

The Jew bears a kinship, though, to the unregenerate European of James’s early fiction. This relationship derives from a religious bias in James. His indifference to religious sanctions, and his Emersonian belief in the potentiality of the individual, co-exist with a dependence upon the authority of the Protestant creed. Hence his assumption that Catholic Europe (Italy in particular) has evolved its superior civilization partly out of and partly despite the deficiencies of its moral sense. Those deficiencies James accounts for by the pagan sub-stratum of Mediterranean civilization, with the result that “Catholic” and “pagan” become highly convergent terms in his work. The heartless European adventurer (even if he is an American who has been “corrupted” by too long residence abroad) tends to be utterly inflexible in his hardened ways and becomes as predictable as the Jew whose op-

portunism and greed are taken for granted. Seen in this perspective, anti-Semitic attitudes in James are only a small element of a major theme: the Jew is another version of the morally indifferent (Catholic) European bearing the stain of his pagan origin, for both are unprotected by the influence of the Protestant conscience. Of course, there are multiple shadings of this conception. Italians, for example, reflect the immense appeal to James of a proud aristocracy with its attendant rituals, privileges, and history, whereas Jewish society is approached solely in terms of the clannishness and corporate impersonality of the tribal unit.

ANOTHER range of associations that the idea of the Jew arouses in James's mind is the sensuous and Eastern. Fanny Assingham of *The Golden Bowl* is "neither a pampered Jewess nor a lazy Creole," though she suggests "a creature formed by hammocks and divans, fed upon sherbets and waited upon by slaves."* The patriarchal Mr. Caliph of "The Impressions of a Cousin" is of overpowering sexuality; Mr. Tischbein and Mr. Perriam, two bejewelled and racy companions of Lady Ida in *What Maisie Knew*, are highly urbanized renderings of the same notion. These associations are expanded in the *Golden Bowl*, where James confronts the alarming fecundity of the Jew with a certain amusement. "A remarkably genial, a positively lustrous young man," the antique dealer Guttermann-Seuss is the father of "eleven in all"—"eleven little brown clear faces, yet with such impersonal old eyes

astride of such impersonal old noses." Others of the "tribe" are the "fat, ear-ringed aunts and . . . glossy, cockneyfied, familiar uncles, inimitable of accent and assumption, and of an attitude of cruder intention than that of the head of the firm." Adam Verver's view of Charlotte Stant's reactions to this group conveys the genuine strangeness with which James approached Jewish life, in the tone of a well-bred slumming expedition:

. . . he felt quite merged in the elated circle formed by the girl's free response to the collective caress of all the shining eyes, and by her genial acceptance of the heavy cake and port wine that, as she was afterwards to note, added to their transaction, for a finish, the touch of some mystic rite of old Jewry.

James's portrait of the other (anonymous) antique dealer of *The Golden Bowl* represents an attempt to reconcile the generally pejorative implications of the picture of the Jew to a sympathetic study of a particular person. The result is an incoherent fusion of conflicting elements. Although there is no doubt that the shopkeeper knows the value of the bowl that he sells to Maggie Verver, he overcharges her, presumably because that is the way of the Jew, the instinctive act of the outcast deceiving the Gentile. But he later abandons this role and confesses, thereby putting Maggie in possession of the knowledge of her betrayal by the Prince and Charlotte, who had visited his shop before Maggie's marriage in search of a wedding gift. We are told that the Jew repents because of a particular liking for Maggie, but it is not clear why this motive did not operate at the time of the original purchase. Maggie's explanation to the Prince (" . . . and in fact he gave me that [the "liking"] to-day . . . he gave me it frankly as his reason") implies recognition of the shopkeeper's departure from a customary role; the inference that the Jew does not ordinarily make amends for his conduct is unavoidable. "The particular reason which he hadn't mentioned, which had made him consider and repent," Maggie says, is his knowledge of the flaw in the bowl. But, again, he had long been in possession of this knowledge.

*This pattern defines itself as early as 1871, in James's first novel, *Watch and Ward*. Of a mother and daughter he writes: "The younger one was extremely pretty, and looked a little like a Jewess. Nora [the heroine] observed that she wore a diamond in each ear." She reappears late in the novel, "decidedly pretty, in spite of a nose a trifle too aquiline." Her boldness contrasts with the quiet grace of the heroine: "A pair of imperious dark eyes, as bright as the diamond which glittered in each of her ears, and a nervous, capricious rapidity of motion and gesture, gave her an air of girlish *brusquerie*, which was by no means without charm."

The circumstantial basis of the Jew's repentance is highly dubious, and his redemption, meant to place him within the moral world of the major figures of the novel, has the impact of a convenient miracle reminiscent of the Christian expectation of the conversion of the Jews. The fact seems to be that James shapes his Jew out of the exigencies of his plot, rather than out of a consistent idea of character. But despite the failure to reconcile successfully the image of a subdued Shylock to that of a man whose aesthetic qualifications admit him to limited community with Gentile society, the antique dealer is sympathetically presented. Charlotte appreciatively notices his civilized relationship to the objects in which he trades, and the Prince, who berates him to Charlotte as "the little swindling Jew" and to Maggie as "a decided little beast," is compelled to hear him defended by both his mistress and his wife.

THE more usual tendency to regard Jews as if they were germs under a microscope is manifest in James's automatic dependence upon the adjective "little"—often reinforced by the distortion which enables the anti-Semite to feel that he can identify the object of his aversion with certainty, the image of the oversized nose. The device is perhaps symptomatic of James's general defensiveness in an age destructive of order and privacy, a capturing in a single image of his resentment of the intrusive and unduly aggressive in all their forms. In the critical dialogue about George Eliot, "Daniel Deronda: A Conversation," this device is kept within the limits of Pulcheria's mania. Her hatred of Jews is distinct from the attitudes expressed through Theodora and Constantius, who voice James's sympathy with George Eliot's attempt to dramatize the struggle for Jewish nationality. But the judgment that "All the Jewish part [of *Daniel Deronda*] is at bottom cold" (the opinion of Constantius) reflects not only an opinion of George Eliot's performance, but also James's own disbelief in the possibilities of "a Jewish revival." The attitude later

expressed in *The Tragic Muse*, noted above, enters here: Deronda's mother, an actress and prima donna, is a Jewish anti-Semite who hates "Jewish manners and looks." James's inability to grasp her motives is given in Pulcheria's failure to understand why she should care about religious questions: ". . . I am not a Jewish actress of genius; I am not what Rachel was. If I were I should have other things to think about"—an exact anticipation of Miriam Rooth's divestment of her Jewish identity.

Pulcheria's strictures on the "horrid big Jewish nose" and her importation of the pariah image ("They have the less excuse then for keeping themselves so dirty") are robbed of some of their offensiveness by the moderate tone of the dialogue, with its genteel setting of embroidery, Japanese screens, and serious discussion at the seashore. Theodora's well-intentioned exoneration (approved by Constantius) of the Jew on the score of his inherent cleverness and charm overbalances Pulcheria's rejoinder, "Clever, but not charming."

The recurrent appeal to such stereotypes of physiognomy and character becomes an intensely personal matter in James's account of the New York ghetto in *The American Scene*. The dominant metaphor of "some great zoological garden," embracing the crowded world of the East Side, includes the notation of "some vast sallow aquarium in which innumerable fish of over-developed proboscis were to bump together, for ever, amid heaped spoils of the sea." This is not decorative ingenuity but the Jamesian technique of fixing meaning within a metaphorical core. The Jewish world is dehumanized. When James comments that "The intensity of the Jewish aspect . . . makes the individual Jew more of a concentrated person, savingly possessed of everything that is in him, than any other human, noted at random," the inference that he has come upon what he looks for in vain in much of the new America eludes him—individuals existing by means of their social and religious identity. His spontaneous preference is for another simile from the animal king-

dom: these Jews put him in mind of certain snakes or worms, "who, when cut into pieces . . . live in the snippet as completely as in the whole." And, ultimately, James comes back to the prevailing clichés of his fiction:

What struck me in the flaring streets (over and beyond the everywhere insistent, defiant, unhumorous, exotic face) was the blaze of the shops addressed to the New Jerusalem wants and the splendour with which these were taken for granted; the only thing indeed a little ambiguous was just this look of the trap too brilliantly, too candidly baited for the wary side of Israel itself. It is not for Israel, in general, that Israel so artfully shines—yet its being moved to do so, at last, in that luxurious style, might be precisely the grand side of the city of redemption. Who can tell . . . what the genius of Israel may, or may not, really be "up to?"

The American Scene is the record of a rude shattering of reverently preserved pieties and an elaborate rationalization of the feeling that Jew and alien alike are unpredictable and dangerous. The anomaly of the mere presence of an Armenian youth in the New Hampshire hills, or of Italian laborers in Central Park (with whom Europe would have offered the means of communication now "absent from the air to positive intensity, to mere unthinkability"), dramatizes James's shocked awareness of the impossibility, attested at every turn, of contact or amenity in the new America. His account is a nightmarish enlargement of the catalogue of absent institutions in his early study of Hawthorne ("no sovereign, no court, no personal loyalty, no aristocracy, no church, no clergy . . ."). But the once unfurnished meagerness of American life has been supplanted by an immense chaos devoid of respect for "place" or "type" or "relationship." The commercial travelers on a Savannah-bound Pullman present James with a despairing sense of this issue: they are the single "type," bereft of the association with a hierarchy of types needed to give them position or meaning. Such exceptions as the Philadelphia Quaker, with his visible marks of a *modus vivendi*, or the young Southerner, making the most of his discredited tradi-

tions, recede before James's vision of the places, the houses, the monuments, that still speak eloquently of a vanished age in the terrible incongruity of the present.

THESE matters are profoundly observed. But is the American drummer any less representative of the American dilemma than the Jew or alien? Perhaps not, but he lacks for James the symbolic value of easy identity as outsider or intruder. The metaphor of the Italian immigrant in the act of extending a greasy ladle from which all must feed imparts strong emotional revulsion, and the discovery in Boston that "the people before me were gross aliens to a man . . . in serene and triumphant possession," astonished dismay. These reactions derive from the violence which 20th-century America offered to the sentiment of a beautiful and vanished native society. This sentiment is an active principle in *The American Scene*, productive of a pastoral myth of early American culture strangely at odds with James's very exact sense of the limitations of that early period. In *The American Scene* James idealizes a past that he once regarded critically. The habit of looking backward upon receding idyllic vistas appears in *The Europeans* (1878), but the ironic burden of this sketch is that the golden age was, even at its apex, hopelessly insular. Marlborough street, never "precisely passionate," is embalmed in the corrosive vision of lifeless gentility set before us in "A New England Winter," of 1884. *The Bostonians* (1886) is a portrait of Boston in a state of decadent collapse. But it is not the Boston of this record that James evokes when he searches for an image against which to contrast the gross aliens observed in 1904, but rather the "small homogeneous Boston of the more interesting time . . . the little interesting city, the city of character and genius, exempt as yet from the Irish yoke." This echoes the comment of 1879 on Hawthorne's world. The Boston of Hawthorne's day, of course, was homogeneous, but in 1879 (the date of James's *Hawthorne*) James was already aware of a danger from without:

At the time of Hawthorne's first going there [Concord], it must have been an even better specimen than to-day—more homogeneous, more indigenous, more absolutely democratic. Forty years ago the tide of foreign immigration had scarcely begun to break upon the rural strongholds of the New England race; it had at most begun to splash them with the salt Hibernian spray.

One cannot but recall that James was himself part of "the salt Hibernian spray" of the post-Revolutionary wave. But the habit of the insider's perspective, which leads to the tenderness for things American that Santayana regarded as excessive in James's autobiographies, prevented him from sharing Alice James's zeal for the Irish cause. Behind this predisposition, at the turn of the century, was the pervasive myth of an organic society—the assumption that a social structure of perfectly related parts is desirable and necessary on a national scale. The myth was obviously helpful to a writer whose genius feeds upon accretions and accumulations confronted by a general leveling of social distinctions. Much of *The American Scene*—its exposure of the promiscuous materialism of the national life, for example—is an indictment in the tradition of Emerson's *The American Scholar* and Whitman's *Democratic Vistas*. The primary usefulness of the organic conception, however, is that it dramatizes the peril to traditional American culture of the new immigrants. The question of "one's relation to one's country" and of "the idea of the country itself," necessarily embraces a repudiation of the alien:

Is not our instinct in this matter, in general, essentially the safe one—that of keeping the idea simple and strong and continuous, so that it shall be perfectly sound? To touch it overmuch, to pull it about, is to put it in peril of weakening; yet on this free assault upon it, this readjustment of it in *their* monstrous, presumptuous interest, the aliens of New York seemed perpetually to insist.

THIS position is pivotal in racist and "cultural" arguments for immigration restriction. The general defense against the new "barbarian invasion" was made through an appeal to a long-established conception of the

"purity" of the original Anglo-Saxon stock which had settled the thirteen colonies. The explanation of national traits on the basis of "race," and the fusion of racial, national, and cultural characteristics into a single entity, had been a commonplace of the nativist movement, aimed primarily at the Irish-Catholic influx of the 1830's and revived in the 1880's in response to the first immigrant incursion from southern and eastern Europe. The most eloquent statement of the position was made by Henry Cabot Lodge in a speech to the Senate on March 11, 1896, in which are disclosed the same alarms about dispossession, the same prizing of homogeneity, and the same identification of culture with racial integrity which James was to express a decade later in *The American Scene*.

From this point of view, James's attitudes reveal well-established New England feelings about the alien and show him to be a member of a literary tradition in which the Jew had long been suspiciously regarded. Cooper and Melville reflect the image; Henry Adams expressed a patrician fear that the editorship of *The North American Review* would "go to some Jew"; James Russell Lowell entertained fantasies about an international conspiracy of Jewry; and John Jay Chapman abandoned his early sympathy with Jewish culture to become openly anti-Semitic.* Behind them is the more disinterested pride of Emerson in the purity of the English pedigree and Thomas Jefferson's study of the Germanic tribes. Despite Henry James's antagonism toward the "Teutonic"—his astonishing outburst against Hugo Münsterberg in his notebooks expresses antipathy for things German as well as fear of the immigrant—his sense of culture is deeply rooted in the idea of a continuing Anglo-Saxon tradition. Ford Madox Ford tells us that near the end of his life James reached an even keener appreciation of the spiritual fineness of the early New England period.

*See Edmund Wilson's "The Jews," in *A Piece of My Mind: Reflections at Sixty* (Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1956).

Though James shares the emotionalism that fostered nativist movements against minorities, he accepts neither the hysteria nor the ideological extremes of such movements. His fear of displacement is tempered by his recognition that the immigrant may lose his own traditions in a general assimilation. Nor does James connect anti-Semitism with any organized program of repression.

Such reservations may have their origin in the liberal internationalism illustrated in "Collaboration," in which James deplors "the hideous invention of patriotism" and pleads for "the land of dreams—the country of art," and in "Owen Wingrave," in which he makes an impassioned defense of pacifism and the pacifist temperament. With his brother William, Henry James was an outspoken foe of imperialism and militarism; he supported the New England Anti-Imperialist League, denounced Theodore Roosevelt as "a dangerous and ominous Jingo," and saw no prospect of relief from "big provincial iniquities and abuses and bloody millionaires" in the election of McKinley. But the brothers part company when confronted with the Dreyfus Affair. The novelist's celebrated declaration, "Thank God, I've no *opinions* . . . not even on the Dreyfus case," is disingenuous, and his explanation, "I'm more and more only aware of things as a more or less mad panorama, phantasmagoria and dime museum," though expressive of his growing disgust with the public scene, reflects not reticence but embarrassment before a Jewish problem of world-wide notoriety. He did not see, as William did, the need for an organized defense of the victims of the racial intolerance that the Dreyfus case provoked.

THE peculiarly American union of literary cosmopolitanism with Anglo-Saxon provincialism that James exhibits has its distinguished modern spokesman in T. S. Eliot. *After Strange Gods* applies religious sanctions to a conception of traditional society very close to James's. Like James, Eliot has insisted that "the population should be homogeneous":

Where two or more cultures exist in the same place they are likely either to be fiercely self-conscious or both to become adulterate. What is still more important is unity of religious background; and reasons of race and religion combine to make any large number of free-thinking Jews undesirable.

Eliot's disavowal of anti-Semitic intention in this passage does not alter his assumptions about the value of a homogeneous society—assumptions which lead quite naturally to the exclusion of "free-thinking" groups. Apart from the restrictions to which it leads, such a view presents a paradoxical cultural ideal, one which would have been fatal to the heterogeneous English society that produced the poetry and drama which Eliot has commemorated, just as the homogeneous New England world that James fondly recalls was responsible, as James himself insisted, for the thinness and poverty of life against which Hawthorne struggled. That James should have escaped so many of the contradictions of his own social attitudes is a hopeful irony: his art is profoundly assimilative and eclectic. Anti-Jewish and anti-alien attitudes were by-products of a commitment to a highly stratified society, and expressions of a particular parochial spirit. These were also essential elements in a major creative enterprise.

GEDARS OF LEBANON

“LOVE TO THY NEIGHBOR”

A Selection from a Commentary by the Malbim

MEIR LOEB BEN YEHIEL MEIR, known as the “Malbim,” was an East European rabbi who in his lifetime (1809-1879) served a number of congregations, including those of Königsberg and even of Paris. He is known to posterity primarily on account of his many literary works which include a very detailed commentary on the Bible. The Malbim was a rabbi of the old school, and the vicissitudes of his life were due to the inevitable conflicts in which he found himself with congregational leaders who favored the modernization of Judaism. It is, therefore, all the more surprising that, in his commentary, the Malbim shows himself quite at home in modern disciplines—though the commentary it-

self follows the Jewish scholastic tradition of the Middle Ages. From the selection below, which is my translation from the Hebrew of the Malbim’s comments on Leviticus 19:18, it is evident that he was familiar with the thought of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), who incidentally preceded him in the city of Königsberg by a generation. Though the Malbim does not mention Kant by name, his comments on the “Golden Rule” are obviously indebted to Kant’s categorical imperative, stated in the *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* (1785) in the following terms: “Act as if the principle of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of nature.”—JAKOB J. PETUCHOWSKI

“**A**ND thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.” The interpreters have already drawn attention to the fact that it is impossible for a man to love his fellow man as he loves himself, for this is a matter which is not within the soul’s power. One cannot issue commands concerning love or hate, for man does not control these emotions.

Actually, however, where this kind of love (i.e. loving another like oneself) is implied, Scripture always uses the phrase “like his own soul.” For example, in I Samuel 18:1, *And Jonathan loved him [David] as his own soul*; and, I Samuel 20:17, *For he loved him as he loved his own soul*. It is not expressed by the term “as thyself.”

Furthermore, the verb “to love” is always followed by the accusative. But here, in Leviticus 19:18, it is followed by the dative [the Hebrew says literally: “And thou shalt love to thy neighbor as thyself”], as is the case also further on in this chapter, verse 34, where [in connection with the stranger] it is stated: *And thou shalt love him as thyself*. [Literally: “And thou shalt love to him as thyself.”] There is, then, a significant dif-

ference between “love” used with the accusative and “love” used with the dative. . . .

However, Hillel the Elder (in the Talmudic story of how he taught a proselyte “the whole Torah while standing on one foot”) has already defined this kind of love [which takes the dative] by saying: “What is hateful to thyself do not do unto thy fellow man”; which means that this kind of love is the opposite of hate. A man should see to it that what he wants for himself should also reach his fellow man—whether it be a case of positive benefits or merely one of the prevention of damage. He should endeavor with his whole being to bring benefit to his fellow man in matters affecting physical health as much as in matters affecting property interests—even as he would endeavor to work for his own benefit. It is, of course, obvious that he should not cause him any harm of the kind he would wish to withhold from himself. This, then, is what is implied by the use of the dative—that he should supply to his fellow man that which he desires for himself.

The philosophers have already explained that the primary law which is the root of

morals is that a man should wish to act in such a way that what he does could become universal law. That is to say: if he wants to do evil to his fellow man, in an instance where through such an evil he himself would stand to profit, he should consider first whether he would want this to become a universal law. If so, it would become universal law that one may harm his fellow men if thereby a profit should accrue to oneself. But it would certainly not seem right to such a man that another man should stand to profit by harming *him*! Consequently, let him refrain from doing so to his fellow man in the first place.

Similarly, if a man has it within his power to benefit his fellow man and he refrains from doing so, let him figure out first if he really wants this to become a universal law. For then others would likewise refrain from benefiting *him*!

That is why Rabbi Akiba called [the law of "Love thy neighbor as thyself"] "the great principle of the Torah." But the speculative philosophers have objected to this principle by saying that this is not yet a universal law, for, by acting in accordance with it, a man would do everything merely for his own benefit; whereas he should be doing everything for the sake of the laws of universal higher intelligence—without diluting it with his own utilitarian motivations.

It is for this reason that Ben Azzai [disputing Rabbi Akiba's choice of the verse which contains "the great principle"] saw "the great principle" expressed on a more exalted level by taking his stand on Genesis 5:1, *This is the book of the generations of man*, which means that all men are bound together like one body. All of them were created in the image of God to complete the highest image and form which contains the souls of all mankind. All of them are like one single person, and like one body which is composed of different members. Thus the head loves the hand as he loves himself.

Therefore did Ben Azzai say in *Aboth*: "Do not despise any man!" He also said (in b. *Berakhoth* 6b): "The whole world has been created for the sole purpose of being subservient to him" [i.e. the God-fearing man]. For if all the children of men are like one person, then, even though the heart be the most perfect and choicest component, all the multitude are like the flesh, the sinews, the bones, the skin, and the cartilage of the body which surround the heart and cover it. And the heart feels the deficiency of every single member, its sickness and its loss—even the pain of the skin or of the lobe of the ear. Because of this a man should desire for his fellow man what he desires for himself, for he is flesh of his flesh and bone of his bones. . . .

ON THE HORIZON

OXFORD'S NEW THEOLOGICAL DICTIONARY

An Anglican View of History

STANLEY EDGAR HYMAN

THE imposing *Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*,* the first of its sort, offers itself "not only to those who through Holy Baptism have been admitted to membership in the Body of Christ, but to all who take an intelligent interest in contemporary culture." The preface continues:

It is addressed to the needs not merely of those whose primary vocation lies in the Christian ministry or in the professional study of theology or church history, nor even only to the general body of professing Christians who seek information about their faith and its growth, but to the educated public as a whole.

The present reviewer, by the *Dictionary's* definition an "infidel" ("A person who has a positive disbelief in every form of the Christian faith"), raised in the Jewish faith but infidel there too, and without pretensions to the professional study of theology, has no justification for this review beyond the hope that he is a member of the educated public to which the book is addressed.

The ODCC, as the *Dictionary* asks that we abbreviate it, is the work of the Reverend F. L. Cross, Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity in the University of Oxford and Canon of Christ Church, his staff, and over a hundred scholars, a great many of them

clergymen in the Church of England. Since "in order to secure the maximum uniformity it was agreed at the outset that all contributions should be subject to such editorial modification and reconstruction as seemed desirable, and that anonymity should be preserved," the book has a unified character and viewpoint lacking in such pluralist signed works as the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*. Its viewpoint throughout is High Church Episcopalian, finding its clearest identification with the Tractarian or Oxford revival of the 19th century which sought to restore the Church of England to its Catholic, credal, and ritualistic traditions. The book's particular hero is Cardinal Newman, the leader of the Oxford Movement and before his conversion to Roman Catholicism its boldest Tractarian. The entry on Newman concludes: "His genius has come to be more and more recognized after his death, and his influence both on the restoration of RC-ism [Roman Catholicism] in England and the advance of Catholic ideas in the C of E [Church of England] can hardly be exaggerated." Secondary heroes are E. B. Pusey, the leader of the movement after Newman's defection and Cross's predecessor as Canon of Christ Church, so strong in the faith that he was suspended from the Oxford pulpit for two years for teaching Roman Catholic doctrine; and John Keble, the brilliant Tractarian and poet.

The aim of the ODCC seems in fact no less than to undo the Reformation, at least for the Church of England. Thus an entry on *Middle Ages* remarks, "Once viewed as

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a sterile period, it has come to be regarded as one of the most creative and fruitful periods in the world's history." In general, the Protestant character of the Established Church is denied, and its traditions are repudiated. Here, of course, the great stumbling block are the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, agreed upon by convocation under Queen Elizabeth in 1562, which affirm many of Luther's basic principles: that "Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation" (Article 6); "that we are justified by Faith only" (Article 11); that "the Church of Rome hath erred" (Article 19) as General Councils of the Church "may err, and sometimes have erred" (Article 21); that the use of "a tongue not understood of the people" is "a thing plainly repugnant to the Word of God" (Article 24); that the Roman doctrine of Transubstantiation in the Eucharist is not only "repugnant to the plain words of Scripture" but "hath given occasion to many superstitions" (Article 27); that the laity must be given the Eucharistic wine as well as the bread (Article 30); that "the sacrifices of Masses" are "blasphemous fables, and dangerous deceits" (Article 31); that marriage is lawful for the clergy (Article 32); and so forth.

Until 1865, "subscription" to all Thirty-nine Articles was required of the clergy of the Church of England and members of the universities of Oxford and Cambridge. Since then there have been no tests of faith at the universities, and the clergy has been required only to "assent" to the Articles in general. The *ODCC* explains: "Assent is generally understood to imply a less definite form of adherence than subscription, but there is apparently no official explanation as to exactly what it involves. Perhaps the term may be explained as an undertaking to refrain from teaching anything directly opposed to the standard of doctrine implied, without requiring positive agreement in detail in one's personal opinions." The *Dictionary* entries seem to assent only in this loose sense to a number of the Articles, and when they are discussed the emphasis tends to be on the range of permitted disagreement. A typical comment is: "Much variety of interpretation has been put upon many of them without improperly straining the text, and probably this license was deliber-

ately intended by their framers," giving as an example the "masterly ambiguity" of Article 17, on predestination.

Insofar as John Foxe's *Acts and Monuments*, commonly known as "The Book of Martyrs," has been the principal household work keeping alive the old Protestant fury in England, one of the consistent efforts of the High Church party has been to discredit Foxe, beginning with attacks by S. R. Maitland, the librarian at Lambeth Palace, more than a century ago. Although Foxe's general reliability has since been solidly reestablished by J. F. Mozley (in a study published by the Church of England's Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge), the *Oxford Dictionary* says flatly of Foxe's book, "As a work of history, its value is impaired by its author's credulity and bitterness." Where Foxe and his party glory in the execution of Roman Catholic martyrs in England, the *ODCC* says of Fisher and More, "Their execution in 1535 was universally mourned." Even Richard Hooker, the "architect" of the Church of England, is not Catholic enough, and the biographical entry on him complains of the liberality of his doctrine on episcopal ordination and the Eucharist. The tone used for such modern critics as John Kensit, who opposed "what he believed to be romanizing tendencies in the C of E," is almost petulant: "increasingly violent and individualist," "causing considerable friction and disturbance wherever he went."

HISTORICALLY, the great Protestant critics of the Roman Catholic Church have not been distinguished for their temperateness. Wycliffe called adherents of the Pope "the twelve daughters of the diabolical leech." Luther described the denial of Communion wine to the laity and other abuses as the "Babylonian Captivity" of the Church. The spirit of the *Oxford Dictionary* is about as far from this as can be imagined. The traditional pre-Reformation martyrs of Protestantism are for the most part blandly repudiated: the Albigenes "were animated by an implacable hatred against the Church" and "because of their unsocial doctrines were a menace not only to the faith of the Church but to ordered society"; "grave excesses and fanaticism brought ill-odour" on the Anabaptists; and so on. "Since the Reformation," an entry on *Antichrist* remarks,

"the identification of the Pope with Antichrist has been frequently made, esp. in the less educated circles of Protestantism," from which one would hardly guess that Archbishop Cranmer died affirming it, that such an identification was one of the 104 Articles of the Church of Ireland adopted in 1615, or that it is a tenet of the Lutheran Book of Concord of 1580, to which many Lutheran churches still subscribe.

Many of the *Dictionary's* entries on aspects of Roman Catholicism maintain a nice impartiality, e.g. the one on the 19th-century Papal Secretary of State, Cardinal Antonelli, which concludes: "A statesman rather than a prelate, he was loaded with praise by his friends, but regarded as unscrupulous by his enemies." The entry on *Massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day* is rigorously dispassionate. On such phenomena as the eighteen manifestations of the Virgin Mary to St. Bernadette near Lourdes, the *Dictionary* confines itself modestly to noting how they are commemorated in the Roman Catholic Church. The cult of saints' relics, the ODCC explains, "is based on the natural instinct of men to treat with reverence what is left of the dead they loved." (Article 22, less impressed by natural instinct, says, "The Romish Doctrine concerning Purgatory, Pardons, Worshipping, and Adoration, as well of Images as of Reliques, and also invocation of Saints, is a fond thing vainly invented, and grounded upon no warranty of Scripture, but rather repugnant to the Word of God.") The *Oxford Dictionary* is critical in two main areas. It hits hard at the wicked and dissolute Popes in history (though no harder than many Roman Catholic historians), and remarks bluntly of an inept Pope, St. Celestine V, "His pontificate was astonishing and disastrous." Hagiography gets equally short shrift, and the typical description of a saint's legend is, "An apparently worthless legend."

In the book's effort to define the Church of England as a Catholic Church, a great deal of space is expended on justifying the legitimacy of its holy orders. A long article on *Anglican Ordinations* defends their historical continuity in a line going back to divine institution, asserting against Roman Catholic polemicists that even if the Apostolic Succession was broken with Archbishop Parker under Queen Elizabeth, it was re-

gained with Archbishop Laud at the Restoration. The article on Parker is nevertheless careful to remind readers of his consecration "by four bishops who had held sees in Edward VI's reign." The entry on *Anglicanism* does not seem embarrassed by the fact that "the C of E tolerated, esp. in the later years of the 19th cent. and the earlier years of the 20th, a considerable infiltration of Liberalism," but the entry on *Liberalism* suggests that the recovery has been relatively complete. The biography of A. H. Stanley, Dean of Westminster, notes that he "gave much offense to orthodox Churchmen by his invitation to all the scholars who had produced the RV [Revised Version], among them a Unitarian, to receive Holy Communion in the Abbey." One would never know from the account of *Essays and Reviews* (1860), "A collection of essays by seven authors who believed in the necessity of free inquiry in religious matters," dealing chiefly with its violent condemnation by the Church of England, that one of the condemned authors, Frederick Temple, later became Archbishop of Canterbury.

As the Oxford Movement in the Church of England paralleled Ultramontanism in the Roman Catholic Church, the *Dictionary* points out, so was there a parallelism between Anglican Liberalism and Roman Catholic Modernism. Modernism was quickly crippled by the excommunication of J. J. I. von Doellinger in 1871 and the enormous pressures put on Lord Acton, and it was finally extirpated by the condemnation of Modernist doctrines as heretic by Pius X in 1907, and the excommunication shortly afterwards of such Modernist priests as Alfred Loisy in France and George Tyrrell in England (in Tyrrell's case, for protesting against the Papal encyclical in two letters to the *Times*). Excommunication "has in fact been very rare in the C of E," the *Dictionary* notes, perhaps proudly, thinking of Dean Stanley and Archbishop Temple.

BALANCING the ODCC's emphasis on the Catholic tradition of the Church of England in matters of ritual and sacramentalism, there is an equally strong identification with Protestantism in the welcome accorded the revival of Calvinism by Barthian theology, with Karl Barth a hero to balance Newman. The article on St. Paul's Epistle to the

Romans, the key New Testament book for Barth, notes that it was equally important to St. Augustine, Luther, Calvin, and Wesley. The enthusiastic entry on Reinhold Niebuhr says, "He has been much influenced by the Dialectical Theology of K. Barth," and adds that he goes even beyond Barth to reject "the theology of the Creeds in its traditional form" as giving "insufficient place to original sin." In the entry on *Arminianism* the *Dictionary* speaks of the recent "theological revival of Calvinism under the influence of K. Barth," and the article on *Calvinism* concludes:

Calvinism suffered severe setbacks through rationalism in the 18th and 19th cents., but recently it has once more come to the fore, esp. through the work of K. Barth, whose influence has been considerable not only in the Protestant Churches on the Continent but also in the C of E. Its attraction for the modern religious mind is probably due to the stress it lays on the omnipotence of God and the nothingness of man, as a reaction against the easy humanitarianism of 19th cent. liberal Protestantism.

Apart from Calvin, the *Dictionary* explains, Barth's Dialectical Theology "drew its inspiration from thinkers in revolt against the humanist ideal," principally Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky. Both are treated to very respectful biographical articles, that on Kierkegaard concluding, "His total influence on contemporary thought is very considerable," and the one on Dostoevsky similarly noting that his ideas "have had a profound influence on the Continent."

The entry on *Atonement* says that in recent years "there has been a return to traditional views" under the influence of Barthian theology and its "determination to put the Cross rather than the Manger at the centre of the Christian Creed." The article on *God* expounds yet another aspect of the Barthian revolution: "The main trend in the present century has been against immanentism, with a reaffirmation of the Divine transcendence." The book's only criticism of Barth, so far as I could see, is the suggestion under *Incarnation* that "Neo-Protestant theology, under the influence esp. of K. Barth and his school, has sometimes been so emphatic in its denial of immanence as almost to imperil belief in a real Incarnation altogether." "In recent times," the *ODCC* explains, "renewed interest has been taken in

the theology of the Church by Catholics and Protestants alike." This revival of theology is regarded as being almost entirely due to Barth: "His influence has been very deep on the Continent as well as in Great Britain and America, where it has done much to break the reign of the more negative elements of German criticism."

The higher criticism of the Bible, in other words, has been replaced by something more positive. "Since the World War of 1914-18," the *Dictionary* explains (Barth's commentary on *Romans* appeared in 1919), "the approach of scholars to the NT has shifted. A 'post-critical' period has begun, in which the interest in literary and historical questions has declined. More attention is paid to the theology of the Bible and to the interrelation of different parts of the OT and the NT." Under *Bible Exegesis* the *Dictionary* notes, "K. Barth is the chief representative of a return to a more dogmatic and conservative method." The tendency of the *ODCC* is to dismiss the higher criticism of the Bible as a mere 19th-century aberration, although Origen in the third century, Eusebius and St. Jerome in the fourth, were "higher critics" in every sense of the term, as were many of the Reformers.

THE writers of the *ODCC* in general take a fairly conservative line on Bible criticism. They accept, or at least treat respectfully, its more moderate conclusions, particularly where the agreement of scholars is overwhelming. In regard to the Old Testament: "large sections" of the Book of Jeremiah were not written by the prophet; "the popular belief that David was the author of the whole Psalter can no longer be sustained"; the Song of Solomon "is prob. an anthology of love poems of varying length, ascribed to Solomon and his beloved (the 'Shulamite') and their friends"; the Books of Ezra and Nehemiah are "generally supposed by modern scholars" to have been written much later than the time of Nehemiah, that is, to be pseudepigraphic. Similar judgments are made about the New Testament: the author of the Book of Revelation is neither the John of the Fourth Gospel nor the Apostle John; "it is widely held" that parts of Second Corinthians do not belong in it; "some modern scholars" have questioned the genuineness of the Epistle to the Ephesians, "but

the problems have not received any agreed solution"; along with Origen and Luther modern scholars "almost unanimously consider" the Epistle to the Hebrews pseudepigraphic; the authenticity of the Pastoral Epistles "has been frequently denied by NT critics."

For the bolder conclusions of higher criticism, or the more radical critics, the *Dictionary* shows little respect. C. C. Torrey questioned the historical existence of Ezra, "but this drastic critical hypothesis has received little support"; F. C. Baur denied the Pauline authorship of all except four Epistles, but his book "roused a storm of controversy"; W. C. Van Manen rejected the authenticity of *all* St. Paul's Epistles, but "his opinions attracted attention more as curiosities than for their intrinsic importance." The notion that Jesus was a mythical rather than a historical person is misunderstood by identifying it with Strauss's *Life of Jesus*, which certainly assumes a historical Jesus, and the theory's actual proponents are ignored or dismissed. C. F. Dupuis, P. C. A. Jensen, Georg Brandes, and P. L. Couchoud are not mentioned; Arthur Drews is tossed aside as a "German anti-Christian apologist"; and the leader of the movement, J. M. Robertson, gets no biographical entry, but along with W. B. Smith is named as among "a small group of critics" who denied the historical existence of Christ and were promptly refuted by P. W. Schmiedel. The long article on *Jesus Christ* entirely ignores the proponents of the myth theory, and none of their many volumes is listed in the extensive bibliography of "Other works from many different standpoints."

Where the *Oxford Dictionary* does not repudiate the higher criticism, it sidesteps it in a variety of fashions. Thus the story of Eden contains "a fundamental truth about man in his relation to God, even if the truth is held to be there conveyed in legendary form"; the purpose of Genesis "is not so much to offer exact science and accurate history as to record the progressive character of the Divine revelation and to indicate the spiritual mission of the Israelite people"; the Gospel according to St. Mark "gives us a patchwork of tradition; but on analysis every part of it bears witness, in its own way, to a 'Jesus of History' behind it." Sometimes the treatment seems almost disingenuous. A

tiny entry on the prophet Elisha says "He had not the individuality or strength of character of his predecessor" Elijah, but significantly neglects to mention that he anticipated many of the miracles of his successor Jesus, among them healing, raising the dead, and multiplying the loaves. An entry on *Bethlehem* nowhere says that it translates as "house of bread," and is thus a peculiarly fitting birthplace for Jesus who said of the bread "Take, eat; this is my body." There is the repeated claim that the Gospels were written by their reputed authors, since "It is unlikely that tradition would wrongly have assigned a Gospel to so unimportant a character" as Mark or Luke, an argument that would make the apocryphal books of Enoch and Baruch authentic. The entries on *Nazarene* and *Nazirite* fail to suggest a connection, nor is there any mention under *Nazareth* that there does not seem to have been any such place before the 3rd or 4th century. The long article on St. Paul pays no attention to the many demonstrations (by Jewish and Christian scholars) that Paul's ignorance of the Hebrew Bible and of Jewish custom makes it impossible for him to have been the rabbinically trained strict Pharisee of the New Testament report. Lastly, the writers of the *Oxford Dictionary* are sometimes surprisingly credulous: Sir Leonard Wooley's excavations at Ur are taken "to indicate a historic foundation for the Babylonian tradition of a very widespread flood"; and the death of Solomon is dated "c. 933 B.C." with all the boldness of Archbishop Ussher and no additional evidence.

WHERE the *Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church* may prove most disturbing to readers not of its persuasion (and, one might hope, to many who are) is in its arrogance. Thus the entry on *Capital Punishment* concludes, "Its abolition in certain countries, however, and the great diminution since 1800 of the number of crimes punishable by death in others, may legitimately be ascribed to Christian enlightenment" (perhaps the author means the enlightenment of Christians). The entry on *Slavery* concludes, "It is now generally condemned on account of the almost inevitable abuses accompanying it, and of its opposition to the spirit of the Gospel." And how odd to find that the Scriptures of the Mandaeans are "a farrago

of inconsistent teachings," so unlike our own well-ordered Bible.

The *Dictionary* tends to be particularly harsh with the aggressively evangelical Protestant sects. Of the English Ranters of the 17th century: "Their revolutionary and immoral doctrines made them the object of deep suspicion." Mormon history "has been marked by constant internal dissensions and strife with the Federal authorities." The Christian Science Church was founded after Mrs. Eddy's recovery from "various ailments, generally held to have been of a hysterical nature," and "Its teaching on the unreality of matter, sin, and suffering conflicts with the fundamental Biblical doctrines of the Creation, Fall, and Redemption." Jehovah's Witnesses "can hardly be regarded as a religious society, since, acc. to Rutherford's own statement, they hold that 'religion is against God.'" Their periodicals "carried on a vigorous propaganda against the British Empire as well as against all institutional religion. The RC Church, the C of E, and the Free Churches are the constant butt of abuse in these publications, which deny most of the fundamental Christian doctrines." A biographical entry on Judge Rutherford notes, "In 1918-19 he served a term of imprisonment at Atlanta (Georgia) for insubordination and disloyalty, and he was frequently accused of fraudulent practices, even by his own followers," and credits him with being the author of "innumerable pamphlets propagating his subversive views." A biographical entry on C. T. Russell, Rutherford's predecessor and the founder of the sect, notes that "In 1909 his wife obtained a divorce on the grounds of his immoral conduct with members of his 'Church' and he went abroad for a time," and concludes: "Despite the great parade of learning in his books he was unable to name in the courts the letters of the Greek alphabet."

The ODCC seems remarkably callous to cruelties committed by the Church against dissenters and heretics. The entry on *Secular Arm* explains: "The Church has not felt justified in imposing in her own tribunals penalties which involve mutilation or death, but the Church courts have had to deal with some cases, chiefly those of heresy, in which it was felt that sterner punishments were needed than they could impose. The assistance of the secular arm was therefore

sought." The article on *Oxford* boasts: "The close and continuous connection with the life of the Church is shewn by the trials of T. Cranmer, N. Ridley, and H. Latimer in the University Church of St. Mary," which is surely a peculiar way of saying that three English Protestant martyrs, educated by Cambridge, were burnt by Oxford. An entry lists *The Spiritual Works of Mercy*: "There are traditionally seven: (1) converting the sinner; (2) instructing the ignorant; (3) counselling the doubtful; (4) comforting the sorrowful; (5) bearing wrongs patiently; (6) forgiving injuries; (7) praying for the living and the dead." The *Oxford Dictionary* perhaps aspires only to the first three.

THE book's arrogance toward Judaism seems equally striking. "Hence," says the article on *Bible*, "the OT was ordained as the possession of the Church to whom (and not to the Jews) Christians held that since the Coming of the Lord it primarily belonged." Thus Aaron is "a type of Christ," the Burning Bush is "a type of the Blessed Virgin," and so on. "Theism," says the entry on that topic, "is in various forms the view of the world common to all Christian philosophers, and, in a less perfect form, also required by the Jewish and Mohammedan religions." Jewish monotheism is elsewhere identified as "deism." Dean Milman's *History of the Jews* was distinguished by "the freedom and freshness with which he handled the OT narratives, treating the Jews as an oriental tribe." *Mixed marriage* is defined as "A marriage between Christians of different religious allegiances." The brief and inadequate entry on *Covenant* makes no mention of what Jews regard as the fundamental Old Testament covenant, the covenant of circumcision with Abraham; and the writer of the entry on the parable of the Good Samaritan in the Gospel According to St. Luke apparently has no idea that the parable is an anti-Semitic anecdote.

The *Dictionary* describes the achievements of a long line of Jewish converts to Christianity, from Johann Pfefferkorn in the 16th century (who devoted himself to the destruction of all Jewish sacred writings) to Michael Solomon Alexander in the 19th (who translated the Book of Common Prayer into Hebrew), and praises the missionary work that "resulted in some very talented con-

verts." The biographical entry on General William Booth of the Salvation Army notes his "partly Jewish origin" and his "shrewd commercial sense." The entry on *Ghetto* is entirely factual, with no hint of disapproval, and the entry on *St. William of Norwich* says, "This is the first known case of the blood accusation against the Jews; but as the authorities took no action, the account is open to much suspicion," which suggests that the writer believes in Jewish ritual murder, and would not suspect an account where the authorities had taken action.

THE *Dictionary's* attitude toward science can only be called cavalier. There is no entry on Charles Darwin, while Darwinism itself is dismissed in twelve lines; but there is a lengthy account of T. H. Huxley, concluding, "Huxley had few claims to be considered an exact thinker." Do the authors of the *Oxford Dictionary* really believe that they have been ordained with the power to bind and loose in the realm of exact thought? Do they mean, for example, that Huxley was an inexact thinker as compared with St. Anselm, with his doctrine that Original Sin is transmitted by our "seminal identity" with Adam? Or St. Augustine, with his distinctions between *dulia*, the reverence proper to saints, *hyperdulia*, the reverence proper to the Virgin Mary, and *latria*, the reverence proper to God alone? Are they comparing Huxley with the scientists who have distinguished between Ascetical, Moral, and Mystical Theology, or between the Church Militant on earth, the Church Expectant in Purgatory, and the Church Triumphant in Heaven?

Secular philosophy is handled very respectfully in the *Dictionary*, and there are long entries on philosophers and various philosophic terms, but the social sciences are treated quite as insolently as is evolutionary biology. The entry on *Anthropology* knowledgeably defines Sacred Anthropology, the study of man as contrasted with God or angels in regard to "his creation, elevation to supernatural status, and his fall," but is woefully inadequate on secular anthropology, mentioning only Java Man and "handicraft-work," with no book on the subject later than 1912 in the appended bibliography. Of modern psychologists we are told that they "frequently interpret sin mainly as

psychological disorder, often teach that the forms of temptation rooted in the appetites are primarily natural instincts, which as such ought, at least to some extent, to be satisfied." As might be expected, Freud's "disciple" Jung is the only acceptable psychologist: "Jung's ideas have found much approval also among students of religion and led to some fruitful developments."

Occasionally a catch in the *Dictionary's* voice suggests that the arrogant tone actually conceals anxiety. The article on *Toleration* that begins so boldly "Christianity, which claims to be the only true religion, has always been dogmatically intolerant," ends with a whimper: "The modern problem is not so much one of toleration for other religious convictions as that of the preservation of religion in view of the general indifference and secularization of life." The entry on *Christian* notes that in modern times the word has tended "in nominally Christian countries" to lose any credal significance and mean only something "ethically praiseworthy" or "socially customary." Another entry sadly recognizes the difficulty of keeping all these shiny Indian clubs spinning: "Popular ideas about the Trinity, in intention orthodox, often tend to be tritheistic in expression" (as does, we might note, the Apostles' Creed, with its statement that Jesus Christ "sitteth on the right hand of the Father"). Running through the book there is a nervous attempt to blame all sorts of things on contemporary secularization, a typical example being: "In the present century the growth of unbelief and superstition has encouraged the revival of astrology in certain quarters." The entry on *Burial Services*, however, gives the show away: for the Christian, death should be an occasion for joy, but "the prevalence of merely nominal Christianity made such joy not always fitting," and the date of the change is given as the 8th century. There is a suggestion that Hitler and the H-bomb may change it all: "More recently the recognition of demonic forces in contemporary civilisation has led to a renewed theological emphasis on the gravity of sin, in the spirit of St. Augustine and the Reformers." At the same time, there is a fear that the lower-class origins of Christianity (those Jews, that cow's stall) may alienate the better people, and the article on *Jesus Christ* is quick to point out

"Jesus is once called the 'carpenter,' or stone mason, but the family though manual workers were not necessarily ill-educated." (Surely St. Joseph could have named all the letters of the Greek alphabet in court.)

NO DOUBLE-COLUMN work of fifteen hundred pages could be quite so monolithic, and of course the *Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church* is not. Some of the entries show a genuine Christian charity toward enemies or opponents: the great persecutor Julian the Apostate did attempt "to reform the morals and elevate the theology of paganism, himself giving (it must be allowed) a conspicuous example of austerity and purpose"; the Puritan controversialist John Owen was "always tolerant and fair," and "Many of his writings show deep spiritual insight and a firm grasp of NT Christianity"; John Wesley was beyond doubt "one of the greatest Christians of his age." Some of the tensions that assenting to the Thirty-nine Articles accumulates are worked off on art and literature, where the entries tend to be boldly opinionated: Fra Angelico's "greatest artistic talents lay in his use of brilliant colour and his powers of decoration"; Matthew Arnold's *Empedocles on Etna* "though poorly constructed as a dramatic work, contained some fine lyrics"; and so forth. Some of the book's entries in the fields of ecclesiology, liturgiology, and the study of vestments are frankly aesthetic, so that an account of a Yorkshire abbey concludes: "To-day the abbey lies in ruins, but the greater part of the exquisite Early English cruciform church remains, with many of the altars *in situ*."

But some of the ODCC is written in a theological jargon so clotted as to be almost incomprehensible, like the remark about Leontius of Byzantium: "He was a staunch upholder of the Chalcedonian Christology which he interpreted on Cyrilline principles, introducing the notion of the *Enhypostasia*." There are inexplicable omissions: in particular one misses an entry on Simone Weil. Some topics of chiefly American interest are similarly slighted, among them Covenant Theology, and the Universalist Church. Apparently the greater part of the book was written before the Dead Sea Scrolls made their impact, and the half-dozen mentions of the Scrolls are added on as afterthoughts

without the revisions they require in traditional opinions. Thus the entries on *Bible*, *Damascus Fragments*, *Essenes*, *Gnosticism*, *Logos*, and *Manuscripts of the Bible* had been superseded by the time they appeared.

This reviewer has noted a few errors or confusions, and scholars will surely find many more. The information that Bar-Cochba's real name was "Simeon" is credited mysteriously to "the Jews"; actually we get it, like most of our information about the Second Revolt, from his surviving coins. An entry on *E*, one of the narratives believed to be embodied in the first books of the Bible, says the Elohist writer "regularly" calls God "Elohim"; actually, he does so only until God reveals his true name to Moses, after which he too calls God "Jahveh." *Bodisatva* is defined as "a title of the Buddha"; more correctly *Bodhisattva*, it is the stage of spiritual perfection just below that of the Buddha. The entry on *taurobolium* identifies it with the worship of Cybele and Attis, but not Mithra. An entry on *Joanina Southcott* says that her sealed box of prophecies was opened in 1927 and proved to contain a woman's nightcap and a lottery ticket; that was someone's practical joke, and the real box has not yet been opened, since her conditions require an Archbishop of Canterbury willing to open it. *Theosophists* are identified as regarding "Christ as purely human," as they certainly do not.

Where it is not wrong, the *Dictionary* is often maddeningly vague. It says of the Roman Catholic Biblical Commission, "Among its most notable decisions are those on the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch (1906), on the authenticity and historicity of the Fourth Gospel (1907), and on the Synoptic problem (1912)," without explaining what was decided. It refers to Emerson's "extremely unconventional views on the Eucharist," without revealing them; it says that Archbishop Lang "played an important part in public affairs in connection with the abdication of Edward VIII," without saying *what* part; it notes that Charles Péguy "had a strong faith in the Eucharist which domestic circumstances made it impossible for him to receive," without taking us beyond that teasing point; it says of St. Peter, "There are considerable historical reasons for believing that his tomb in St. Peter's in Rome is au-

thentic," but cites none of them. Occasionally a cross reference promises an entry that is not produced.

Where the *Oxford Dictionary* delights is in its odd and relatively useless information, the gleanings of thousands of unavailable and specialized publications (as well as of such standard works as the *Dictionary of National Biography* and the *Oxford English Dictionary*). One can thus learn that the theft of a book from the Ambrosian Library at Milan is a sin from which only the Pope can absolve; that there have been Binitarians as well as Trinitarians and Unitarians; that St. Catherine, martyred on a wheel, is the patron saint of wheelwrights and attorneys; that the Ethiopian Church still circumcises; that St. Francis of Assisi is thought to have made the first crèche; that the Eastern Church forbids fourth marriages; that "tawdry" is derived from the cheap finery sold at the fair of St. Audry or Ethelreda; that barrel organs and trumpets called "vamping horns" were widely used in 18th-century English churches; and that the Wandering Jew made an appearance in Salt Lake City in 1868. There are some wonderful characters, ranging from St. Alphonsus Liguori—a prominent Neapolitan lawyer who realized the transitoriness of earthly glory and renounced the world when his client lost a hundred-thousand-pound lawsuit on a technicality—to Jenny Geddes, a Scottish vegetable-seller who achieved immortality by throwing her folding stool at the head of

the Bishop of Edinburgh in St. Giles' Cathedral when the hated Scottish Prayer Book was introduced.

In places, the Dictionary even reveals a dry wit. We learn of *Canaan*: "Of the original inhabitants (called Canaanites) some survived, and appear to have had a reactionary influence upon the development and maintenance of Hebrew monotheism." Of St. Gemma Galgani we are told: "Apart from her conviction of occasional diabolical possession, her spiritual life was normally peaceful." An account of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem remarks: "The scene on Sunday mornings, when the various rites, all with music, are proceeding simultaneously, is unique in Christendom." On *Obscurantism*, "Christians have sometimes been charged with it by secular critics, and professing Christians have also sometimes made the charge against one another, but it has rarely, if ever, been admitted." On the doctrine of the early Church, based on Matthew 22:14 ("For many are called, but few are chosen"), that the number of the damned is considerably larger than the number of the saved: "The tendency of most modern theologians who have been bold enough to seek an answer to this and other such questions has been towards a more optimistic view." With such leaven to leaven the lump, perhaps even the *Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, for all its black sins, may yet, in later editions, be numbered among the saved.

LETTERS FROM READERS

Western Policy & Israel

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I have read with great interest the excellent analysis of the Middle East situation in your lead article of the August issue ("Can the Middle East Be Held?" by G. F. Hudson). If I were a Zionist or an Israeli citizen, I would pray God to save me from my friends; for in his zeal to argue Israel's case, the author concludes that the U.S. should use Israel as a toe-hold in Asia or as a sort of shield against the onrushing Arab flood. Isn't this precisely the policy which the Arabs accuse us of following? Moreover, it is the kind of policy which is most likely to alienate from us any country which we propose to use in this manner.

The Arabs no longer are willing to serve as tools of Western policies; Israel may not like to be our battering ram either. Already Mr. Ben Gurion has tendered an olive branch to Nasser; speaking in the Knesset he hinted that Israel might not continue her Western affiliation, provided Nasser were ready to do business with Israel. In fact, the Arab resentment against Israel as a cultural intruder may subside now that the Arab countries are modernizing themselves; but simultaneously their hatred of Israel as an American satellite increases—and this is a condition which an intelligent Foreign Secretary in Jerusalem can remedy more easily; by just veering around and becoming a Middle Eastern country, Israel could sooner or later hope to increase her chances of survival in an Arab sea, at least much better than as an American frontier outpost, as Mr. Hudson amiably suggests.

The same reasoning, of course, holds for Turkey and other states which Mr. Hudson's policy (and I am afraid it is Mr. Dulles's too) would convert into exposed bastions. No nation likes to be in that position, and as a consequence of this disastrous policy our allies are looking over their shoulders for some way out. In foreign policy the bonds of a common philosophy usually are weaker than the strings of interest, and a Foreign Secretary of Israel or Turkey, faced with the alternative of unlimited hostility and danger as a consequence of our policy of "writing off the Arabs," would be foolish not to take out some re-insurance with

the Russians and the Arabs. At the moment, to be sure, Israel has no choice but to seek support from the West; but this is not unalterably and not necessarily so. In the long run she could follow her own interests and maybe her resentments, too, in turning as anti-Western as any Arab today, and some State Department advisers would hasten that day, by rubbing it in that Israel is not to be protected but is supposed to protect us.

In summary, let me repeat the simple truism, that even the biggest powers cannot afford to treat their small neighbors as mere instruments of power. We must develop a policy which minimizes the risk for our allies, or we shall have none.

HENRY M. PACHTER

New York City

The Role of Rabbi Joshua

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I was gratified to read the article "A First-Century Jewish Sage" by Joshua Podro. There are, however, a few points with which I should like to take issue. Dr. Podro's interpretation of Rabbi Joshua's Halachic opinion with regard to the prerequisite for the admission of proselytes is grossly misleading. Although circumcision was not a prerequisite to conversion, it would become obligatory immediately after conversion to Judaism. It would hardly "take some of the sting from Paulinist propaganda" which declared that "Circumcision is nothing, and uncircumcision is nothing" (I Corinthians 7:19). Nor does it make "the most liberal concessions to all foreigners who wished to meet under the wings of Shechinah." A proselyte who was baptized but remained uncircumcised would scarcely be considered a faithful Jew (see Book XX, Ch. II of the *Antiquities* by Josephus). . . .

In an effort to convince the reader of Rabbi Joshua's "liberalism," Dr. Podro portrays him as a "modern" Jew. He asserts that Rabbi Joshua showed less interest in ritual "than did the conservative-minded" Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Joshua was as vitally concerned with ritual as was Rabbi Eliezer. The two disagreed in their interpretation of Scripture and tradition, but Rabbi Joshua was most definitely interested in

ritual which is an integral part of Scripture and tradition. The Torah was of the greatest import in his life. The Talmud (Nedarim 50b) records that when a remark was passed concerning his uncomeliness, Rabbi Joshua initiated an experiment in order to prove that the Torah is better preserved in an unattractive vessel than in a comely one. Admittedly, the tendency to categorize the Rabbinic scholars into two groups, the liberal and conservative, has ample precedent. . . . Nevertheless, this is an oversimplification which leads to a naive and distorted picture of the Halachic processes.

Dr. Podro's assertion that Rabbi Joshua's opinion on the Rabbinic laws relating to vows, for example, was that ". . . the laws on Sabbath, Feasts, and Desecration of Holy Things have little Scriptural authority: many Halachahs are like mountains hanging on hairs with nothing on which to support themselves" is utterly confusing. For one, he omits the words dealing with dissolution of vows which are to be found at the beginning of the passage. Secondly, the opinion stated in the Mishnah (Hagigah 10a) and Tosefta (Hagigah 1.11) which Dr. Podro fails to quote is masterfully explained by the commentary "Hasdei David."

Rabbi Joshua acknowledged the importance of interpretation of the Torah in order to apply it to the needs of the time. Nevertheless, he insisted that the Torah was eternally binding and not to be altered. According to the Maharsha, Rabbi Joshua made the statement (Hagigah 3b) "The words of the wise are as goads, and as nails well planted by the masters of Assemblies, which are given from one Shepherd. Why are the words of the Torah compared to a goad? To teach that just as the goad directs the heifer along its furrow in order to bring forth life to the world, so the words of the Torah direct those who study them from the paths of death to the paths of life. But (should one suppose) that just as the goad is movable so the words of the Torah are movable, therefore the text says: nails! But (should one suppose) that just as the nail diminishes and does not increase, so too the words of the Torah diminish and do not increase; therefore the text says 'well planted'; just as a plant grows and increases, so the words of the Torah grow and increase."

(CHAPLAIN) ABRAHAM I. KURTZ

Office of the Jewish Chaplain
Fort Jackson, South Carolina

DR. PODRO writes:

Rabbi Kurtz's letter contains a number of arguments of which I cannot see the force.

1. I did not *interpret* Rabbi Joshua's statement of circumcision, I merely reported it.

Rabbi Joshua's opinion is not, of course, the established Halachah, but in his time the problem was still an open one. We are dealing with a period when a great deal of the Halachah was still fluid and under discussion. Your correspondent should read on in Yebamoth (46b, top, to "all agree that ablution without circumcision is effective"). This passage simply is a dispute on whether circumcision is or is not necessary for a proselyte.

Proselytizing in Joshua's time was a very real problem. There was a great turning away from idolatry and the Jewish religion attracted many thinking strangers, even in high places. Jewish propaganda for mass proselytizing was very keen ("Ye compass sea and land to make one proselyte"—Matt. 23:15) and Rabbi Joshua supported an easier way of becoming a proselyte. The fact that Paul hoped to attract many converts by making it easier for them to join, and the inroad he made on adherents in many places, may have given Rabbi Joshua the idea to attract would-be converts to Judaism rather than to let them join the new and disruptive movement. Rabbi Kurtz's quotation (I Cor. 7:19) "Circumcision is nothing and uncircumcision is nothing" means nothing, without the earlier statement (5:18) "Is any called in uncircumcision? Let him not be circumcised."

2. Rabbi Kurtz cannot deny that we can make a distinction between those Rabbis who worked for the elaboration of ritual practice on the basis of the Scriptures and those who did not want it elaborated (the case of the Ma'arib is in point here), while the suggestion was never made that Rabbi Joshua wanted a deritualized religion. The point is simply that Rabbi Eliezer was an extremist in comparison with Rabbi Joshua; surely a quite cursory reading of the Talmudic texts would reveal this. (I cannot see why Rabbi Kurtz regards it as necessary to talk of Rabbi Joshua's holding the Torah eternally binding. Whoever suggested anything to the contrary?)

3. On the laws relating to vows etc., Rabbi Kurtz says that I made an assertion which was "utterly confusing." I made no assertion; I merely quoted the Mishnah. The passage omitted in no way affects the point I was making which concerned the need for Scriptural foundation for Halachahs.

To what purpose does he introduce the opinion of an 18th-century rabbi, the "Hasdei David," when we are dealing with a 1st-century statement, which from the point of view under consideration is perfectly clear? We were concerned with the historical fact that this argument was used, and on this fact the excellent 18th-century rabbi's views are scarcely relevant.

For the record I should like to add that I

did not intend to represent Rabbi Joshua as a prototype of modern Liberal or Reform Judaism. To see him as such, from my point of view, would be sadly to underestimate his value for Judaism.

The President & the Party

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

To the extent that "The Decline of the Republican Party," of which Harold Lavine wrote in your August issue, is actually the decline of its Old Guard, few outside its ranks will find need to mourn. The bitterness and irresponsibility bred by twenty years in opposition, and which constituted too large a proportion of the unbroken morale to which Mr. Lavine refers, might have permanently poisoned our political life. It is a significant and welcome sign of the change in atmosphere that Senator Jenner, out of "sheer disgust with the administration," has seen fit not to run for reelection.

The effect of the Eisenhower administration has been to clear the Republican garden of some of its rankest weeds. Like most of the administration's achievements, this too has been a negative one. The President, a man of good intentions with little capacity (perhaps even little interest) for carrying them out, has failed to build from the ashes of the Old Guard that responsible conservative party which we have long lacked in American politics. It is not that the materials have been absent. Little has been made of the group of progressive businessmen who were so largely responsible for Eisenhower's first nomination—notably Paul Hoffman and John J. McCloy. Men like C. D. Jackson have been used only intermittently. Indeed, their role has largely been limited to prodding the administration from outside.

Even sadder has been the lot of the Eisenhower Republicans in Congress. The President has chosen to work almost exclusively through the established leadership. Senators Knowland and Dirksen and Congressman Martin have, on the whole, supported the President—but their hearts have obviously not been in it. Indeed, since he was stricken with Presidential aspirations, Knowland has become increasingly independent. Meanwhile, authentic Eisenhower Republicans like Clifford Case and John Sherman Cooper have found it difficult even to see the President, let alone to influence Republican policy in Congress.

In retrospect, the President's fatal error would seem to have been his failure to exact a higher price for his consent to seek reelection in 1956. He owed the Republican party nothing; the party owed him everything. Yet he set no price upon their use of his name, even that of a free choice of his running mate. The President appears finally to have seen the light—albeit very late in the day. On May 3 he told a Republican party rally that he would determine those Republican Congressional candidates he would support this fall by how they voted on three vital parts of his legislative program—defense reorganization, reciprocal trade, and overseas aid. Eight Senators who voted against him on one or more of these measures are up for reelection this fall—Goldwater of Arizona, Langer of North Dakota, Williams of Delaware, Barrett of Wyoming, Hruska of Nebraska, Malone of Nevada, and Hoblittsell and Revercomb of West Virginia. The President's future attitude to these Senators will make an interesting footnote to Lavine's article.

DAVID C. WILLIAMS

Washington, D.C.

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Harold Lavine's otherwise admirable article, "The Decline of the Republican Party," oversimplifies the kind of leadership the Democrats in Pennsylvania have successfully offered the electorate. Governor George Leader, aged forty-one, is the only well-known Democrat in this state "who had not fought the battles of the 30's." U.S. Senator Joseph S. Clark and Philadelphia's Mayor Richardson Dilworth were moderately active in politics then (one ran for state senator and the other for city council then, but really became active in 1947 when Dilworth ran for mayor). They are now fifty-seven and sixty years old respectively. As for patriarchal Mayor David L. Lawrence of Pittsburgh, the current Democratic gubernatorial candidate, he is a veteran of the New Freedom of Woodrow Wilson and of the New and Fair Deals. In other words, the revival of the Democratic organization here has not been led and fronted by youngsters. Men in their middle years and sixty-nine-year-old Dave Lawrence have played prominent roles.

WALTER R. STOREY

Philadelphia, Pa.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

Studies in Disaster

STRATEGIC SURRENDER: THE POLITICS OF VICTORY AND DEFEAT. By PAUL KECSKEMETI. Stanford University Press. 289 pp. \$5.00.

Reviewed by GORDON A. CRAIG

Few criticisms of Western leadership during World War II have been accepted more uncritically than the charge that the war was unnecessarily prolonged by insistence upon the unconditional surrender of Germany. Rarely accompanied by any supporting evidence more substantial than those passages in Goebbels' diary in which the doctor said he *hoped* to use the "unconditional surrender" formula to strengthen the German will to resistance, this statement has become a shibboleth of military writers. It is high time that someone took the pains to show that it is contrary to fact and, indeed, to logic; and Paul Kecskemeti deserves credit for having done so.

In a careful study of the German surrender of 1945—one of the four case studies in this interesting and original book—Mr. Kecskemeti points out that the principal causes of the prolongation of German resistance were, first, Hitler's flat refusal to countenance the idea of capitulation—a refusal dictated by his belief that, if the German people lost the war, they would have no right to future existence—and, second, the fact that, as long as Hitler was alive, military loyalty prevented his commanders from seeking surrender. Unconditional surrender had very little influence, for example, on the determination of General von Rundstedt to go on fighting even after the situation on the western front had become hopeless. He refused to try to negotiate on his own initiative with Allied commanders because, as one of his staff has written, "his military upbringing ruled that out" and because "no one can jump over his own shadow."

After Hitler had committed suicide, the unconditional surrender formula does not seem

to have had any effect on the course adopted by German soldiers. Indeed, as soon as they were freed from their oath to the Führer, German commanders made strenuous efforts to capitulate to the Western powers, while seeking to avoid surrender to the Russians. Yet it was the Western powers who were insistent upon unconditional surrender, whereas the Russians used much more attractive language in their appeals to the Germans. All of this leads to the inescapable conclusion that unconditional surrender had no real effect on the doggedness of German resistance and the duration of the war; and the idea that a different formula or slogan would have shortened the conflict appreciably is, therefore, a myth. It is a myth which has won credence because we have all fallen under the spell of Madison Avenue psychology, to the extent of believing that word-manipulation determines human conduct. As Mr. Kecskemeti writes: "Addicted to a naive stimulus-response philosophy, we tend to take it for granted that people's actions depend on nothing but the momentary stimuli they receive, stimuli that we, the manipulators, can control at will." History, to say nothing of current events, gives little basis for this easy belief.

ARE we then to conclude that unconditional surrender was a desirable and effective policy? Not in Mr. Kecskemeti's view. He believes—and this is the main point of his book—that it had unfortunate effects after the fighting phase of the war proper was over and the time had come to arrange a surrender. The Allies were prevented from "handling surrender situations in the most efficient and expeditious manner" by what he calls "the rules of unconditionality." They had resolved that, when it came time for the enemy to treat, there must be no dealings with enemy leaders except to instruct them about details of orderly capitulation (the "no-negotiation" rule) and further, that immediately after capitulation the enemy leaders would cease to exercise political authority and no other leaders would be recognized (the "no-

recognition" or "vacuum" rule). In practice, these rules had unfortunate effects.

How unfortunate the author illustrates with studies of the Italian surrender negotiations of 1943, the Japanese surrender of 1945 and—for purposes of comparison—the Franco-German armistice negotiations of 1940. In the last of these, Mr. Kecskemeti argues, both parties were entirely realistic, both were thinking of the benefits to be gained from a quick solution, both recognized that the surrender of a power that possesses residual strength involves concessions from the victor, and the armistice was, as a result, attained with a minimum of difficulty. In the other cases, difficulty was made inevitable by Allied rigidity and insistence that all bargaining be ruled out as a matter of principle. In the Italian case, the "no-recognition" rule—specifically, reluctance to recognize the authority of the Badoglio regime—was the principal source of confusion. In the case of Japan, the "no-negotiation" rule was crucial, and failure to establish direct and confidential channels of communication with the Japanese government left that government under illusions which prevented a quick settlement. In neither case was the resultant delay of more than a few weeks' duration; the main damage done to the Allied cause by holding to the rules of unconditionality was that it enabled third parties to make gains at our expense. In Italy, the Germans were able to strengthen their position in and around Rome; in Japan, the Soviet Union, whose intervention in the Far Eastern war might have been forestalled by quicker agreement, was the real beneficiary.

Historians will probably have some fault to find with details in Mr. Kecskemeti's case studies. His discussion of the Italian surrender suffers from an inadequate account of the Cassibile talks, and this weakens his treatment of the projected American air-drop at Rome; he seems also to underestimate the unfortunate political effects which Allied negotiations with Badoglio and the House of Savoy were bound to have in the United States and England, as well as in the captive countries. Neither Mr. Churchill nor President Roosevelt dared underestimate them; and this explains their behavior. In his treatment of the Japanese situation, Mr. Kecskemeti argues that the dropping of the atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki "made no essential contribution to Japan's surrender without a last battle." This is hard to believe and is not made any easier by the fact

that, in seeking to prove it, the author seems, to this reader, to become involved in a maze of qualifications and contradictions.

But these are matters which do not affect his main argument or the conclusions he draws from it. The coming of nuclear weapons has changed a lot of things, and the kind of strategy that guided both military operations and political negotiations in World War II is hardly suited to the new conditions. "Powers may seek to survive in the nuclear age," Mr. Kecskemeti writes, "either by going to extremes of inhumanity and malevolence never imagined before, or by drastically limiting their expectations of gain from the application of armed power." It is not to be expected that the United States will resort to the first alternative. Forced to rely on the other, Americans will have to perform the painful but necessary task of overcoming traditional attitudes, like the rejection of compromise, the reliance on inflexible rules, and the refusal to adjust positions once taken, which marked their conduct of the surrender negotiations of the last war.

Israel and the Arabs

BACKDROP TO TRAGEDY: THE STRUGGLE FOR PALESTINE. By WILLIAM R. POLK, DAVID M. STAMLER, and EDMUND ASFOUR. Beacon. 399 pp. \$4.95.

ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST. By HARRY B. ELLIS. Ronald. 260 pp. \$4.00.

MULTITUDES IN THE VALLEY: CHURCH AND CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By DENIS BALY. Seabury. 307 pp. \$5.00.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST: FROM THE RISE OF ISLAM TO MODERN TIMES. By GEORGE E. KIRK. 4th edition. 308 pp. \$5.00.

Reviewed by J. C. HUREWITZ

THREE of the four books under review focus on the Arab-Israel dispute. All three rest on a premise which no thoughtful person would contest: the frictions and barriers that divide Israel from its Arab neighbors antedate the expiry in mid-May 1948 of the British Mandate for Palestine. All three, moreover, contend—explicitly or implicitly—that the Arab-Israel dispute, or what some still call the Palestine problem, is the prime unsettling force in the

Middle East. They go on to suggest—actually or virtually—that if this dispute, however defined, were once resolved—or, as it is phrased in one of the volumes, if we only learn “how to live with and control the situation as we now see it”—everything Middle Eastern will begin to fall into place and the Middle East story will move assuredly to a happy ending.

Aside from this oversimplification, or over-emphasis of a problem which, though certainly torturing enough, is not the only one that racks the Middle East or even the truly central one, the three works share little else in common. Each uses different methods and appeals to different audiences. *Israel and the Middle East* is slanted toward journalism and *Multiitudes in the Valley* toward theology, while *Backdrop to Tragedy* might be classed as academic popularization. To start with Mr. Baly, *Multiitudes in the Valley*, to the non-Christian layman at least, presents many obstacles. It is basically a sermon on the Arab-Israel problem in international politics. It summons devout Christians to reflect on their religious obligations to take a constructive lead in helping Arabs and Israelis to accommodate their differences. Yet within such an unlikely context, Denis Baly contrives to develop in simple language a vigorous, and often persuasive, plea. He begs not for patience and understanding alone but for viewing the Arab-Israel contest as a whole and evaluating on its own merits each of the many issues entailed.

Baly manifests an intimacy with the subject gained from two decades of experience as a British missionary in Israel and Jordan and their mandated antecedents. Nowhere, it is true, does he subject the USSR and its involvement to detailed scrutiny. But otherwise he shows a sympathetic appreciation of the attitudes of the major contestants, yet does not flinch from exploring with refreshing frankness topics that might embarrass sensitive Arabs and Israelis, Britons and Frenchmen, and even Americans. The book comes as close as a theological tract can to a realistic appraisal of the emotional and psychological forces that hold sway in and over the Arab-Israel zone. To deaden the pain that his criticism might induce in thin-skinned partisans, the author tends to tell them what they would like to hear while simultaneously pricking their pride. The technique is well illustrated in his assertion that Israel “is a country with a generous heart, and a pulsating life, but very little soul.” He re-

jects the Arab claim that the Palestine Jews alone created the Arab refugee problem. But after insisting that the British and the Arabs themselves must share the blame, he measures the extent of Israel’s responsibility. Although Baly is himself an advocate of non-intervention, he nevertheless finds that all three Western allies acted selfishly at the time of the Sinai-Suez crisis of 1956, the United States no less in refusing to commit force than Britain and France in committing it.

The bi-millennial persecution of the Jews, which combined with their “continuing consciousness of the promises of God” tended through the ages to make them visionaries, argues Baly, has in the mid-20th century transformed Israeli politicians into practitioners of the impossible in contrast to the prevailing devotion in Western politics to “the science of the possible.” Israel’s “most virulent critics” are warned not to forget that the new state has “achieved so much, which the rest of the world often declared visionary.” The Israelis themselves, however, are also cautioned not to fall victim of their own propaganda, particularly as it relates to the absorptive capacity of their modest tract of real estate.

In the light of the Iraqi coup d’état of July 1958, the author’s admonition written more than a year earlier takes on new meaning. “Changes in the political structure [of Arab lands] are bound to take place,” he observed, “and we cannot lay it down that they shall not take the revolutionary pattern set by Egypt. We must therefore not try to maintain in power an existing government because we are afraid of what would take its place, or overthrow a government because we do not like it. We must recognize now that new Middle Eastern dictators will almost certainly arise (Iraq seems a likely place as soon as Nuri es-Sa’id is gone) and there will be much that is politically abhorrent to us.” So far so good. But when he goes on to advise that “We shall have every temptation to intervene, but on no account must we do so. We may, however, quite legitimately give warning that we shall oppose any form of outside interference” he does not explain how we might effectively “oppose . . . outside interference” by means other than intervention. Indeed, one of the obvious weaknesses of the Baly thesis is the implied advocacy of a passive policy for the West. Yet, characteristically, he admits that “paralysis or . . . pietism . . . would be a great mistake.”

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
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BALY's analysis of the religious background of Muslim thinking is surprisingly anemic for a student of comparative religion. His weakness is William R. Polk's strength, for it is Polk who contributed to *Backdrop to Tragedy* the section on the Arabs and Palestine and the data on Islam and the Islamic interest. Polk generally demonstrates an easy familiarity with Islamic institutions, Arab history, and Arabic literature, in which he steeped himself in four years of apprenticeship—financed by the Rockefeller Foundation—at Baghdad and Oxford. Nor does he disappoint the expectation of fresh insights into the working of the Arab mind, the behavior of the individual in Arab society, and the intensity of Arab feeling against Zionism and against the British Mandate.

Yet Polk seems more at home in history than in contemporary politics. No clear picture is drawn of the mechanics of such movements as Palestine Arab nationalism, or the rising interest in Palestine among the nearby Arab states, or the growth of Arab unity nationalism. This emerges most clearly from his treatment of the causes of the Arab refugee problem. One of the most revealing phenomena of mid-May 1948 was the absence from Palestine at the time of every member of the Arab Higher Committee (the officially recognized directorate of the community's political affairs), and in fact of almost all Arabs entertaining pretensions to community leadership. No one who studies the Arab refugee question impartially will try to minimize the fear that the slaughter of the Arabs residing at Dayr Yasin spread through Palestine Arab ranks in the final weeks of the Mandate. But surely the lack among the Palestine Arabs of political leadership, the consequent dearth of political plans, and the miscarriage of their military plans—no less than the swift dismantling by the Mandatory power of the central governmental machinery—had already given rise in the Arab community to conditions of chaos which Dayr Yasin merely compounded. But none of these factors other than Dayr Yasin is even mentioned.

In writing *Backdrop to Tragedy* Polk was joined by David M. Stamler, an English-born student of modern Hebrew literature and of Zionism, and Edmund Asfour, a Palestine-born economist specializing on the Middle East. The central idea of uniting the efforts of an American, a Zionist, and an Arab nationalist to reexamine the Palestine problem in depth was unique and daring. But the book fails to

live up to its promise. The difficulty springs from faulty conception of procedure and purpose. Scrambled authorship throughout might have yielded unity and coherence. This is amply attested by the use of the method in the long opening section on the historical background and the short statement of conclusions. Instead, the individually written sections that form the bulk of the book, by repeating the subject matter, impede the flow of analysis and, at times, blur the issues. Furthermore, if it is germane to evaluate the role of the European powers in the historical background as the authors have done, it is no less so for the period after 1948. For who will deny that the issues raised by the unabating Arab-Israel tension have become entangled irretrievably with issues that plague the relations among the major powers? Yet this phase of the Arab-Israel quarrel is nowhere systematically probed. There is, finally, gross unevenness in the quality of authorship. Stamler's handling of Zionism, the emergence of Israel, and the state's travail in its first decade rarely rises above the pedestrian, while his discussion of politics falls well below. Yet he is, like Polk, dispassionate. This is more than may be said of Asfour, who dwells on the economic framework of the Palestine problem as seen by an Arab, which means that he employs his knowledge of economics primarily in the pursuit of refuting Zionist and Israel claims.

IN A class quite different from either of the two preceding works is *Israel and the Middle East*. The roving Middle East correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor* for three years in the early 1950's and now its assistant overseas news editor, Harry B. Ellis, distilled his experiences in a book on the Arabs. Ellis returned to the area in 1956, this time concentrating on Israel. His latest volume would appear designed to redress the balance. It is not a question of emotional balance, I must hasten to add, for Ellis as a professional observer of high competence tends to see unfolding events in the larger perspective without commitment to any cause but that of honest and fearless journalism. His present book on Israel in its regional setting, as one might anticipate, is honest and fearless—as far as it goes. But it does not go very far. The major reason is simple enough. The book is not wholly a product of journalism. Indeed half the space is taken up with history, with information culled from reading that the author did to supplement

what he saw. But he seems to have done his homework rather hastily and to have chosen his sources poorly. For supporting evidence on the rise and fall of the Palestine Mandate, for example, he leans almost wholly on an apologetic British Information Services pamphlet issued at the time the United Kingdom was laying down its authority. I fail to see what this kind of superficial research can offer even to the newspaper reader who has followed only the shooting and the shouting along the inflamed Arab-Israel frontier in the past decade. Ellis might have been better advised to use all his space for recording and assessing his direct observations.

The last book, George E. Kirk's *A Short History of the Middle East*, may be swiftly dismissed, for this is a reprinting of the fourth edition (1955) with a few paragraphs added to cover the 1956 Suez crisis. Of particular interest in the present context is the fact that more than half the volume is devoted to the Middle East after 1918, and more than a third of this space is given to the Palestine dispute. Kirk uses the space more to controvert Zionist arguments than to analyze the dispute itself, paying almost no attention to the internal affairs of the Palestine Arabs whose cause he largely endorsed. Because the author was bound in his task of revision by the structure and contents of the book when it first appeared in 1948, it no longer meets the needs of the situation. Now that Britain has been toppled in the Middle East from its political and military eminence, not only have revolutionary nationalist forces been unleashed in the Arab East with a vengeance, but the Soviet Union and the United States have been brought into direct rivalry. Instead of grappling with these new—and, for the West, most unpleasant—realities, Mr. Kirk in his concluding paragraphs seeks escape into pietism. Nothing could be more out of character with the rest of the work.

American Protestantism

AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM AND SOCIAL ISSUES, 1919-1939. By ROBERT MOATS MILLER. University of North Carolina Press. 385 pp., \$6.00.

Reviewed by ROBERT E. FITCH

It is the great convenience of the church (temple, synagogue) that it functions both as savior and as scapegoat. If the world is in a

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mess, we can call upon the church to get us out of it, or we can blame the church for getting us into it. One set of critics complains that the church is too conservative, that it is a peddler of opiates to the people. Another set of critics complains that the church is too radical, that it is the spiritual ferment behind every sort of dangerous revolutionary impulse. The interesting thing about this situation is that everybody in one way or another is right. The difficult problem, however, is that of making discriminating judgments.

The merit of Robert Moats Miller's book is that it gives us some facts. The inquiry is focused on American Protestantism from 1919 to 1939—the two decades between the two great world wars. There is a thorough and systematic study of the attitudes and actions of various sects, denominations, and interdenominational bodies with reference to the central issues of the time. Mr. Miller first of all considers the general movement of the church to the left during these two decades, and then examines its dealings with civil liberties, with labor, with race, and with war and peace. In these pages we meet Reinhold Niebuhr, Buell Gallagher, Bishop McConnell,

Norman Thomas; we watch the Federal Council of Churches, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, or the Fellowship of Socialist Christians; we are there with Sacco and Vanzetti, or with Mooney and Billings; we follow the great strikes, from the steel strike of 1919 to the textile strikes in Lawrence, Passaic, and Gastonia. But it is impossible to summarize the enormous number of issues, organizations, and crises that are encompassed in this study.

If the reader finds some difficulty in staying with the book, this is because in time the sheer massing of evidence can induce tedium. It may also be because, in spite of a prevailing order, clarity, and even zest in the style of exposition, the author lets go every now and then with what appears to be a deliberately outlandish expression. He likes the colloquial "still and all," gives way on impulse to the casual and clumsy wisecrack, and occasionally provides us with an incredibly incongruous combination of images: "Indeed, it becomes as plain as a pike-staff that Protestant protests against lynching were almost as thick as bald headed sinners at an Amy Semple McPherson revival." Again, some of his apothegms are more pretentious than sententious: "After all, new found worlds could not be discovered by lost souls"—which I forbear to comment upon; or else: "After all, it was Jesus not Marx who observed that where a man's purse is there will be his heart also." But the key word in Matthew 6:21 in the King James version, or in the RSV, or in Moffatt, or even in Phillips, is rendered "treasure," not "purse," and it certainly does not signify a pocketbook with money in it.

Nevertheless this volume still offers all the excitement of discovery and of challenge. When Mr. Miller begins with a discussion of "The Churches Corpulent and Contented in the Twenties," we relish his shrewd documentation, nod our heads in agreement, think uneasily about a possible analogy with the 50's, and continue reading with the confident feeling that all of our precious stereotypes are to be respected. But the very next chapter is "A Dissenting Report of the Churches in the Twenties," which shows that there was a considerable ferment of social radicalism among the churches even in those complacent times. And the next chapter, on the election of 1928, presents the disturbing thesis that it really was the Prohibition question, rather than anti-Catholic prejudice, that turned so many Protestants against Al Smith.

Every now and then, with respectful malice, Mr. Miller points out how the "realist" Reinhold Niebuhr was often naive and doctrinaire in his judgments in the 20's and 30's. He also argues that, during the period under consideration, if you cancel out the socially conservative Unitarians against the socially radical apostles of neo-orthodoxy, there is still a high degree of direct correlation between conservatism in theology and in public affairs, and liberalism in theology and in social action. However, it also becomes evident that simple sociological interpretations in the Marxian manner can be quite misleading. On the hypothesis of economic determinism it may be understandable that the South should be less liberal than the North. Yet it is in the North, where the industrial interests exist, that the church is more radical in its social policies; and it is the churches of the upper middle classes, rather than those of the lower middle classes, that take the lead in this radicalism.

A rough summary of Mr. Miller's findings would be to the effect that the church did very well on civil liberties, did pretty well in the cause of labor, did rather poorly in the race question, and, after its mistakes in the First World War, was consistently high-minded and idealistic, if occasionally fatuous, in matters of war and peace. He suggests that the church did not really get going in the cause of racial justice until a later decade. And while Protestants provided both the members and the leaders for anti-Semitic movements, it is nevertheless the case that official organs of the church, both denominational and interdenominational, were overwhelmingly in opposition. It is plain, moreover, that the church dared more than once to take a stand that was genuinely sacrificial. Perhaps the most dramatic instance of this was the report on the steel strike of 1919 by the commission under Bishop Francis J. McConnell. This report had a lot to do with ending long hours of work in the steel industry; but it was also a prime factor in the failure of the Inter-church World Movement, under whose auspices the report was issued, in that it alienated the wealthy sponsors of that movement.

A principal effect of this study should be to force upon our attention the importance of making discriminating judgments. For instance, there can be quite a difference between the stand taken by local churches and the position of churches in their regional or in their na-

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tional groupings. Of course the class alignments of churches are important, although one must beware of naively Marxian interpretations here. Then each denomination has its own tradition of a peculiar emphasis in social ethics. One must distinguish again between the attitude of the majority and the attitude of a minority, while remembering that sometimes the minority (the leaven) may be more important than the majority (the lump). There are also questions of strategy and of tactics, which may evoke patterns of speech and of behavior rather different from what is involved in the simple affirmation of a social creed. Incidentally, the naivety or the realism of Reinhold Niebuhr needs to be understood in the light of this consideration, for he has always been a man of action as well as an expositor of ideas.

OF PARTICULAR interest to all religious bodies that are organized in a congregational polity—i.e., to all Jews, and, among Protestants, to all Baptists, Congregationalists, Disciples, Brethren, and most sectarian groups—is the unmistakable conclusion that the boldest leadership in liberal causes comes not from the local clergy but from those church officers who are

farthest removed from the control of the local congregation. While allowing for important exceptions, Mr. Miller tells us that “on the whole Protestantism’s most liberal leaders were seminary professors, church press editors, episcopal officers, agency heads, and the like.” That phrase “episcopal officers” may upset some of us, and yet both the Methodist and the Episcopal churches have shown time and again that their bishops can be among the most daring and unconventional in their social attitudes. Indeed, it was the general rule during these two decades that the clergy were ahead of the laity in social liberalism, and this explains in part the fact that there could be a discrepancy between the official, high-level pronouncements of the church and what it put into practice. But if there was a lag in radical social action, that lag would have to be blamed on laicism rather than on clericalism.

Of course in this year 1958 we are already two decades past the concluding point of Mr. Miller’s study. In these two decades what used to be called the Red “scare” has become a world-wide Communist menace; the assault on civil liberties, on the courts, and on due process of law has lost little of its momentum; there

has been a tremendous effort to smash the barriers between church and state in public and private school education; there are critical issues of desegregation, of automation, of atomic energy, of the warfare of total annihilation, that claim our attention. In general, the disposition of American society during this time reflects a shift from the left to the right. What has been the role of the churches in these changing times?

It would be my hope that Mr. Miller will shortly be at work on a new book, covering the two decades from 1939 to 1959; and that, with some slight gain in dignity of expression as well as in the interpretive structuring of his materials, he will bring to this fresh undertaking the same energy in research and the same zest in exposition that have already made him a significant scholar in his field.

More Groves of Academe

A FRIEND IN POWER. By CARLOS BAKER.
Scribner's. 312 pp. \$3.95.

Reviewed by RICHARD SCHICKEL

It is almost too good a coincidence to be true. Americans seem suddenly beset with a desire for reconciliation with the intellectual—"the man who knows," as one advertisement calls him. There was, for example, quite a remarkable response to the recent suggestion by Louis Hacker, via the *New York Times Magazine*, that the government set aside some funds to do various honors to the eggheads. Coincident with this shift in the national mood comes the first academic novel in years to emphasize, not the eccentricities of the professorial inhabitants of our universities, but their similarity to ordinary mortals. The characters in *A Friend in Power* bear a disquieting resemblance to stereotyped "ordinary guys" of television and movie screens. In fact, Carlos Baker's novel might be termed an academic Man in the Grey Flannel Suit. Baker writes with the rice-pudding blandness of a Sloan Wilson, his incredibly nice people—far less neurotic even than Wilson's ex-urbanites—come from the same kit of paper dolls, and his happy ending is also in the Wilsonian mode.

Edward Tyler, French scholar, Voltaire expert, department chairman, excellent friend, father, and husband, is selected to serve on a faculty committee advising the trustees of a

university not unlike Princeton (where Baker is chairman of the English Department) on the appointment of a new president for the institution. In happy ignorance he goes about discreetly campaigning for his friend Cos Cobb (not to be confused with the town in Connecticut), a biologist modeled on Thoreauvian lines. Cos had come out of the woods long enough to get himself involved with a floosie—an indiscretion he has long since paid for. But suspense is built as the reader wonders if this old mistake will cost Cos the presidency. At last Tyler is summoned to hear the decision of the trustees. Their choice? Ed Tyler, of course. Well, Ed couldn't have been more surprised, but after decent hesitation he takes the job. Except for this brief battle with himself, Tyler at no point in the novel finds himself in conflict; the trustees are a group of benign capitalists and professional men; the college administration is a singularly enlightened one; the faculty a group of dedicated scholars who would no more do dirt to a colleague than they would falsify a footnote; among their wives there is neither a dipsomaniac nor a nymphomaniac, nor even a shrew; the student body is represented by an amiable lunkhead who, we can see, will shortly become A Useful Member of Society. In other words, all is serene within the academic grove.


WHAT a contrast this is to the works which have made up the genre of the academic novel until Mr. Baker came along to set things right. As John Aldridge has pointed out, the academic novel has been one of the most interesting results of the mass retreat of American writers to the campus. "As their memory of life faded," he wrote, "along with their capacity to feel it, many of them began exploiting the world of academy itself; and there set in among them a species of creative incest in which the relations which normally obtain between writers and their experience were perverted into relations with the agency which instructed them or supported them in the art of having relations with their experience."

The *Beowulf* of the breed was a 1946 novel by Helen Howe, called *We Happy Few*. The first half of it is a splendidly satirical account of smug complacency amongst a group of politically liberal, socially immature, Harvard faculty men. This section of the work need yield to nothing for sheer bitchiness. The second half of the novel, unfortunately, consists of a pil-

grimage by Dorothea, the heroine, across America, in the course of which she discovers the democratic mystique, learns that despite the best efforts of her friends and herself to be different, to be smart, that she—and they (and by extension all intellectuals)—are no better than the meanest among us. This leads her to a new humility, and Miss Howe to a terrible falsification of character. As David Riesman noted in an illuminating essay on “The Ethics of *We Happy Few*,” it represents an attack on the intellectuals. Miss Howe rubs Dorothea’s nose in Democracy, forces her to submit her individuality to mass values, implying that somehow they are better than the sham values of the happy few. She refuses to recognize that many of the mass values are as hypocritical as those of the intellectuals, and that at least the intellectuals of her “little group” aren’t afraid to be different.

THIS recognition of the world outside the academy does not occur in the novels which followed *We Happy Few*. It was as if their writers, eschewing the sentimental rapprochement of Miss Howe’s Dorothea with non-intellectual America, said to themselves, “We’re out of touch? OK, we’re out of touch.” And proceeded to write for one another and for the happy few. Mary McCarthy brought her well-known waspishness to *The Groves of Academe*, Randall Jarrell his wittiness to *Pictures from an Institution*. Howard Nemerov, without the satirical gifts of McCarthy and Jarrell, plodded along with *The Homecoming Game*, a study of administrative hanky-panky and academic spinelessness which was the most depressing fiction of the lot. Stringfellow Barr weighed in, just a few months ago, with an angry, self-righteous satire, *Purely Academic*, that was directed more at institutional shortcomings than at individuals.

The writers of the academic novels which preceded *A Friend in Power* resembled a group of explorers surrounded by howling savages, awaiting the final breaching of the stockade. They turned inward upon themselves and their peers, bickering like a group of left sectarians about what should be done, blaming one another for their plight, feeling sorry for themselves, rather than fighting the common enemy. Before they had written their novels, David Riesman suggested that “intellectuals turn against themselves because they are few, and because they are not happy enough; that is,



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
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they have not enough love for themselves, or pride in what they are." So it is not simply the writers' retreat to the sheltering universities which has produced the academic novel. That novel has simply been one by-product of the general dissociation of intellectuals from the wider public. Dorothea embracing, as Diana Trilling said, "the wide American panorama presenting itself as little more than a series of small-spirited, harassed and unhappy people who in their uneducated fashion are just as egotistical as Dorothea," attempted a rapprochement which was, as we have seen, false, or at least naive. The very fact that in 1946 Miss Howe felt a need to seek this bridge between the intellectuals and the rest of the country indicates that one cannot place the blame for the latter's isolation on the anti-intellectualism of McCarthy (Joe) and his yahoo followers. The split is much deeper than that, and the appearance of a novel like *A Friend in Power* is as far from signaling a closing of the crevasse as the post-Sputnik wave of pro-intellectuality.

In *A Friend in Power* Carlos Baker, indi-

rectly, makes the same error that Helen Howe made directly. Like her, he feels the need for communication to a wider group than the happy few who have so relished the McCarthy, Jarrell, and Nemerov books. But while Miss Howe met the problem of mind in America head on, and failed, Baker blithely chose to ignore the fact of the separation of the intellectuals from other Americans. His intellectuals are determinedly "just like everyone else." Helen Howe at least had the perception to see that this is untrue. Certainly, intellectuals share with other Americans a great common fund of problems—and even values. But the fact that they are manipulators of symbols, that they do work with their brains, does make them different. Not better, just different. And you can't write of them as if they were so many insurance salesmen.

In a sense, however, *A Friend in Power* represents an advance on the previous novels of university life. It avoids the satirical approach which has been exhausted. There have been too many ingroup gossip sessions in the form of novels, with no wider fictional meaning, full of self-loathing and self-pity. What is needed now is what Riesman called for in his essay on *We Happy Few*. He ended that piece by quoting William James: "We ought to have our own class consciousness. *Les Intellectuels!* What prouder clubname could there be than this one. . . ."

In that Baker does not see that such a club exists, in that he has refused in his novel to show us that intellectuals *are* different from the mass of men—and that their worth is often the sum of that difference—he has failed as a novelist. This failure is reflected in his slick, smooth style, plot, and characterizations. In short he has written a timid book.

Italian Jews under Fascism

CINQUE STORIE FERRARESI (Five Ferrarese Stories). By GIORGIO BASSANI. Einaudi Publishers (Torino, Italy, 1956). 1200 Italian lire.

Reviewed by EDOUARD RODITI

Jews have always been a very small minority in Italy, but in the past hundred years or so they have played an important part in the country's cultural, scientific, and political life. Fictional descriptions of Italian Jewish life,

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however, remain rare. Except in the old ghetto of Rome, Italian Jews have belonged mainly to the educated middle class. As thinkers, writers, or artists, they have contributed to Italian rather than to specifically Jewish movements. The painter Amedeo Modigliani was typical of this liberal assimilationist trend; in spite of the apparently Jewish *morbidezza* of his temperament, he never painted a single picture which can be defined as recognizably Jewish. Nor was Modigliani the only Italian Jewish painter of distinction; of others—Vito d'Ancona, Serafino da Tivoli, Roberto Melli, or Sadun—one generally forgets they were Jews.

Among contemporary Italian novelists, there have also been outstanding writers of Jewish origin: Italo Svevo, whose stories describe the Italian-speaking upper bourgeoisie of Austro-Hungarian Trieste without ever mentioning that any of his recognizably Jewish characters are Jews; Alberto Moravia, who likewise refrains, even when describing his own family, from proclaiming the hideous secret of his ancestry; and Carlo Levi, the author of *Christ Stopped at Eboli*. Giorgio Bassani's *Cinque storie ferraresi*, a collection of five stories mainly about relations between Jews and Gentiles in Ferrara during the years that preceded Fascism, in the Fascist era, and since the Liberation, are exceptional in that they state

their problem explicitly and even present a few characters who still use occasional words of the dialect of the old Italian ghettos, a kind of Italian analogue of Ladino or of Yiddish that was once spoken in Rome, Livorno, Ferrara, Venice, Ancona, and a few smaller cities.

The Jewish community of Ferrara has an ancient history. When Ferrara was ruled by the enlightened Este princes, its ghetto was a great center of Jewish learning. Even in our age, many Ferrarese Jewish families bore obviously local names, those of neighboring cities where Jews had been allowed to reside ever since the Middle Ages: Fano, Ravenna, Pesaro, Camerino, Veneziani, Bassani. With few exceptions, these Jews belonged, until Fascist measures upset the structure of the community, to the more prosperous local bourgeoisie of professional men and merchants. Many of them had been active patriots at the time of the Italian Risorgimento, in the 19th century; after 1920, many had even been Fascists and had participated in the movement's campaigns against Communism and Socialism. Suddenly, these Jews found themselves, in 1938, deprived of their rights as Italian citizens. Under the short-lived Fascist Republic, toward the end of World War II, nearly two hundred Ferrarese Jews, practically half the community, were rounded up and deported to extermination

camps in Germany and Poland. Very few survivors returned from this ordeal.

ONE of Bassani's stories* deals with the unwelcome return of a lone survivor to a post-war Ferrara where everyone is intent on forgetting the past. At first, nobody recognizes Geo Jozs, a disconcertingly grotesque Jewish Banquo's ghost who has become, as a consequence of hunger and deprivations, quite monstrously obese. His half-crazed behavior causes universal embarrassment, even to his own surviving relatives, whether they had been conformists and good Fascists and thus managed to escape deportation by assuring themselves the protection of Fascist friends, or active anti-Fascists who had joined the underground movement and fought among the Partisans. In pressing his claims for restitution of his murdered father's home and business firm, Geo Jozs is tactless and arouses all sorts of hostilities. He is a stuffed shirt, begins to dress conspicuously well, tries to behave as if the clock would simply be set back a few years, and makes tactless remarks about the beards of the former Partisans who, having been unable to shave regularly when they were living in the *maquis*, now flaunt their rugged appearance as a mark of distinction. Geo Jozs is indeed a problem to all, until, for some mysterious reason, his pose breaks down, and the pent-up bitterness within him suddenly boils over and he slaps the face of a former Fascist in public. After this scandal, Geo Jozs is seen for a while wearing again, every day, the shocking rags in which he had returned from deportation. He sits around all day in a café, recounting endlessly the macabre details of his family's extermination. Then he disappears for good, as mysteriously as he had returned, abandoning his home, his business, and everything that he had regained.

*To be published in COMMENTARY in the near future.—Ed.

The four other stories in Bassani's book all present equally inadequate Jewish characters. It is as if the author, one of postwar Italy's most remarkable poets and the editor of the Italian section of American-born Princess Gaetani de Bassiano's *Botteghe Oscure*, were intent on pointing out that the burden a Jew must bear is too heavy for any ordinary human being. The four hundred Jews of Ferrara seem to have been lonely souls, misunderstood by their more numerous Christian neighbors, puzzling to their Gentile wives or mistresses, unable even to understand themselves. Only one or two elderly characters, in these stories, continue to dwell like living anachronisms in the old ghetto, speak its special jargon, remain true to their ancestral faith and traditions, and seem content.

Bassani describes for us, with great sensitivity and an unusual gift for significant psychological and political detail, the death throes of a dying community. We feel that it was doomed to disappear, even if Fascism had not so brutally hastened its dissolution. In discussing the absurdities and crimes of his Jewish or Gentile characters, Bassani explains their motives but never condemns. His understanding of human cowardice and folly are indeed remarkable. Though he reduces tragedy to the proportions of petty local scandal, he views with infinite compassion this whole tiny doomed world. Nor is his realism, in this respect, different from that of other Italian storytellers. A *verista* writing in the same tradition as Verga, Pirandello, and Silone, he remains a regionalist whose special milieu, instead of being that of the peasants of Sicily or of the Abruzzi, is the Jewish middle class of Ferrara that produced learned rabbis a couple of centuries ago, many distinguished professional men in the past hundred years, and, if rumor can be trusted, Fascist Air Marshal Italo Balbo in our own age.

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